zupt/THREAT_MODEL.md

VaptVupt threat model

Plain-English description of what VaptVupt protects against, what it doesn't, and what assumptions you're making when you use it.

This document is for users and downstream packagers. Read it before trusting VaptVupt with anything you can't afford to lose.

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TL;DR

VaptVupt is designed for at-rest backup encryption by someone who controls the machine doing the encryption and the machine doing the extraction. It is not a network protocol, a multi-party scheme, or a substitute for full-disk encryption.

Use case	VaptVupt is appropriate?
Backing up files to an untrusted cloud (S3, Backblaze, Google Drive)	Yes
Backing up a disk image to external media you might lose	Yes
Long-term archival of personal/business data	Yes
Sharing an encrypted archive with someone you trust to handle the key	Yes, with care (see "Key distribution" below)
Real-time encrypted communication	No (use Signal, age, or TLS)
Multi-party access (n-of-m)	No (no threshold scheme)
Hiding the existence of an archive (steganography)	No (archive header has fixed magic bytes)
Protecting against a hostile machine you're encrypting on	No (a compromised host can read plaintext before encryption)

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Modes referenced in this document

• -p / password mode: symmetric encryption with a key derived from a password. The default build derives the key with PBKDF2-SHA256 (600k iterations). Argon2id is available only in an upstream make WITH_SDK=1 build against the separately distributed libraries.
• --pq: native post-quantum mode (ML-KEM-768 + X25519), the PQ mode in the default build. The ML-KEM-768 implementation is in-tree.
• --pq-sdk / --pq-box: optional post-quantum modes backed by the separately distributed libzuptsdk / libpqvaptvupt libraries. Available only in a make WITH_SDK=1 build. Key files for these modes are produced by vaptvupt keygen --sdk, also SDK-only.

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What VaptVupt protects against

1. Confidentiality of archive contents (encrypted mode)

An attacker with read access to the archive bytes cannot recover plaintext file contents, file names, file sizes, file modes, or embedded comments without the key/password, assuming:

• The chosen mode is one of the encrypted modes (-p, --pq, or the optional --pq-sdk / --pq-box)
• The password is strong enough to resist offline brute-force (see "Password strength" below)
• The key file (for --pq-sdk / --pq-box) was not compromised at generation time

2. Integrity of every byte of an encrypted archive

If any single bit of the on-disk archive bytes is flipped, the extraction fails with an authentication error. Coverage layers:

• Per-block HMAC-SHA256 with frame-preface AAD (F-09): every data block carries an HMAC over its ciphertext and over the canonical 29-byte preface (block_type, codec_id, block_flags, sizes, plaintext-XXH64)
• Archive Integrity Trailer (F-08): HMAC-SHA256 over the 64-byte header and 24 bytes of footer, appended after the footer
• Strict structural validation of the encryption-header block (F-09): codec must be STORE, flags must be 0, csz must equal usz, the plaintext XXH64 must match

3. Tamper detection on plaintext archives (best-effort)

Plaintext archives (no -p, no --pq*) are protected by XXH64 plaintext checksums per block plus structural validation. This is not cryptographic integrity — a determined attacker with write access can produce a tampered plaintext archive that passes the checksum (XXH64 is not collision-resistant). It does catch accidental corruption and naive tampering.

Use an encrypted mode if you need cryptographic integrity.

4. Authentication failure indistinguishability (F-11)

The default error message for "wrong password", "wrong PQ key", and "actual header tamper" is the same single line:

Error: Authentication failed (wrong key, wrong password, or tampered archive).

This prevents an attacker who can issue extraction attempts from learning which check failed first via the stderr output. Timing is also constant (HMAC is always run, branchless return).

The detailed cause is available via --verbose for debugging on machines under the user's own control.

5. Post-quantum forward secrecy (--pq and optional --pq-sdk)

The native --pq mode uses ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) hybridized with X25519 via an HKDF combiner. Archives encrypted today cannot be decrypted by a future quantum adversary holding only the ciphertext, assuming:

• ML-KEM-768 retains its claimed security level (NIST Category 3, 192-bit classical / 96-bit quantum strength)
• X25519 hybridization protects against an unforeseen ML-KEM break
• The recipient's private key is not later compromised

The optional --pq-sdk mode provides the same hybrid guarantee via the separately distributed SDK libraries.

6. Side-channel resistance for cryptographic primitives

The hot crypto paths (AES-256-CTR, HMAC-SHA256 comparison, X25519 field operations, ML-KEM polynomial arithmetic) are implemented in Jasmin and proved constant-time at the assembly level on x86_64. Non-Jasmin platforms (aarch64, fallback x86_64) use C implementations that avoid secret-dependent branches and memory accesses where feasible — but without formal proof.

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What VaptVupt does NOT protect against

1. Compromised endpoints

VaptVupt cannot protect against:

• Malware on the machine doing the encryption (it sees plaintext before any crypto is applied)
• Malware on the machine doing the extraction (it sees plaintext after decryption)
• A hardware keylogger capturing the password
• A compromised user account that can read your files or ~/.zupt-key directly
• Cold-boot attacks on running machines

If you don't trust the machine, VaptVupt cannot help.

2. Key compromise

If the password or ~/.zupt-key is leaked:

• All archives encrypted with that key are decryptable
• VaptVupt has no forward secrecy across archives — each archive is encrypted under a single static key derived from the password or stored in the key file
• There is no key-rotation feature; rotate by re-encrypting archives under a new password/key and securely deleting the old password/key

For high-value, long-term archives, treat the key file as you would a master password: store it offline, encrypt it under another layer (e.g. on an encrypted USB), and rotate periodically.

3. Password strength

Password mode derives the key with PBKDF2-SHA256 (600k iterations) in the default build, or Argon2id in a make WITH_SDK=1 build. A key derivation function slows offline guessing but does not make a short, common password safe: a determined attacker with GPU clusters or cloud compute can still exhaust a weak password.

Use a long, high-entropy password — a multi-word diceware passphrase or a random 16+ character string with a full alphabet. For critical data, use a key-file mode (native --pq, or the optional --pq-sdk with a random key file from vaptvupt keygen --sdk) so the key is CSPRNG output, not derived from human-typed text.

4. Metadata leakage from archive structure

Even with encryption, an attacker who can see the archive bytes can infer:

• Approximate file count (from total_blocks in the footer)
• Total archive size (file size on disk)
• Whether the archive is encrypted at all (ZUPT_FLAG_ENCRYPTED in the global flags is visible)
• Whether the archive is solid or per-file mode (visible flag)
• Whether post-quantum mode is in use (visible flag)
• Approximate file size distribution (block sizes are visible even when block payloads are encrypted)
• Archive creation time (a 64-bit timestamp in the header)
• A random 16-byte UUID per archive (no information leak, but globally identifies the archive across copies)

If metadata privacy matters, layer VaptVupt under another tool that hides bulk metadata (e.g., put the .zupt file inside a fixed-size encrypted container).

5. Network attacks

VaptVupt is not a network protocol. There is no:

• Forward-secure session establishment (use TLS or Noise)
• Mutual authentication of remote parties (use signed messages or TLS client certs)
• Replay protection across sessions (archives can be replayed by an attacker who can write to the destination)
• Network-layer encryption (use TLS to transport .zupt files)

6. Multi-party schemes

There is no threshold cryptography, no n-of-m sharing, no multi-party computation, no proxy re-encryption. Each archive has exactly one decryption credential (one password OR one recipient key). To give two people access to the same archive, they must share the password or the key file.

7. Plausible deniability / hidden volumes

VaptVupt archives have a fixed 6-byte magic \x90\x5a\x55\x50\x54\x01 at offset 0. Anyone scanning the bytes can see it's a VaptVupt archive. VaptVupt has no hidden-volume or duress-password feature.

8. Side channels we don't claim to address

• Power analysis (relevant for embedded targets, not commodity desktops)
• Electromagnetic emanation
• Acoustic side channels
• Network timing of upload patterns
• Filesystem-level metadata (mtime/atime of the .zupt file)

9. Trusted setup of post-quantum primitives

The in-tree ML-KEM-768 implementation was not independently audited at the time of writing. We use NIST KAT vectors for correctness verification but have not formally proven constant-time properties for every PQ code path.

For maximum assurance, treat the post-quantum layer as a hedge — it does not replace the X25519 layer; both must be broken for an attacker to recover plaintext.

10. Format extension attacks

The format is versioned (v1.6). Older readers may accept newer archives in unexpected ways. We try to maintain forward compatibility, but a careful attacker who can produce malformed-but-just-valid archives may find parser-state issues that don't rise to the level of a CVE. The fuzzing harness (make fuzz-format) is the primary mitigation; report bugs.

11. Compression-side-channel attacks (CRIME / BREACH style)

VaptVupt compresses before encryption. If an attacker can:

• Influence part of the plaintext (e.g. inject a known prefix)
• Observe the resulting archive size precisely

then they can use the compression ratio to learn information about the rest of the plaintext — this is the classic CRIME/BREACH attack against TLS compression.

VaptVupt is designed for offline backup, where attacker-controlled plaintext injection is rare. If your threat model includes attacker-chosen plaintext mixed with secret plaintext in the same archive, use --no-compress (codec 0 = STORE) to disable the LZ codec and eliminate this side channel.

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Cryptographic assumptions

VaptVupt's security rests on the following standard assumptions:

Assumption	What breaks if it fails
AES-256-CTR is a secure stream cipher	All encrypted archives become readable
HMAC-SHA256 is a secure PRF / MAC	Tamper detection fails; integrity can be forged
PBKDF2-SHA256 (or Argon2id, WITH_SDK) is a secure password KDF	Password-mode archives become brute-forceable faster
ML-KEM-768 retains NIST Category 3 security	--pq / --pq-sdk reduce to the X25519 layer
X25519 retains 128-bit security (no quantum)	PQ modes reduce to the ML-KEM layer; classical password mode unaffected
HKDF-SHA256 is a secure key-derivation construction	Combined PQ + classical keys may be predictable
SHA3 / SHAKE retain pre-image and collision resistance	Auxiliary protocol bindings may be forged

If you don't trust one of these primitives, VaptVupt cannot protect you. We rely on the same primitives the broader cryptographic community has standardized.

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Reporting security issues

Email sac@securityops.co with the subject VaptVupt security report. PGP key available on request.

We will:

• Acknowledge receipt within 7 days
• Investigate and publish a CVE / advisory if warranted
• Credit you in the CHANGELOG if you wish

Please don't open public issues for security reports until we've coordinated disclosure. For non-security bugs (parser edge cases, documentation typos, performance issues), open a public issue normally.

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Document version

This threat model covers archive format v1.6 as shipped in VaptVupt 4.1.0. It is part of the source tree (THREAT_MODEL.md) and versioned with the project; this section will be updated as the format evolves.