zupt/packaging/debian/changelog

vaptvupt (5.0.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=high

  * ML-KEM-768 is now genuinely FIPS 203-conformant. Earlier releases shipped
    round-3 CRYSTALS-Kyber under a "FIPS 203" label; it was secure but not
    interoperable. Fixed a transposed matrix-A sampling convention (keygen +
    encrypt), the round-3 KDF, and the implicit-rejection domain. Validated
    byte-for-byte against OpenSSL 3.5's FIPS 203 ML-KEM-768 in both
    cross-decapsulation directions (tests/test_mlkem_fips203.sh, in make check).
  * BREAKING: --pq / --pq-only keys and archives from <= 4.2.1 no longer decrypt
    (the KEM math changed). Regenerate keys and re-encrypt. Password mode and
    plain compression are unaffected; wire format stays v1.6.
  * Security: compress -p <archive> <files> data-loss guard (was overwriting an
    input file); compress <archive> <dir> -p <pw> silent-plaintext guard; heap
    OOB read in the AVX2 decoder fast path bounded; overflow-safe bound in the
    solid-mode test path; secret-wipe on hybrid-decrypt key-read error.
  * GUI reworked for the source-only build: build-aware Hybrid/Full-PQ selector
    (no more SDK-mode defaults that fail), PQ-key auto-detect on Extract/Verify,
    thread-safety + About fixes.
  * Truthful banner/help (real default KDF); cross-platform packaging.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Fri, 10 Jul 2026 18:00:00 +0000

vaptvupt (4.2.1-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Fix: `vaptvupt info` mislabelled full post-quantum (--pq-only, enc_type
    0x06) archives as "PQ Hybrid (ML-KEM-768 + X25519)". Full-PQ archives
    set the generic ZUPT_FLAG_PQ_HYBRID header flag, but info only checked
    that flag. info now reads the real enc_type from the encryption-header
    block and reports the actual mode ("ML-KEM-768 only, no classical
    layer" for --pq-only; hybrid / SDK-v2 / sealed-box otherwise).
    Reader-side only — no wire-format change; existing 4.2.0 archives are
    relabelled with no re-encryption.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Fri, 10 Jul 2026 12:00:00 +0000

vaptvupt (4.2.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=high

  * New native full (pure) post-quantum mode --pq-only: ML-KEM-768 (FIPS
    203) as the sole key-establishment mechanism, no classical X25519
    component (envelope type 0x06; archive key SHA3-512(ml_ss || ml_ct ||
    "ZUPT-PQ-ONLY-v1")). For compliance postures that require a single
    NIST-standardised PQ primitive with no classical KEM in the envelope
    (CNSA 2.0-style "PQ-only"). Keys via keygen --pq-only (ZPQK magic;
    not interchangeable with hybrid --pq keys). Hybrid --pq remains the
    recommended default; --pq-only has no classical fallback, so a break
    of ML-KEM-768 alone breaks the archive. In-tree, default build.
  * Security (critical): AES-256-CTR keystream reuse under --dedup. Dedup
    blocks all use sequence 0, so the previous nonce (base_nonce XOR seq)
    collapsed to a single value across blocks, reusing the CTR keystream
    (a many-time-pad). Each block now uses a fresh random 128-bit nonce
    stored in the block prefix and bound into the block MAC; block_seq is
    still bound as MAC AAD. Regression test tests/test_dedup_nonce.sh.
    Re-encrypt any --dedup encrypted archives written by <= 4.1.0.
  * keygen --sdk / --box on a source-only build now fails with a clear
    message pointing to native --pq / --pq-only (or a WITH_SDK=1 build).
  * Wire format v1.6 unchanged; the 0x06 envelope is additive.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Thu, 09 Jul 2026 12:00:00 +0000

vaptvupt (4.1.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=high

  * Source-only build: the prebuilt vendored libraries libzuptsdk.so and
    libpqvaptvupt.so are removed; the package builds with no external
    library dependency and ships no shared object. The default password
    KDF is PBKDF2-SHA256 (600k); the Argon2id KDF and the --pq-sdk /
    --pq-box modes are gated behind an upstream WITH_SDK=1 build. Native
    --pq (ML-KEM-768 + X25519) is unchanged.
  * Fix: multithreaded encrypted archives were unextractable on the
    native AEAD path — the parallel workers now bind the F-09 frame-
    preface AAD like the serial path. Byte-identical across thread counts.
  * Security: LZH raw code-length stack overflow and huff_lut OOB;
    integer-overflow heap OOB reads in the index and solid-mode parsers;
    SEQ decoder safe-zone heap overflow; per-block ENCRYPTED-flag
    authentication gate; PBKDF2 iteration-count DoS cap; non-elidable
    secret wipe; restored disk images created 0600. Wire format v1.6.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Tue, 07 Jul 2026 12:00:00 +0000

vaptvupt (4.0.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=high

  * Codec upgraded to canonical VaptVupt 2.60.4 (security release):
    fixes a high-severity OOB heap write in the AVX2 decode fast path
    on exact-content_size buffers; brings CBMC-verified BCJ filters
    with automatic ELF/PE/Mach-O detection. Ratio gate verified
    byte-identical on identical inputs. New regression suite: 80
    exact-size decode cases under ASan + BCJ roundtrips.
  * F-16 (data loss, pre-existing, fixed): archives created by <= 3.8.0
    at -l 8/-l 9 whose inputs included executables may be undecodable
    by any version (write-time defect in the old divergent BCJ
    encoder). Re-create such archives with 4.0.0 and verify extraction
    before deleting sources. Readers <= 3.8.0 cannot open new archives
    where the auto-filter fired (L3+ on executables).
  * New --pq-box recipient encryption (envelope 0x05) via vendored
    libpqvaptvupt 0.6.0: ML-KEM-768 + X25519 combined through
    HKDF-SHA256 with domain separation; magic-tagged keypair files;
    13/13 adversarial checks; ASan/UBSan clean. keygen --box generates
    keypairs. Legacy --pq and --pq-sdk unchanged and re-verified.
  * SHA-NI measured on capable silicon: SHA-256 5.8x over scalar
    (204 -> 1184 MB/s); the v3.2.0 [ESTIMATED] label is retired.
    Encrypted per-block throughput ~2x the 3.8.0-era figure.
  * Toolchain: clang strict build restored (Jasmin .s assembled with
    as(1)); vendored codec under explicit upstream warning policy;
    test-asan link fixed (vv_bcj.c); codec license comment corrected
    to GPL-3.0-or-later.
  * Wire format v1.6 unchanged; 8-mode back-compat matrix byte-exact.
    26 test suites green; NIST/RFC vectors 16/16.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Wed, 10 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.8.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Documentation-only release. No source, crypto, or wire-format change
    (format v1.6); the binary behaves identically to 3.7.0.
  * Add BENCHMARKS.md: a consolidated, reproducible, measured benchmark
    set with the test machine and method stated for every table —
    compression ratio + encode/decode throughput at level 9 across the
    5-fixture suite; encode-speed-vs-level trade-off; encryption overhead
    separating the one-time KDF (Argon2id ~741 ms, PBKDF2 ~1562 ms on the
    test box) from per-block crypto (~147 MB/s) and plain throughput
    (~944 MB/s single-threaded); and a head-to-head ratio comparison
    against zstd-3/zstd-19 that plainly shows where VaptVupt loses.
  * The SHA-NI speedup is explicitly marked [ESTIMATED] because the test
    box has no SHA-NI. Previously the only documented benchmarks were
    codec-ratio numbers dated v3.1.0; the crypto-path data measured
    across 3.2.0-3.7.0 had never been consolidated.
  * README benchmark section re-dated v3.1.0 -> v3.8.0 and linked to
    BENCHMARKS.md. Test surface unchanged: test_vectors 16/0, F-09
    0/1827, F-06 0/2000.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Sun, 01 Jun 2026 17:30:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.7.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Route the ML-KEM-768 decapsulation implicit-rejection comparison
    through the single audited constant-time primitive zupt_ct_memeq
    (introduced in 3.5.0 for the MAC tag compare), replacing an inline
    byte-OR loop over the 1088-byte ciphertext. A timing leak in this
    comparison is a KEM decapsulation oracle (distinguishing valid from
    invalid ciphertexts), which would break IND-CCA2 security; it is now
    the same measured-constant-time code path as the MAC compare. This
    was the last security-critical comparison still using a bespoke
    inline loop.
  * ML-KEM output semantics are unchanged: zupt_ct_memeq returns equality
    and the implicit-rejection fail bit is derived as (1 - equal), so a
    matching ciphertext yields the success shared secret and a mismatched
    one yields the pseudorandom rejection key, exactly as before.
    Verified by the FIPS 203 roundtrip (5 trials), the implicit-rejection
    vector, PQ-hybrid roundtrip, and wrong-key rejection.
  * Extend tests/test_ct_timing to cover the 1088-byte comparison and add
    a source-routing guard that fails if the decaps compare stops using
    zupt_ct_memeq or a raw 1088-byte inline loop reappears. The 1088-byte
    dudect numbers are reported as INFORMATIONAL, not pass/fail: at that
    size on a shared vCPU the signal is dominated by memory effects and
    plain memcmp is no longer a cleanly-leaking control, so the
    environment-relative ratio that is meaningful at 32 bytes does not
    transfer. Constant-timeness of the 1088-byte compare instead follows
    rigorously from the 32-byte pass plus zupt_ct_memeq being
    length-independent by construction (OR-accumulate, no early exit, no
    data-dependent branch) plus the source-routing guard.
  * No cryptographic-correctness change, no wire-format change (v1.6).
    test_vectors 16/0; F-09 byte sweep 0/1827; F-06 HMAC fuzz 0/2000.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Sun, 01 Jun 2026 16:30:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.6.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Add NIST SP 800-38A AES-256-CTR known-answer vectors (F.5.5 encrypt,
    F.5.6 decrypt) to the test_vectors suite. AES is the bulk cipher but
    was previously only tested indirectly via roundtrips; it now has a
    standards KAT that validates zupt_aes256_ctr on BOTH the Jasmin
    AES-NI path (zupt_aes256_ctr4 + zupt_aes256_blk, x86_64) and the C
    T-table fallback. Confirms the Jasmin AES is correct against the
    standard (closing the stale "stack-offset" concern). userPreferences
    list SP 800-38A as a required vector; this closes that gap.
  * Fix an inverted result check in the ML-KEM-768 self-test reporting:
    zupt_mlkem768_selftest() returns 0 on success / -1 on failure, but
    test_vectors checked `if (ok)` and so printed "OK" precisely when the
    self-test FAILED (and would have printed FAIL on success). The check
    is now `if (rc == 0)`. The test had been passing vacuously.
  * Fix the ML-KEM-768 NTT roundtrip self-test itself. It asserted
    ntt∘inv_ntt == identity, which is false for this pqcrystals/Kyber
    Montgomery convention (forward ntt divides by R without a prior
    to-Montgomery map, so the roundtrip recovers each coefficient scaled
    by a fixed constant R^-1 mod q). The self-test now verifies the real
    invariant — a CONSISTENT linear scaling across all 256 coefficients —
    which still catches genuine NTT bugs (wrong zeta/index) while no
    longer emitting a misleading "NTT roundtrip FAILED" line on stderr.
    ML-KEM correctness end-to-end was never affected: the K-PKE and KEM
    roundtrips and the FIPS 203 roundtrip vectors all pass.
  * test_vectors now reports 16 passed, 0 failed (was 14, one vacuous).
    No source-crypto behaviour change, no wire-format change (v1.6).
    F-09 byte sweep 0/1827, F-06 HMAC fuzz 0/2000.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Sun, 01 Jun 2026 15:30:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.5.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Measured constant-time MAC comparison (dudect-style). The MAC tag
    compare — the most timing-sensitive operation, where a leak is a
    forgery oracle — was previously implemented as three duplicated
    inline byte-OR loops marked /* CT-REQUIRED */ but never measured.
    Consolidated into a single audited primitive zupt_ct_memeq() (OR-
    accumulate, no early exit, volatile sink so the optimiser cannot
    reintroduce a branch), used by the v1.6 strict decrypt path and the
    F-08 archive-integrity-trailer check.
  * New dudect-style timing test tests/test_ct_timing.{c,sh}: Welch's
    t-test over fixed-equal vs random-differing tag classes, built at
    -O2 (the shipped optimisation level). Verdict is environment-
    relative — zupt_ct_memeq's data-dependent timing signal must be a
    small fraction (<=20%) of leaky memcmp measured in the same
    environment; it lands near 1%. A positive control (memcmp) confirms
    the harness can detect a real leak; if the host is too coarse the
    test reports INCONCLUSIVE rather than passing vacuously. Wired into
    make check and make test.
  * Pure internal hardening: turns an asserted constant-time property
    into a measured one and a regression guard (a future early-return
    refactor fails the t-test). No cryptographic-correctness change, no
    wire-format change (v1.6). F-09 byte sweep 0/1827, F-06 HMAC fuzz
    0/2000. The formally-verified Jasmin zupt_mac_verify_ct path for the
    v1.4/v1.5 legacy compare is unchanged.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Sun, 01 Jun 2026 14:30:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.4.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * F-15: Argon2id KDF parameter transparency. The 0x04 Argon2id
    enc-header previously recorded only [type|salt|nonce] and nothing
    about the KDF cost, unlike the PBKDF2 header which records its
    iteration count — a latent robustness problem for a long-lived
    archive format (if the Argon2id preset ever changed, old archives
    could become silently undecryptable). New archives append a one-byte
    KDF profile descriptor at offset 33 (ZUPT_ARGON2_PROFILE_MODERATE),
    making the header self-describing. The descriptor is covered by the
    F-08 archive-integrity trailer, so it cannot be stripped or forged
    without failing authentication.
  * Back-compatible (additive): the legacy reader checks enc_hdr_len>=33
    and reads fixed offsets, so it ignores the trailing byte; existing
    33-byte Argon2id archives decrypt unchanged. New readers validate the
    profile and refuse an unknown value (fail-closed) rather than
    guessing a derivation. Verified byte-exact on pre-3.4.0 encrypted
    archives.
  * New regression test tests/test_kdf_transparency.{c,sh} (5 checks),
    including a build-time KDF cost-floor + determinism guard that fails
    if the vendored SDK is swapped for a non-memory-hard stand-in. Wired
    into make check and make test.
  * No cryptographic-correctness change, no wire-format change (v1.6);
    F-09 byte sweep 0/1827, F-06 HMAC fuzz 0/2000. 23/23 suites green.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Sun, 01 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.3.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Incremental HMAC-SHA256 for the per-block Encrypt-then-MAC hot path.
    Adds zupt_hmac_sha256_init/update/final: the ipad/opad key-prefix
    blocks are folded once per keyring (not once per block), and the
    MAC is streamed segment-by-segment (aad || nonce || ciphertext ||
    seq) instead of being concatenated into a freshly malloc'd buffer.
    Removes a per-block malloc + full-ciphertext memcpy on BOTH the
    encrypt and decrypt sides (for 4 MB blocks: a 4 MB malloc + 4 MB
    copy per block per direction), and stops copying secret plaintext-
    derived ciphertext into a second heap buffer.
  * Byte-identical MAC: RFC 2104 + SHA-256 Merkle-Damgard make streamed
    updates equal to a single concatenated hash. Verified by RFC 4231
    vectors, a new equivalence test, and byte-exact decryption of
    archives produced by 3.2.0 and earlier. No wire-format change
    (format v1.6); F-09 byte sweep 0/1827, F-06 HMAC fuzz 0/2000.
  * The one-shot zupt_hmac_sha256 is now a thin wrapper over the
    incremental API (single source of truth; used by the AIT and other
    once-per-archive sites).
  * New regression test tests/test_hmac_incremental.{c,sh} wired into
    make check and make test. ASan clean on both KDF paths.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Sun, 01 Jun 2026 12:30:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.2.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * SHA-256 hardware acceleration (Intel SHA-NI). Adds an
    SHA256RNDS2/MSG1/MSG2 compression-function path
    (src/zupt_sha256_shani.c) with runtime CPUID dispatch
    (has_shani, CPUID.07H:EBX[29]) and a multi-block update() that
    feeds full blocks straight to the hardware. Accelerates the
    Encrypt-then-MAC second pass (HMAC-SHA256) and PBKDF2 on CPUs
    with the SHA Extensions (Intel Goldmont+/Ice Lake+, AMD Zen+).
    Bit-identical output to the scalar path; the scalar C fallback
    runs everywhere SHA-NI is absent (incl. aarch64).
  * Security: SHA-NI is constant-time by construction (no data-
    dependent memory access or branches), strengthening the side-
    channel posture of HMAC verification over attacker-influenced
    ciphertext relative to the table-free-but-scalar software path.
  * Validation: the 64 SHA-NI round constants are verified bit-
    identical to the scalar K[] table; NIST FIPS 180-4 vectors pass
    on both paths; streaming-split == one-shot across lengths
    0..4096. New regression test tests/test_sha256_shani.{c,sh}
    wired into make check and make test.
  * No wire-format change: same SHA-256, same HMAC, same bytes.
    Format stays v1.6; 3.1.x archives extract unchanged.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Sun, 01 Jun 2026 11:00:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.1.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Integrate VaptVupt LZ + ANS codec 2.48.5 -> 2.53.3. Codec API is
    byte-identical (vaptvupt.h and all vv_*.h unchanged); only vv_ans.c,
    vv_decoder.c, vv_encoder.c changed. Brings the optimal parser
    (measured: text -1.95%, binary -1.31%, source -4.72% smaller),
    large-window extreme mode, faster decode (now ~on par with zstd-19),
    and 6 upstream corrupt-input decoder memory-safety fixes.
  * F-14: fix heap-buffer-overflow WRITE in the decode wrapper. Decode
    buffers were malloc(uncompressed_size) with no slack; the codec AVX2
    over-copy needs >=32 B slack per its documented contract. The old
    codec never reached it; the 2.53.3 wider AVX2 hot path does (found
    by ASan on a degenerate all-repeats input at L1). Fixed with a shared
    ZUPT_VV_DECODE_SLACK (64 B) guard on both the single-threaded
    (zupt_format.c) and parallel (zupt_parallel.c) decode paths.
  * vv_decoder.c scalar/non-AVX2 build is now -Wall -Wextra -Werror clean
    (3 AVX2-only safe-zone vars guarded with #if VV_INLINE_AVX2) — fixes
    a -Werror break on the aarch64/Termux scalar target.
  * Removed the unverified "1.27x zstd-3 decode" claim from help/version
    output and README; replaced with our own measured numbers.
  * New regression test tests/test_vv_decode_slack.sh (7 assertions),
    wired into make check and make test.
  * Wire format unchanged (v1.6); 3.0.3 archives extract byte-exact.
    19/19 suites green; ASan 24/24 single-threaded + 15/15 multi-threaded;
    300-trial bit-flip fuzz: 0 crashes. F-09 byte sweep 0/1827.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Sat, 31 May 2026 12:00:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.0.3-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Static-analysis cleanup pass:
    - Removed dead AND-branch in zupt_decode_varint() and
      zupt_read_varint() (the `&& (x&0x80)` part of the s>=64
      overflow check was unreachable since the preceding
      `if(!(x&0x80))return n;` already handles the terminator
      case). Behaviour identical; flagged by cppcheck as
      `knownConditionTrueFalse`.
    - Explicit (tcflag_t) cast on the ECHO bit-clear in
      prompt_password() to silence -Wsign-conversion.
    - Explicit (size_t) cast on zupt_encode_varint return value
      in zupt_disk_backup() — matches the convention used in
      zupt_format.c.
  * Our (non-vendored) C source now compiles cleanly under:
      gcc -Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -Wshadow -Wcast-align
          -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wnull-dereference
          -Wformat=2 -Wlogical-op -Wjump-misses-init -Wdouble-promotion
          -Woverlength-strings -Wconversion -Wsign-conversion -Werror
    on 9 source files. Vendored vv_*.c, fips202.c, and zupt_mlkem.c
    are kept under the upstream warning policy.
  * New regression test tests/test_static_analysis.sh (7 assertions)
    wires up cppcheck warning+performance level, error-level, and
    pattern-level checks for the v3.0.3 dead-code findings.
    Skipped gracefully if cppcheck is not installed. Wired into
    make check and make test.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Mon, 26 May 2026 15:00:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.0.2-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * F-13: split usage() string literal to stay under C99's 4095-char
    limit (was 4121 chars, triggering -Woverlength-strings). Five
    logical fprintf sections (synopsis, compress opts, extract opts,
    examples, footer) — readable and maintainable.
  * Help text refreshed: examples now use `vaptvupt` (not legacy
    `zupt`), default codec described as "VaptVupt LZ + ANS 2.48.5"
    (was stale "LZ77 + Huffman"), license attribution corrected to
    "AGPL-3.0-or-later (VaptVupt)" (was "(Zupt)"), commercial-
    licensing contact added, format-version line added.
  * -Woverlength-strings now in the default CFLAGS — F-13 type
    regressions caught at compile time.
  * New regression test tests/test_help_consistency.sh (10 assertions):
    parses src/zupt_main.c for the longest fprintf string-literal,
    checks help output for command-name consistency, codec naming,
    license attribution, KDF default, and format-version reporting.
    Wired into make check and make test.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Mon, 26 May 2026 14:00:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.0.1-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * GUI license cleanup: removed MIT-license credit line from the
    about panel (the GUI is AGPL-3.0-or-later with commercial dual-
    licensing; the MIT reference was a templating mistake). Replaced
    gui/LICENSE-GUI (was MIT) with AGPL-3.0-or-later, mirroring the
    top-level LICENSE. Top-level LICENSE preamble updated to reflect
    the v3.0.0 Zupt → VaptVupt rename.
  * GUI version-string parsing bug fix: the v3.0.0 GUI used
    `replace("zupt ", "")` to peel the product name out of the CLI's
    version banner, but that substring also appears inside the v3.0.0
    parenthetical "formerly zupt; renamed in v3.0.0", so the parser
    produced garbage. Window title, splash header, status bar and
    about-panel hero number all now display "3.0.1" cleanly. New
    anchored regex `_VERSION_RE` matches the version number only.
  * GUI about-panel enhanced: header "ZUPT" → "VAPTVUPT", crypto
    stack expanded to include Argon2id (default since v2.4.1), HKDF,
    and the VaptVupt LZ + ANS codec attribution as a separate row
    with its own copyright + license. Commercial-licensing contact
    (sac@securityops.co) now visible.
  * New regression test `tests/test_gui_branding.sh` catches future
    MIT-line resurgence, the broken `replace("zupt ", ...)` parser
    pattern, and the about-panel header still saying "ZUPT".
    Wired into `make check` and `make test`. 11 assertions.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Mon, 26 May 2026 13:00:00 +0000

vaptvupt (3.0.0-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Renamed from zupt → vaptvupt: prior INPI Brasil trademark on
    "Zupt" required a product rename. Archive extension stays .zupt
    for format continuity (header magic unchanged). The binary
    `zupt` is preserved as a symlink to `vaptvupt` for one major
    version cycle.
  * Integrated VaptVupt LZ + ANS codec 2.48.5: fixes csz==0 heap-
    buffer-overflow READ in vv_dstream_decompress_chunk (fuzzer-
    found, medium severity), UBSan-safe pointer arithmetic in
    vv_copy_match.
  * Enhanced manpage covering all v3.0.0 surface (rename rationale,
    PERFORMANCE table, threat model summary, exit codes, ENV vars).
  * GUI binary-discovery bug fix: GUI launched from desktop
    sessions with minimal PATH (no /usr/bin) now finds the binary
    correctly. Discovery log available via VAPTVUPT_DEBUG=1.
  * Format unchanged at v1.6. Bidirectional compat with 2.4.x.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Sun, 25 May 2026 13:00:00 +0000

zupt (2.4.8-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium

  * Initial Debian source package.
  * Closes F-12 (encrypted comments), continues from upstream's
    no-open-findings security baseline.

 -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Tue, 20 May 2025 12:00:00 +0000