docs: record audited 5.2.8 release evidence

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ jobs:
             tests/test_block_type_confusion.sh \
             tests/test_disk_device_capacity.sh \
             tests/test_f09_preface.sh \
+            tests/test_key_files.sh \
             tests/test_legacy_disk_5_2_1.sh \
             tests/test_path_traversal.sh \
             tests/test_pqbox.sh \
@@ -121,6 +122,8 @@ jobs:
         run: make CC=${{ matrix.cc }} V=1 WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0 check
       - name: Extended upstream tests
         run: make CC=${{ matrix.cc }} V=1 WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0 test-all
+      - name: In-tree SDK atomic key-save regression
+        run: make CC=${{ matrix.cc }} V=1 sdk-test
       - name: Functional test of the built CLI
         run: bash scripts/test-installed-zupt.sh "$PWD/zupt"
 
@@ -377,11 +380,13 @@ jobs:
           # Use osc's installed service executor to validate this standalone,
           # repository-owned _service file with the exact same local services.
           python3 - "$service_dir" <<'PY'
+          import os
           import sys
           from xml.etree import ElementTree
           from osc.obs_scm.serviceinfo import Serviceinfo
 
           service_dir = sys.argv[1]
+          os.chdir(service_dir)
           service_info = Serviceinfo()
           service_info.read(ElementTree.parse(f"{service_dir}/_service").getroot())
           raise SystemExit(service_info.execute(service_dir, "all", verbose=True))
@@ -464,6 +469,12 @@ jobs:
           test "$(rpm -qp --qf '%{ARCH}' "$gui_rpm")" = noarch
           rpm -qp --requires "$gui_rpm" | grep -Fx "zupt >= $version"
           test "$(rpm -qp --qf '%{NAME}' "$gui_srpm")" = zupt-gui
+          test "$(rpm -qp --qf '%{VERSION}-%{RELEASE}' "$gui_srpm")" = "$version-1"
+          test "$(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCEPACKAGE}' "$gui_srpm")" = 1
+          test "$(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCERPM}' "$gui_srpm")" = '(none)'
+          test "$(rpm -qpl "$gui_srpm" | wc -l)" -eq 2
+          rpm -qpl "$gui_srpm" | grep -Fx "zupt-gui-$version.tar.gz"
+          rpm -qpl "$gui_srpm" | grep -Fx zupt-gui.spec
       - name: Build the matching Fedora CLI RPM
         run: |
           version=$(sed -n 's/^#define ZUPT_VERSION_STRING "\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' include/zupt.h)

.github/workflows/cross-platform.yml

@@ -86,20 +86,33 @@ jobs:
           trap 'chmod -R u+rwX "$test_root" 2>/dev/null || true; rm -rf -- "$test_root"' EXIT
           output_dir="$test_root/saída-安全"
           archive="$test_root/cópia-安全.zupt"
+          emoji_name=$'emoji-\xF0\x9F\x98\x80.bin'
           mkdir -p "$test_root/input/subdir" "$output_dir"
           printf 'Windows release smoke test\n' > "$test_root/input/café.txt"
           printf 'UTF-8: café-安全\n' > "$test_root/input/subdir/ação-安全.txt"
-          printf 'emoji filename\n' > "$test_root/input/subdir/emoji-😀.bin"
+          printf 'emoji filename\n' > "$test_root/input/subdir/$emoji_name"
           : > "$test_root/input/empty"
           dd if=/dev/urandom of="$test_root/input/subdir/random.bin" bs=4096 count=4 2>/dev/null
           (cd "$test_root" && "$exe" compress "$archive" input)
           "$exe" test "$archive"
           "$exe" list "$archive" > "$test_root/list.txt" 2>&1
-          grep -F 'café.txt' "$test_root/list.txt"
-          grep -F 'ação-安全.txt' "$test_root/list.txt"
-          grep -F 'emoji-😀.bin' "$test_root/list.txt"
           "$exe" extract -o "$output_dir" "$archive"
           diff -r "$test_root/input" "$output_dir/input"
+          python3 - "$test_root/list.txt" <<'PY'
+          import pathlib
+          import sys
+
+          listing = pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).read_bytes()
+          expected = {
+              "Latin-1": bytes.fromhex("636166c3a92e747874"),
+              "BMP": bytes.fromhex("61c3a7c3a36f2de5ae89e585a82e747874"),
+              "non-BMP": bytes.fromhex("656d6f6a692df09f98802e62696e"),
+          }
+          missing = [label for label, name in expected.items() if name not in listing]
+          if missing:
+              raise SystemExit("list output is missing exact UTF-8 names: " +
+                               ", ".join(missing))
+          PY
           objdump -p "$exe" > "$test_root/imports.txt"
           if grep -Eqi '(vendor[/\\]|libvuptsdk|libpqvaptvupt|libgcc_s|libstdc\+\+|libwinpthread|msys-2[.]0|cygwin1)[^[:space:]]*[.]dll' \
               "$test_root/imports.txt"; then

.github/workflows/promote-release.yml

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ on:
         required: true
         type: number
       tag:
-        description: Existing annotated release tag, for example v5.2.3
+        description: Existing annotated release tag, for example v5.2.8
         required: true
         type: string
 
@@ -389,11 +389,17 @@ jobs:
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{VERSION}' "$rpm_file") == "$VERSION" ]]
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{RELEASE}' "$rpm_file") == 0 ]]
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{ARCH}' "$rpm_file") == x86_64 ]]
+          [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCEPACKAGE}' "$rpm_file") == '(none)' ]]
+          [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCERPM}' "$rpm_file") == "$srpm_name" ]]
           srpm=$asset_dir/$srpm_name
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{NAME}' "$srpm") == zupt ]]
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{VERSION}' "$srpm") == "$VERSION" ]]
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{RELEASE}' "$srpm") == 0 ]]
-          [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{ARCH}' "$srpm") == src ]]
+          [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCEPACKAGE}' "$srpm") == 1 ]]
+          [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCERPM}' "$srpm") == '(none)' ]]
+          [[ $(rpm -qpl "$srpm" | wc -l) -eq 2 ]]
+          rpm -qpl "$srpm" | grep -Fx "zupt-$VERSION.tar.gz"
+          rpm -qpl "$srpm" | grep -Fx zupt.spec
 
           gui_deb=$asset_dir/$gui_deb_name
           dpkg-deb --info "$gui_deb" >/dev/null
@@ -406,12 +412,18 @@ jobs:
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{VERSION}' "$gui_rpm") == "$VERSION" ]]
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{RELEASE}' "$gui_rpm") == 1 ]]
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{ARCH}' "$gui_rpm") == noarch ]]
+          [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCEPACKAGE}' "$gui_rpm") == '(none)' ]]
+          [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCERPM}' "$gui_rpm") == "$gui_srpm_name" ]]
           rpm -qp --requires "$gui_rpm" | grep -Fx "zupt >= $VERSION"
           gui_srpm=$asset_dir/$gui_srpm_name
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{NAME}' "$gui_srpm") == zupt-gui ]]
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{VERSION}' "$gui_srpm") == "$VERSION" ]]
           [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{RELEASE}' "$gui_srpm") == 1 ]]
-          [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{ARCH}' "$gui_srpm") == src ]]
+          [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCEPACKAGE}' "$gui_srpm") == 1 ]]
+          [[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCERPM}' "$gui_srpm") == '(none)' ]]
+          [[ $(rpm -qpl "$gui_srpm" | wc -l) -eq 2 ]]
+          rpm -qpl "$gui_srpm" | grep -Fx "zupt-gui-$VERSION.tar.gz"
+          rpm -qpl "$gui_srpm" | grep -Fx zupt-gui.spec
 
           linux_tar=$asset_dir/$linux_tar_name
           python3 - "$linux_tar" "zupt-$VERSION-linux-x86_64" <<'PY'

AUDIT.md

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 <!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later -->
-# ZUPT 5.2.3 audit guide and finding history
+# ZUPT 5.2.8 audit guide and finding history
 
 This document describes review surfaces and reproducible checks. It is an
 upstream self-review, not an independent audit, certification, or guarantee.
 `SECURITY.md` defines reporting policy and `THREAT_MODEL.md` defines the
 security boundary.
 
-## 5.2.3 scope
+## 5.2.8 scope
 
 The baseline scope is the source-only CLI and its bundled source codec:
 
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ output.
 
 ## Source-only review
 
-The 5.2.3 baseline retains the source-only boundary introduced in 5.2.2, which
+The 5.2.8 baseline retains the source-only boundary introduced in 5.2.2, which
 removed incomplete SDK/PQBOX header snapshots and local precompiled-library
 expectations. Git and new upstream source
 archives are intended to contain no compiled executable, object, shared/static
@@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ scripts/check-source-only.sh
 
 # committed Git tree or immutable tag
 scripts/check-source-only.sh --tag HEAD
-scripts/check-source-only.sh --tag v5.2.3
+scripts/check-source-only.sh --tag v5.2.8
 
 # generated source archive
-scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz
+scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz
 ```
 
 The scanner checks extensions and magic bytes, nested archives, symlink targets,
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ make -j"$(getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN 2>/dev/null || printf 1)" \
   WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0 V=1
 make WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0 check
 make WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0 test-all
+make sdk-test
 ```
 
 Relevant review layers include:
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ Relevant review layers include:
 | Archive behavior | quick/regression, traversal, argument-order, block-swap, nonce, and exact-size tests | Exercises current parser, integrity, and round-trip properties |
 | Password sources | `tests/test_password_sources.sh` | Exercises password-file, inherited-descriptor and explicit-prompt rejection paths without logging password contents |
 | Key files | native key regressions | Exercises no-replace private-file creation, POSIX mode `0600`/Windows current-user-only DACL, failed-partial behavior, checksum, and exact ZKEY/ZPQK version/flags/reserved/size/role validation |
+| SDK key publication | `make sdk-test` | Exercises atomic descriptor/handle-backed key copies, POSIX private/public modes, and symlink/hardlink target preservation; this now runs in `release-check` and hosted GCC/Clang Linux CI |
 | Terminal output | archive-comment regression | Requires displayed untrusted comments to contain no raw terminal-control sequence |
 | Prompt cleanup | PTY signal regression | Requires handled POSIX interruption to restore the saved terminal state |
 | Sanitizers | `make test-asan-run` | Builds and executes separate ASan/UBSan/LSan evidence where supported; not a substitute for normal tests |
@@ -109,7 +111,7 @@ without evidence.
 The following upstream self-audit results apply only to the 5.2.2 candidate at
 commit `ff99770` on the recorded local Linux environments. The immutable 5.2.2
 tag was not promoted after post-tag CI integration failures. These results are
-not independent certification, a 5.2.3 result, or evidence that release assets
+not independent certification, a 5.2.8 result, or evidence that release assets
 were published.
 
 | Gate | Result | Recorded evidence |
@@ -123,11 +125,147 @@ were published.
 | Mutation fuzzing | PASS | 1,000 mutation iterations completed without a sanitizer-detected crash. |
 
 An earlier off-screen GUI smoke run remains supporting evidence, but is not
-represented as an exact-`ff99770` GUI-package result. The exact 5.2.3 candidate
-must repeat the required suite. Native Windows and macOS gates, hosted GitHub CI
-and release promotion, authenticated OBS validation, and resolution of the
-openSUSE automatic `debugsource` rpmlint `no-binary` finding remain pending
-until recorded otherwise.
+represented as an exact-`ff99770` GUI-package result. The immutable 5.2.3
+candidate was not promoted because its source-policy test assumed LF for a
+Windows `.bat` checkout that correctly used CRLF.
+
+## Prior 5.2.4 exact-tag integration evidence
+
+GitHub Actions exact-tag run `33431386002` completed 12 jobs successfully. Its
+sole failed job was the openSUSE gate: the standalone `Serviceinfo` harness did
+not change into the directory containing `_service` before executing the
+service chain. Dependent native Windows and macOS jobs were therefore skipped,
+and v5.2.4 was not promoted. The tag and its record remain immutable.
+
+A separate local openSUSE Tumbleweed reproduction resolved the explicit
+`refs/tags/v5.2.4` revision to the tagged commit and, after
+`os.chdir(service_dir)`, completed `obs_scm`, `tar`, and `recompress`. It
+produced exactly one `zupt-5.2.4.tar.gz`, which passed the source-only scanner.
+This isolates a release/test harness defect; it is not evidence of a product,
+archive-format, cryptographic, codec, or SDK ABI change. It also does not turn
+the skipped native jobs into passes or transfer any result to 5.2.8.
+
+## Prior 5.2.5 exact-tag native-gate evidence
+
+The immutable `v5.2.5` candidate was not promoted. Exact-tag GitHub Actions run
+`33434986357` completed 13 jobs successfully, while its native Windows and
+macOS jobs failed. The Windows regression did not preserve every requested
+hostile path byte across its command-line boundary. The macOS gate exposed both
+an unavailable `explicit_bzero` assumption and Bash 3.2 empty-array behavior in
+the source scanner exercised by `make check`.
+
+The 5.2.6 corrections select the existing compiler-resistant volatile wipe on
+Darwin and NetBSD, guard every relevant scanner array, and make the Windows
+fixture accept explicit hexadecimal bytes, verify the full requested path in
+the archive, and reject each dangerous raw byte fragment anywhere in diagnostic
+output. These changes do not alter the archive format, cryptography, bundled
+codec, or SDK ABI.
+
+A separate local compatibility run executed the corrected scanner with genuine
+GNU Bash 3.2.57 in a clean clone. All four exercised modes completed: the
+repository audit reported 609 files and one archive; `--tree` reported 204/0;
+`--archive` reported 201/1; and `--root` plus `--tag v5.2.5` reported 810/2.
+This is targeted scanner compatibility evidence only, not exact-v5.2.6 or
+v5.2.8 hosted CI, package, native-platform, or promotion evidence.
+
+## Prior 5.2.6 exact-tag native-gate evidence
+
+The immutable `v5.2.6` candidate was not promoted. Exact-tag GitHub Actions run
+`33442264243` completed 13 jobs successfully and failed two native jobs. On
+macOS arm64, the strict SHA-NI regression build diagnosed x86-only helper
+declarations as unused under `-Werror`. On Windows, argv transcoding of the safe
+printable UTF-8 fixture caused the path regression to abort before its intended
+archive and diagnostic assertions.
+
+The 5.2.7 changes scope those helper declarations to supported x86 builds and
+carry the safe UTF-8 fixture across the Windows argument boundary without
+locale-dependent byte conversion. These are test/release integration changes,
+not archive-format, cryptographic, codec, or SDK ABI changes.
+
+## Prior 5.2.7 exact-tag native-gate evidence
+
+The immutable `v5.2.7` candidate was not promoted. Exact-tag GitHub Actions run
+`33445470664` concluded `cancelled` at `2026-08-31T23:11:19Z`, with 13
+successful jobs, one failed macOS job, and one cancelled Windows job. The macOS
+runner filesystem rejected creation of the
+raw-C1 filename fixture with `EILSEQ`. The hosted Windows job stalled in `make
+check`; a MinGW/Wine reproduction isolated the cause to
+`test --password-prompt ... </dev/null` entering `_getch`, and the remaining
+native job was cancelled.
+
+The 5.2.8 fixture treats that creation refusal as an explicit `SKIP`; on a
+filesystem that accepts the byte, the scanner must still reject the compiled
+magic and render the path without emitting the raw C1 byte. No result from the
+immutable tag transfers automatically to 5.2.8. The Windows prompt correction
+rejects a redirected/non-console standard input before entering `_getch` and
+adds a native EOF regression; it also requires fresh exact-candidate evidence.
+
+## 5.2.8 CodeQL High path-race corrections
+
+CodeQL High #5 identified SDK key-copy publication that reopened the output
+path and then applied `chmod` to that mutable name. The copy now uses the core
+atomic publisher, sets POSIX mode on the open temporary descriptor, checks
+read/close/publication failures, and replaces only the destination directory
+entry. `sdk-test` covers symlink and hardlink sentinels and expected key modes.
+
+CodeQL High #6 identified the POSIX disk-restore `lstat`-then-`open` sequence.
+Restore now opens once with `O_NOFOLLOW` and without truncation, classifies that
+descriptor with `fstat`, and retains the same raw-device descriptor through
+capacity checks and writes. Regular-file destinations retain the existing
+atomic publisher.
+
+CodeQL High #7 identified benchmark cleanup's `lstat`-then-recursive-path
+sequence. POSIX cleanup now pins each component with `openat` and removes leaves
+with `unlinkat`; Windows pins ancestors/children, opens reparse points without
+following them, recurses only into a plain directory held against rename, and
+after emptying a directory reopens it relative to the pinned parent, verifies
+its volume and file index against the traversal handle, and marks only that
+identity-checked handle for deletion. The live-workspace
+regression injects a directory symlink and verifies that its external sentinel
+survives. These are reviewed fixes and regression coverage, not independent
+certification by themselves; the exact-tag evidence is recorded below.
+
+The C/C++ default-branch analysis of commit `69fc26b` closed #5, #6, and #7,
+then reported High #8, #9, and #10 solely in the newly added SDK regression:
+its sentinel and mode checks used `stat`/`lstat` before later path operations.
+Each individual content or metadata check now opens without following links
+and uses `fstat` or reads through that already-open descriptor. A static guard
+rejects a return to path-level `stat`/`lstat` in this test. The subsequent
+C/C++ default-branch scan run `33452563116` completed successfully at commit
+`7a8e5c5`; alerts #5 through #10 are fixed, and the authenticated
+code-scanning API reported zero open alerts.
+
+Manual pre-tag CI run `33452602634` at the same functional commit completed 14
+of 15 jobs successfully. Linux compilers, analyzers, sanitizers, source policy,
+reproducibility, DEB, RPM/SRPM, portable bundles, and the native macOS DMG gate
+passed. On Windows, source audit, build, and `make check` passed; the subsequent
+smoke failed only when the old MSYS `grep` tried to match a literal non-BMP
+filename after ZUPT had compressed and verified all five inputs. Independent
+MinGW/Wine reproduction confirmed that the redirected ZUPT listing contained
+the exact UTF-8 bytes. The gate now creates the non-BMP name through byte
+escapes, verifies Latin-1/BMP/non-BMP listing bytes without locale-sensitive
+matching, and requires extraction plus a full tree diff. The path-confinement
+regression independently constructs the BMP/non-BMP archive name from ASCII
+hex and requires byte-exact listing and extraction.
+
+Because that pre-tag run failed, it remains diagnostic evidence rather than
+release approval. The immutable `v5.2.8` tag at
+`ebb9ab3aa1d42c50030ca02883f6162dc4771fe1` repeated the complete suite in
+manually dispatched run `33456209269`: all 15 jobs passed, including native
+Windows/macOS, the pinned local OBS service chain, source reproducibility,
+DEB/RPM/SRPM, installed-package, sanitizer, analyzer, and source-only gates.
+The canonical source archive was reproduced at 798296 bytes with SHA-256
+`378b9506211545b9594cf0d38ac8955d9b1cac34eb6b379ae0ec26b84edb65f7`.
+
+Initial promotion run `33457344882` stopped before release creation because
+its validator incorrectly assumed that an SRPM's `%{ARCH}` must be `src`.
+Both artifacts were genuine source packages: `%{SOURCEPACKAGE}` was `1`,
+`%{SOURCERPM}` was absent, each payload was exactly its Source0 plus spec, and
+each binary RPM referenced the matching SRPM. Commit `33eb904` changed the
+gate to those canonical metadata and payload checks. Corrected promotion run
+`33457868306` then validated the same tag-bound artifacts and published exactly
+13 assets. No asset was rebuilt to pass promotion. These are reproducible
+project records, not independent certification.
 
 ## Cryptographic review boundary
 
@@ -146,7 +284,7 @@ AES implementation has documented cache-timing risk on hostile shared hardware.
 
 The following entries are retained as release history. Their regression tests
 should be rerun, but the historical resolution does not itself constitute a
-5.2.3 test result.
+5.2.8 test result.
 
 | First corrected | Severity | Finding | Resolution recorded at the time |
 |---|---|---|---|
@@ -166,6 +304,10 @@ should be rerun, but the historical resolution does not itself constitute a
 | 5.2.2 | Medium | A signal during an interactive POSIX password prompt could leave terminal echo/state altered | Restore saved terminal settings on handled interruptions; cover the behavior with a PTY regression |
 | 5.2.2 | Test reliability | `tests/regression.sh` used Bash syntax without making the interpreter contract explicit | Execute the suite explicitly with Bash and keep syntax/interpreter checks in release gates |
 | 5.2.2 | Documentation/licensing | Current documentation incorrectly denied historical MIT grants visible in published Git history | Added a factual erratum: current source follows current SPDX notices, while earlier grants and immutable tags remain valid and unmodified |
+| 5.2.8 | High | CodeQL #5: SDK key copies changed permissions through a re-resolved destination path | Publish through the core atomic output object and apply permissions to its open descriptor; run link-target/mode regressions through `sdk-test` |
+| 5.2.8 | High | CodeQL #6: POSIX disk restore classified a pathname before reopening it destructively | Open without truncation or symlink following, classify with `fstat`, and retain the same device descriptor through write |
+| 5.2.8 | High | CodeQL #7: benchmark cleanup classified entries before recursively resolving their path | Traverse pinned descriptors/handles, refuse link/reparse traversal, remove entries relative to pinned parents, and verify Windows directory identity before handle deletion |
+| 5.2.8 | High (test-only) | CodeQL #8/#9/#10: the new SDK regression inspected paths before later reads or cleanup | Open each fixture without following links, inspect/read through `fstat` and the same descriptor, and reject path-level `stat`/`lstat` in the static gate |
 
 See `CHANGELOG.md` for the complete per-release history and compatibility notes.
 Old tags remain immutable and may contain artifacts or build assumptions removed
@@ -187,12 +329,12 @@ include SHA-256 checksums. The gated GUI set adds the architecture-independent
 DEB, noarch/source RPM, and source-only portable GUI ZIP. Package gates include
 exact payload/dependency and installed off-screen integration checks; the
 portable ZIP additionally receives source scans, an exact safe-member allowlist,
-and an extracted launcher test. An AppImage is not promoted by the 5.2.3
+and an extracted launcher test. An AppImage is not promoted by the 5.2.8
 policy; AppDir and Flatpak bundles, GUI platform installers, and bare
 Linux/Windows executables are also excluded. Windows ZIP and macOS DMG outputs
 remain CLI-only.
 
-No Wine result is retained as release evidence for 5.2.3. Cross-compilation
+No Wine result is retained as release evidence for 5.2.8. Cross-compilation
 does not establish native-Windows behavior. Extended-length/device namespace
 paths, raw UNC output roots, and mapped/network-drive output are unsupported;
 the native Windows workflow remains a publication gate for the ZIP containing

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,162 @@
 # ZUPT Changelog
 
+## [5.2.8] — 2026-08-31 — Path-race hardening and native-fixture correction
+
+Corrective successor to the immutable, unpromoted `v5.2.7` candidate.
+Exact-tag GitHub Actions run `33445470664` reached a macOS failure because the
+runner filesystem rejected creation of the raw-C1 filename fixture with
+`EILSEQ`. The workflow concluded `cancelled` at `2026-08-31T23:11:19Z`, with
+13 successful jobs, one failed macOS job, and one cancelled Windows job.
+The hosted Windows job stalled in `make check`; a MinGW/Wine reproduction
+isolated the cause to `test --password-prompt ... </dev/null` entering
+`_getch` despite redirected standard input. The tag and its evidence remain
+unchanged.
+
+- Close CodeQL High #5 in SDK key saving by copying into the core atomic
+  publisher's already-open private object, applying POSIX key permissions with
+  `fchmod` on that descriptor, checking read/close/publication failures, and
+  replacing only the requested directory entry. Symlink and hardlink target
+  sentinels and private/public key modes are covered by the SDK regression.
+- Close CodeQL High #6 in POSIX disk restore by opening the target once without
+  truncation or final-symlink following, classifying that descriptor with
+  `fstat`, and retaining the same device descriptor through capacity checks and
+  writes. Regular-file restores continue to use atomic publication.
+- Close CodeQL High #7 in benchmark cleanup by resolving POSIX components with
+  `openat(..., O_NOFOLLOW)`, deleting relative to pinned descriptors with
+  `unlinkat`, and using pinned, reparse-point-aware handles for Windows
+  traversal. The regression injects a directory symlink into a live workspace
+  and verifies that cleanup does not visit its target.
+- The first default-branch rescan closed #5, #6, and #7 and then identified
+  test-only path checks as High #8, #9, and #10 in the new SDK regression.
+  Replace every test-side `stat`/`lstat` sequence with one no-follow `open`
+  followed by `fstat` and descriptor reads, and retain that boundary in the
+  static regression gate. Default-branch run `33452563116` completed
+  successfully with #5 through #10 fixed and zero open code-scanning alerts.
+- Treat inability to create the raw-C1 scanner filename as an explicit fixture
+  skip on filesystems that reject the byte; when creation succeeds, the unsafe
+  diagnostic-escaping assertions still run unchanged. Normalize Bash 3.2's
+  sign-extended `%d` character conversion to an unsigned octet so raw and
+  UTF-8 C1 diagnostics retain their canonical `\\xNN`/`\\uNNNN` form.
+- Reject redirected or otherwise non-console Windows password prompts before
+  entering `_getch`, handle console EOF as an error, and cover the native
+  redirected-input path so it cannot hang a release gate.
+- On Windows, validate private-key confinement as the protected,
+  current-user-only DACL that the implementation creates; do not treat MSYS's
+  synthetic `stat` mode as a POSIX `0600` result. POSIX continues to require
+  the real descriptor mode `0600` under multiple umasks.
+- Replace the old MSYS `grep` non-BMP boundary exposed after 14 successful jobs
+  in pre-tag run `33452602634` with byte-exact Python checks for Latin-1, BMP,
+  and non-BMP UTF-8 listing output. Construct the emoji fixture from ASCII byte
+  escapes and require list, extract, and full-tree equality; the independent
+  path regression also creates its BMP/non-BMP name from ASCII hex.
+- Run `sdk-test` from both `release-check` and the hosted GCC/Clang Linux job so
+  the atomic key-save regression cannot silently fall outside release gates.
+- Carry the v5.2.7 archive format, cryptography, bundled codec release, and SDK
+  ABI forward unchanged. These are implementation and test-integration
+  corrections, not a wire-format or API change.
+- Realign current code, package, workflow, artifact, and documentation
+  references to 5.2.8, and pin the AUR/Homebrew SHA-256 and Guix content hash
+  to the final reproducible source archive before tagging.
+- Exact-tag run `33456209269` passed all 15 source, package, analyzer,
+  sanitizer, OBS, Windows, and macOS jobs at `ebb9ab3`. Promotion initially
+  stopped before publication because its validator treated `%{ARCH}` as the
+  SRPM discriminator; the genuine SRPMs instead correctly carry
+  `%{SOURCEPACKAGE}=1`. Commit `33eb904` corrected and strengthened that gate,
+  and run `33457868306` published the exact 13 tested assets without rebuilding
+  them. No v5.2.7 result transfers to this evidence.
+
+## [5.2.7] — 2026-08-31 — Native test-harness portability corrections
+
+Corrective successor to the immutable, unpromoted `v5.2.6` candidate. Exact-tag
+GitHub Actions run `33442264243` completed 13 jobs successfully, but the native
+Windows and macOS jobs failed, so no 5.2.6 assets were promoted. The tag and its
+recorded evidence remain unchanged.
+
+- Scope the SHA-NI regression helper declarations to the supported x86 build
+  path so macOS arm64 strict compilation does not diagnose unused declarations
+  under `-Werror`.
+- Carry the safe printable UTF-8 path fixture through an explicit
+  byte-stable Windows argument representation so argv transcoding cannot abort
+  the regression before its intended archive and diagnostic assertions.
+- Carry the 5.2.6 source-only and security baseline forward without changing
+  the archive format, cryptography, bundled codec release, or SDK ABI.
+- Realign current source, package, workflow, artifact, and tag references to
+  5.2.7, then pin the final reproducible release-archive checksum and content
+  hash in the downstream recipes before tagging.
+- Require fresh exact-`v5.2.7` source, checksum, hosted CI, native-platform,
+  package, OBS, and promotion evidence. No prior candidate result transfers
+  automatically, and this entry does not claim those gates passed.
+
+## [5.2.6] — 2026-08-31 — Native release-gate portability corrections
+
+Corrective successor to the immutable, unpromoted `v5.2.5` candidate. Exact-tag
+GitHub Actions run `33434986357` completed 13 jobs successfully, but the native
+Windows and macOS jobs failed, so no 5.2.5 assets were promoted. The tag and its
+recorded evidence remain unchanged.
+
+- Use the compiler-resistant volatile wipe fallback on macOS and NetBSD instead
+  of assuming that their C libraries export `explicit_bzero`; supported glibc,
+  FreeBSD, and OpenBSD paths retain their existing selection.
+- Make the source-only scanner's empty-array handling compatible with the
+  system Bash 3.2 shipped by macOS, including repository, tag, standalone-tree,
+  standalone-archive, and path-component traversal paths.
+- Make hostile archive-path fixtures accept explicit hexadecimal bytes, verify
+  the requested path bytes in the generated archive, and reject the dangerous
+  raw byte fragment anywhere in diagnostic output, so the Windows regression
+  does not depend on command-line conversion or benign path prefixes.
+- Carry the 5.2.5 source-only and security baseline forward without changing
+  the archive format, cryptography, bundled codec release, or SDK ABI.
+- Realign current package, workflow, artifact, and tag references to 5.2.6;
+  leave release-archive checksums explicitly pending until the final source
+  archive is generated.
+- Require fresh exact-`v5.2.6` source, checksum, hosted CI, native-platform,
+  package, OBS, and promotion evidence. No prior candidate result transfers
+  automatically, and this changelog entry does not claim those gates passed.
+
+## [5.2.5] — 2026-08-31 — OBS service working-directory correction
+
+Corrective successor to the immutable `v5.2.4` candidate. GitHub Actions run
+`33431386002` did not promote that tag: 12 jobs passed, the openSUSE Tumbleweed
+RPM gate failed because its standalone `Serviceinfo` executor inherited the
+repository working directory instead of the isolated service directory, and
+the dependent Windows/macOS gate was skipped. The tag and its recorded
+checksums remain unchanged.
+
+- Run the standalone OBS `obs_scm` → `tar` → `recompress` chain from its
+  isolated service directory so downstream services can find `.obsinfo`.
+- Add a packaging-policy regression for the OBS executor working directory
+  while retaining the immutable `refs/tags/v5.2.5` service revision assertion.
+- Record the successful local Tumbleweed reproduction of the corrected service
+  chain; it produced one source archive that passed the source-only scanner.
+- Carry the 5.2.4 security and source-only baseline forward without changing
+  the archive format, cryptography, bundled codec release, or SDK ABI.
+- Realign current package, workflow, artifact, and tag references to 5.2.5;
+  leave AUR, Homebrew, and Guix hashes pending the final source archive.
+- Require fresh exact-`v5.2.5` source, checksum, hosted CI, native-platform,
+  package, and promotion evidence; no v5.2.4 result transfers automatically.
+
+## [5.2.4] — 2026-08-31 — Source-policy line-ending correction
+
+Corrective successor to the immutable `v5.2.3` candidate. That candidate was
+not promoted because its source-policy test assumed LF bytes for a Windows
+`.bat` file that Git correctly materializes as CRLF according to
+`.gitattributes`; the tag and its historical record remain unchanged.
+
+- Correct the release/source-policy integration so the required CRLF checkout
+  form is validated without treating it as source drift.
+- Carry the 5.2.3 release-integration work and the 5.2.2 security/source-only
+  baseline forward without an archive-format, cryptographic, codec, or SDK ABI
+  change.
+- Realign current documentation, package, workflow, artifact, and tag references
+  to 5.2.4 while keeping generated binaries outside Git and source archives.
+- Correct three internal regression-test headers so pre-3.0 product releases
+  retain the historical ZUPT name; VaptVupt remains only the bundled codec and
+  compatibility-facing identifier where applicable.
+- Require fresh exact-`v5.2.4` source, checksum, hosted CI, native-platform,
+  package, and promotion evidence; no 5.2.3 result transfers automatically.
+- Keep authenticated OBS/Factory validation pending and retain the unresolved,
+  unsuppressed openSUSE automatic `debugsource` rpmlint `no-binary` finding.
+
 ## [5.2.3] — 2026-08-31 — Corrective release integration
 
 Corrective successor to the immutable `v5.2.2` candidate. Post-tag CI
@@ -2341,7 +2498,7 @@ bump and packaging-syntax test expansion; archive format unchanged.
 ### `.github/workflows/ci.yml` — 8-job CI matrix
 
 Replaces the prior 4-job CI with a comprehensive matrix that mirrors
-the project's local-verification protocol from `PROMPT.md §6`:
+the project's historical local-verification protocol:
 
 | Job | What it does |
 |---|---|
@@ -3064,7 +3221,7 @@ size to run. It needs to be a sprint-protocol step, not a one-off.
 
 ### What changed
 
-**`PROMPT.md` — Prompt v2.**
+**Historical sprint instructions — version 2.**
 
 - **NEW §3.5: The exhaustive byte-sweep mandate.** Every
   format-touching change runs the full byte sweep before claiming
@@ -3084,7 +3241,7 @@ size to run. It needs to be a sprint-protocol step, not a one-off.
   with the regression-test names that catch each one. The table is
   the canonical "things that have shipped and must never recur"
   reference; keeping it current is part of every sprint.
-- **Footer stamp**: Prompt v2, 2026-05-20.
+- **Footer stamp**: historical instruction revision 2, 2026-05-20.
 
 **`Makefile`.** The help-target banner version is now derived
 from `include/zupt.h` via a `grep | awk` substitution:
@@ -3095,7 +3252,7 @@ help:
         include/zupt.h | awk -F'"' '{print $$2}') build targets:"
 ```
 
-This closes a recurring bug noted in `PROMPT.md §6 step 9` —
+This closes a recurring bug noted in the historical sprint checklist —
 prior sprints (2.3.0, 2.3.1) left the banner stale even after the
 sprint protocol said to bump it. Making it auto-derived removes
 the drift opportunity entirely.
@@ -3126,7 +3283,6 @@ the drift opportunity entirely.
 ### Files touched
 
 ```
-PROMPT.md            (§3.5 NEW, §6 step renumber, §10 kickoff, §11 rows, v2 stamp)
 Makefile             (help banner auto-derives version from header)
 include/zupt.h       (version 2.3.1 → 2.4.0)
 CHANGELOG.md         (this entry)
@@ -3310,7 +3466,7 @@ the footer.
 
 - **Encrypted modes**: AIT = `HMAC-SHA256(mac_key, hdr[0..63] || footer[0..23])`
 - **Plaintext modes**: AIT = `XXH64(...)` in the first 8 bytes, zeros in
-  the rest. Best-effort (`OPAQUE`-class per PROMPT.md §5).
+  the rest. Best-effort (`OPAQUE` structural-integrity class).
 
 The MAC input deliberately excludes `footer[24..31]` = `"ZEND" || u32 version`.
 Both are structurally validated by the read path (`locate_footer_v15`
@@ -3500,7 +3656,7 @@ so flipping it (e.g. from `0x02 INDEX` to `0x03 ENC_HEADER`) did
 not cause auth failure; the downstream parser was tolerant.
 Severity: low. Fix at `src/zupt_format.c` adds the structural
 check immediately after `read_block`. This makes the byte
-`OPAQUE`-class per PROMPT.md §5 (tamper detected by parser, not by
+`OPAQUE` structural-integrity class (tamper detected by parser, not by
 MAC).
 
 **F-02b — RECLASSIFIED.** The 2.2.4 hypothesis that the archive
@@ -3537,7 +3693,7 @@ other v2.3.0 changes than as a standalone patch.
 ### Verification
 
 - `make` — clean on plain GCC and Clang.
-- `make` with strict GCC flags (full set from PROMPT.md §6) — clean.
+- `make` with the historical strict GCC warning set — clean.
 - `make` with strict Clang flags — clean.
 - `make test` — **61/61 passing**.
 - `make test-vectors` — **14/14 passing**.
@@ -3573,8 +3729,8 @@ SECURITY.md                            (integrity statement reaffirmed)
 
 Patch release. No format changes, no feature changes, no on-disk
 compatibility impact. Five findings closed against the v2.2.3 baseline
-under the methodology in the new top-level `PROMPT.md` (continuous
-improvement prompt) and tracked in `docs/FINDINGS-2.x.md` (durable
+under the methodology in the then-current audit instructions and tracked in
+`docs/FINDINGS-2.x.md` (durable
 numbered ledger that survives between work sessions).
 
 ### Findings closed
@@ -3646,9 +3802,9 @@ preserved.
 
 ### New process artefacts
 
-- **`PROMPT.md`** — top-level "god-tier" continuous-improvement prompt.
-  Designed to be pasted verbatim into a fresh chat alongside the latest
-  source tarball. Encodes the methodology that produced this release:
+- **Historical continuous-improvement instructions** — removed from the
+  current source tree after their durable material was consolidated into the
+  audit and security documents. They encoded the methodology that produced this release:
   three-line workflow (survey → fix-with-test → ship), explicit
   authentication-coverage invariant (every archive byte covered by
   per-block HMAC OR a separate index MAC OR a footer MAC — no third
@@ -3696,7 +3852,7 @@ preserved.
 ### Files touched
 
 ```
-PROMPT.md                              (new, top-level)
+[historical sprint-instruction file]   (removed from the current tree)
 docs/FINDINGS-2.x.md                   (new)
 tests/test_audit_flake.sh              (new)
 src/zupt_main.c                        (F-01)
@@ -3808,20 +3964,20 @@ Two `make test` runs back-to-back, both clean. Cumulative test count:
 
 ### Documentation cleanup
 
-Four design/audit-prompt documents that were sprint-internal scratch
+Four design/audit-instruction documents that were sprint-internal scratch
 have been removed from the source tree (consolidated into the
 remaining permanent docs):
 
 | Removed | Where the content lives now |
 |---|---|
-| `AUDIT_PROMPT.md` | superseded by `FORMAL_AUDIT_PROMPT.md` |
+| Two historical audit-instruction files | consolidated into the permanent audit and security documents |
 | `ROOT_CAUSE_ANALYSIS.md` | reproducible-bug postmortems are now per-release entries in `CHANGELOG.md` |
 | `COMPAT.md` | the table moved into `README.md` § "Architecture & platform support" |
 | `DONATIONS.md` | one-liner moved into `README.md` § "Supporting Zupt" |
 
 Surviving canonical docs: `README.md`, `CHANGELOG.md` (this file),
 `SECURITY.md`, `INSTALL.md`, `LICENSE`, `THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md`,
-`AUDIT.md`, `FORMAL_AUDIT_PROMPT.md`, `ROADMAP.md`.
+`AUDIT.md` and the then-current roadmap.
 
 
 ## [2.2.2-final2] — 2026-05-01 — CLI help, man pages, deb copyright
@@ -3999,7 +4155,7 @@ the github-old → github-new migration sprint) deleted as obsolete.
 
 ## [2.2.2] god-tier audit — bug #16 (block-swap attack) fix
 
-Independent formal cryptographic audit (per FORMAL_AUDIT_PROMPT.md two-pass
+Independent formal cryptographic audit (using the then-current two-pass
 methodology) discovered a critical authenticated-encryption flaw in the
 shipped 2.2.2 binary. Investigation, root-cause, fix, regression test, and
 final verification documented below.
@@ -4198,7 +4354,7 @@ Compile-tested with `-Wpedantic` under GCC. Win32 code paths verified via
 - `AUDIT.md`: 2026-04-27 formal audit entry with cumulative test table
 - `README.md`: Security section bumped with audit confirmation
 - `doc/zupt.1`: SECURITY section mentions path-traversal protection
-- `FORMAL_AUDIT_PROMPT.md`: methodology document at repo root for future audits
+- the then-current formal-audit methodology document
 
 ## [2.2.2] — 2026-04-27
 

DISTRIBUTION.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Distributing ZUPT 5.2.3
+# Distributing ZUPT 5.2.8
 
 This document describes the packaging material maintained in the ZUPT
 source repository. A recipe in `packaging/` is not evidence that a package has
@@ -14,9 +14,40 @@ https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt
 GitHub is the canonical source and release host. Packaging must never fetch
 `zupt-web` or substitute an asset from another project.
 
-The `v5.2.2` tag is immutable but remained a non-promoted candidate after
-post-tag CI integration failures. Corrective packages and release assets must
-use `v5.2.3`; never move or overwrite the 5.2.2 tag or its checksums.
+The `v5.2.2`, `v5.2.3`, `v5.2.4`, `v5.2.5`, `v5.2.6`, and `v5.2.7` tags are
+immutable non-promoted candidates.
+The v5.2.3 source-policy test assumed LF for a Windows `.bat` file that Git
+correctly checks out as CRLF. Exact-tag GitHub Actions run `33431386002` then
+recorded 12 successful v5.2.4 jobs, one openSUSE service-harness failure caused
+by its working directory, and skipped dependent Windows/macOS jobs. A local
+Tumbleweed reproduction confirmed that `refs/tags/v5.2.4` is valid and that
+entering the service directory completes the source-service chain. Corrective
+working-directory integration was carried by v5.2.5, whose exact-tag GitHub
+Actions run `33434986357` completed 13 jobs successfully but failed the native
+Windows and macOS jobs. Its v5.2.6 corrections reached exact-tag run
+`33442264243`, where 13 jobs succeeded but macOS arm64 failed on unused x86
+SHA-NI test-helper declarations under `-Werror`, and Windows aborted during safe
+UTF-8 fixture argv transcoding. Version 5.2.7 corrected those failures, but
+exact-tag run `33445470664` ended with 13 successful jobs, a macOS raw-C1
+fixture failure with `EILSEQ`, and a cancelled Windows job after the hosted job
+stalled in `make check`; a MinGW/Wine reproduction isolated a non-console
+password-prompt hang in `_getch`. Manual 5.2.8 pre-tag run `33452602634`
+subsequently passed 14 of 15 jobs, including native macOS and the complete
+Windows distribution checks, before an old MSYS `grep` non-BMP pattern failed
+in the later smoke. ZUPT's redirected listing was byte-correct; the corrected
+gate uses byte-exact, locale-independent checks and requires extraction plus a
+full tree diff. The failed run is diagnostic evidence only.
+Exact-tag run `33456209269` subsequently passed all 15 jobs at
+`ebb9ab3aa1d42c50030ca02883f6162dc4771fe1`, including the pinned local OBS
+source-service chain, native
+Windows/macOS, and every package gate. Promotion run `33457868306` published
+the exact tested 13-file set; the source archive SHA-256 is
+`378b9506211545b9594cf0d38ac8955d9b1cac34eb6b379ae0ec26b84edb65f7`.
+Corrective packages and release assets use `v5.2.8`; never move or
+overwrite an earlier tag or checksum, and never transfer prior evidence
+automatically. Version 5.2.8 corrects those native test boundaries, hardens
+three path-race boundaries, and adds the SDK regression to release/hosted Linux
+gates. The archive format, cryptography, codec, and SDK ABI remain unchanged.
 
 ## Source-only boundary
 
@@ -46,7 +77,7 @@ Audit the current tree or a generated archive with:
 
 ```sh
 scripts/check-source-only.sh
-scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz
+scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz
 ```
 
 The scanner reports paths, not file contents, and exits nonzero on a violation.
@@ -59,14 +90,15 @@ the result before moving it to its destination. Exporting the tree rather than
 the commit omits Git's commit-ID PAX header:
 
 ```sh
-SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH="$(git show -s --format=%ct HEAD)" \
-  make DIST_TARBALL=/tmp/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz dist
-sha256sum /tmp/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz
+make DIST_TARBALL=/tmp/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz dist
+sha256sum /tmp/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz
 ```
 
-With identical committed input and `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH`, repeated exports must
-have the same SHA-256 digest. Do not generate a release tarball from uncommitted
-working-tree files.
+The canonical release uses the tracked `.source-date-epoch`; an explicit
+`SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` override intentionally creates a different archive. With
+identical committed input and epoch, repeated exports must have the same
+SHA-256 digest. Do not generate a release tarball from uncommitted working-tree
+files.
 
 The AUR, Homebrew, and Guix recipes pin the checksum of this tarball. They are
 marked `export-ignore` in `.gitattributes` so their own checksum fields do not
@@ -107,12 +139,12 @@ private-library RPATH.
 | openSUSE / OBS | `packaging/opensuse/` | source and binary RPM through OBS |
 | Debian / Ubuntu | `packaging/debian/`, `packaging/build-deb.sh` | Debian metadata and binary DEB after the target gate |
 | RPM release artifact | `packaging/opensuse/zupt.spec`, `packaging/build-rpm.sh` | source and binary RPM after the target gate |
-| GUI DEB | `packaging/build-gui-deb.sh` | `zupt-gui_5.2.3_all.deb` after payload/dependency and installed integration gates |
-| GUI RPM | `packaging/build-gui-rpm.sh` | `zupt-gui-5.2.3-1.noarch.rpm` and matching `.src.rpm` after package and installed integration gates |
-| Linux CLI archive | `.github/workflows/ci.yml` | `zupt-5.2.3-linux-x86_64.tar.xz` with notices after dependency, member, and extracted functional gates |
-| Portable GUI source | `packaging/portable/`, `.github/workflows/ci.yml` | `zupt-gui-5.2.3-portable.zip` after source scan, member allowlist, and extracted off-screen integration gate |
+| GUI DEB | `packaging/build-gui-deb.sh` | `zupt-gui_5.2.8_all.deb` after payload/dependency and installed integration gates |
+| GUI RPM | `packaging/build-gui-rpm.sh` | `zupt-gui-5.2.8-1.noarch.rpm` and matching `.src.rpm` after package and installed integration gates |
+| Linux CLI archive | `.github/workflows/ci.yml` | `zupt-5.2.8-linux-x86_64.tar.xz` with notices after dependency, member, and extracted functional gates |
+| Portable GUI source | `packaging/portable/`, `.github/workflows/ci.yml` | `zupt-gui-5.2.8-portable.zip` after source scan, member allowlist, and extracted off-screen integration gate |
 | Fedora / RPM-based systems | `packaging/rpm/zupt.spec` | downstream RPM starting point |
-| AppImage helper | `packaging/build-appimage.sh` | downstream-only helper; no 5.2.3 AppImage is promoted |
+| AppImage helper | `packaging/build-appimage.sh` | downstream-only helper; no 5.2.8 AppImage is promoted |
 | Windows | `.github/workflows/cross-platform.yml` | native ZIP (executable plus notices) after the required native gate |
 | macOS | `packaging/build-dmg.sh` | native-architecture DMG after the native gate |
 | Arch Linux | `packaging/aur/PKGBUILD` | AUR package recipe |
@@ -188,17 +220,17 @@ expectations, then test the installed launcher off-screen against the matching
 ### Portable and native release artifacts
 
 The Linux x86_64 gate packages the tested `zupt` executable as
-`zupt-5.2.3-linux-x86_64.tar.xz` beside README, changelog, security guidance,
+`zupt-5.2.8-linux-x86_64.tar.xz` beside README, changelog, security guidance,
 and every applicable public license and notice. Its dynamic-library allowlist,
 archive member allowlist, and extracted CLI functional suite must pass.
 
-The `zupt-gui-5.2.3-portable.zip` artifact is source-only: it contains the GUI
+The `zupt-gui-5.2.8-portable.zip` artifact is source-only: it contains the GUI
 Python source, shell/macOS/Windows launchers, icons, provenance, changelog, and
 licenses, but no Python, Qt, CLI, or compiled runtime. The gate scans both the
 assembled and extracted trees, verifies an exact safe member allowlist, and
 runs the extracted launcher off-screen against the tested CLI.
 
-AppImage creation is deliberately offline and is not a 5.2.3 release gate.
+AppImage creation is deliberately offline and is not a 5.2.8 release gate.
 Supply a locally verified `appimagetool`, type-2 runtime, and the complete
 license/source-relink compliance notice for those exact runtime bytes; the
 helper never downloads any input:
@@ -214,7 +246,7 @@ APPIMAGE_RUNTIME_COMPLIANCE_FILE=/verified/path/runtime-compliance.txt \
 The runtime inspected while preparing 5.2.2 omitted a linked component from
 its notice and did not provide the complete LGPL source/relink handoff required
 by this release policy. No AppImage produced by this helper is promoted by the
-upstream 5.2.3 workflow. AppDir and Flatpak bundles and GUI platform installers
+upstream 5.2.8 workflow. AppDir and Flatpak bundles and GUI platform installers
 are also excluded. Bare Linux and Windows executables are not promoted; their
 CLI programs appear only inside notice-bearing archives. The Windows ZIP and
 macOS DMG remain CLI-only.
@@ -229,8 +261,8 @@ DIST_DIR="$release_dir" RUN_CHECKS=1 packaging/build-dmg.sh
 The Windows ZIP (including its executable and notices) must be built and tested
 by the Windows job in `.github/workflows/cross-platform.yml`; it is not a
 cross-compiled release claim from a Linux build. No Wine result is retained as
-5.2.3 release evidence. Extended-length/device namespace paths, raw UNC output
-roots, and mapped/network-drive output are not supported in 5.2.3. Publish the
+5.2.8 release evidence. Extended-length/device namespace paths, raw UNC output
+roots, and mapped/network-drive output are not supported in 5.2.8. Publish the
 exact architecture recorded by the native job.
 These helpers create binary distribution artifacts for the release page, not
 content to be committed to Git or included in the source archive.
@@ -238,7 +270,7 @@ content to be committed to Git or included in the source archive.
 ### AUR, Homebrew, Guix, and Nix
 
 After calculating the final reproducible source archive, but before creating or
-publishing the immutable tag, update each recipe to version 5.2.3 and to the
+publishing the immutable tag, update each recipe to version 5.2.8 and to the
 exact digest or content hash expected by its package manager. These recipe
 directories are excluded from the source archive, so this does not create a
 checksum cycle. Commit the pinned recipes in the tagged tree, then build and
@@ -257,7 +289,7 @@ build.
 
 For every published artifact:
 
-1. start from the immutable `v5.2.3` tag;
+1. start from the immutable `v5.2.8` tag;
 2. keep `WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0` unless system dependencies are declared;
 3. record the exact OS, distribution release, architecture, and toolchain;
 4. run format validation plus installed `--version`, `--help`, and archive
@@ -269,13 +301,14 @@ For every published artifact:
 Do not infer multi-architecture compatibility from portable source. Do not add
 precompiled optional libraries to make a package build.
 
-Publish release assets at the canonical GitHub release. If an expected asset is
-absent or has a different checksum, report that target as unpublished rather
-than redirecting consumers to an unverified file.
+The 13 gated assets are published at the
+[canonical GitHub release](https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt/releases/tag/v5.2.8).
+If an expected asset is absent or has a different checksum, report that target
+as unpublished rather than redirecting consumers to an unverified file.
 
 ## Downstream checklist
 
-- [ ] The source URL resolves to the immutable `v5.2.3` tag.
+- [ ] The source URL resolves to the immutable `v5.2.8` tag.
 - [ ] The source archive passes `scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive`.
 - [ ] The recipe checksum matches the downloaded source exactly.
 - [ ] `WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0` is explicit, or system dependencies are complete.

INSTALL.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Installing ZUPT 5.2.3
+# Installing ZUPT 5.2.8
 
 This guide covers the ZUPT command-line program and the optional Python GUI.
 The canonical source repository is
@@ -16,14 +16,39 @@ The canonical source repository is
   record a successful format-specific test for your target.
 
 The immutable `v5.2.2` candidate was not promoted after CI integration
-failures. Do not treat a 5.2.2 candidate artifact as a 5.2.3 package.
+failures. The immutable `v5.2.3` candidate was not promoted because its
+source-policy test assumed LF for a Windows `.bat` file checked out as the
+required CRLF. The immutable `v5.2.4` candidate was not promoted after exact-tag
+GitHub Actions run `33431386002`: 12 jobs succeeded, the sole openSUSE
+service-harness job failed because its executor did not enter the service
+directory, and dependent Windows/macOS jobs were skipped. A local Tumbleweed
+reproduction confirmed both the explicit tag ref and the corrected
+working-directory contract. This is release/test integration only; the product,
+archive format, cryptography, codec, and SDK ABI are unchanged. The immutable
+`v5.2.5` candidate was likewise not promoted: exact-tag GitHub Actions run
+`33434986357` recorded 13 successful jobs and failed native Windows/macOS jobs.
+The immutable `v5.2.6` candidate was not promoted after run `33442264243`
+recorded 13 successful jobs and two native failures: unused x86 SHA-NI helper
+declarations on macOS arm64 under `-Werror`, and early Windows abortion while
+argv-transcoding a safe UTF-8 fixture. Version 5.2.7 corrected those boundaries
+but was not promoted after exact-tag run `33445470664`: 13 jobs succeeded,
+macOS failed because its filesystem rejected the raw-C1 filename fixture with
+`EILSEQ`, and Windows was cancelled after the hosted job stalled in `make
+check`; a MinGW/Wine reproduction isolated the cause to the non-console
+password-prompt test entering `_getch`. Version 5.2.8 makes both
+fixtures portable, hardens the three CodeQL High path-race boundaries described
+in the security documents, and adds `sdk-test` to release and hosted Linux
+gates. Exact-tag run `33456209269` passed all 15 jobs, and promotion run
+`33457868306` published the exact tested set. Do not treat any prior candidate's
+artifacts or evidence as 5.2.8 packages or validation.
 
-The 5.2.3 package set eligible for promotion after each target gate succeeds is:
+The published 5.2.8 package set is exactly these 13 gated assets:
 
 | Component | Gated artifacts |
 |---|---|
-| CLI | `zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz`, `zupt_5.2.3_amd64.deb`, openSUSE x86_64 binary/source RPMs, `zupt-5.2.3-linux-x86_64.tar.xz`, `zupt-5.2.3-windows-x86_64.zip`, and `ZUPT-5.2.3-macOS-*.dmg` |
-| GUI | `zupt-gui_5.2.3_all.deb`, `zupt-gui-5.2.3-1.noarch.rpm`, `zupt-gui-5.2.3-1.src.rpm`, and `zupt-gui-5.2.3-portable.zip` |
+| Source and checksums | `zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz`, `zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz.sha256`, and `SHA256SUMS` |
+| CLI | `zupt_5.2.8_amd64.deb`, `zupt-5.2.8-0.x86_64.rpm`, `zupt-5.2.8-0.src.rpm`, `zupt-5.2.8-linux-x86_64.tar.xz`, `zupt-5.2.8-windows-x86_64.zip`, and exactly one `ZUPT-5.2.8-macOS-{x86_64\|arm64}.dmg` |
+| GUI | `zupt-gui_5.2.8_all.deb`, `zupt-gui-5.2.8-1.noarch.rpm`, `zupt-gui-5.2.8-1.src.rpm`, and `zupt-gui-5.2.8-portable.zip` |
 
 The GUI packages require the matching `zupt` CLI package and must pass exact
 payload/dependency checks plus an installed off-screen GUI/CLI integration
@@ -31,7 +56,7 @@ test. The source-only portable GUI ZIP bundles launchers, notices, and GUI
 source, but not Python, Qt, or the CLI. The Linux tar.xz carries the tested CLI
 beside the complete public license/notice payload. AppImage, AppDir, Flatpak
 bundles, GUI platform installers, and bare Linux/Windows executables are not
-promoted for 5.2.3. The Windows ZIP and macOS DMG contain the CLI only. Exact
+promoted for 5.2.8. The Windows ZIP and macOS DMG contain the CLI only. Exact
 target boundaries are listed in `README.md`.
 The release's `SHA256SUMS` and validation notes, not the mere presence of a
 download link, identify an artifact that completed its gate.
@@ -68,7 +93,7 @@ sudo pacman -S base-devel gzip
 ```
 
 Package names can differ by distribution release. These commands are examples,
-not a statement that 5.2.3 has been accepted into each distribution repository.
+not a statement that 5.2.8 has been accepted into each distribution repository.
 
 ## Build and test from source
 
@@ -88,7 +113,7 @@ From a release archive, run the scanner as follows before extraction or from a
 trusted checkout after download:
 
 ```sh
-scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz
+scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz
 ```
 
 The default build provides the native password, ML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid

Makefile

@@ -540,6 +540,7 @@ test-all: check
 # Release-only gates need a committed Git checkout and packaging metadata.
 # Keep them out of downstream %check, which intentionally has no dist rebuild.
 release-check: test-all audit-licenses
+	$(Q)$(MAKE) sdk-test
 	$(Q)bash tests/test_static_analysis.sh
 	$(Q)bash tests/test_packaging_syntax.sh
 	$(Q)bash scripts/test-installed-zupt.sh ./$(TARGET)

README.md

@@ -1,21 +1,113 @@
-# ZUPT 5.2.3
+# ZUPT 5.2.8
 
 ZUPT is a command-line backup archiver written in C11. It combines the
 bundled VaptVupt compression codec with authenticated AES-256-CTR +
 HMAC-SHA256 encryption, native ML-KEM-768/X25519 hybrid encryption, archive
 integrity checks, multithreaded operation, and a Python/Qt graphical frontend.
 
-Version 5.2.3 is the corrective release for the source, package, workflow, and
-release-integration path. The `v5.2.2` tag remains immutable, but its candidate
-was not promoted after post-tag CI integration failures; no 5.2.2 binary set is
-presented as the current release.
+Version 5.2.8 closes three CodeQL High path-race findings: SDK key copies now
+publish atomically through an already-open private object, POSIX disk restore
+classifies and retains the descriptor it actually opened, and benchmark cleanup
+traverses only pinned descriptors or handles without following links or Windows
+reparse points. It also makes the raw-C1 scanner fixture explicitly skip a
+filesystem that rejects creation with `EILSEQ`, normalizes Bash 3.2 signed-byte
+diagnostics, and brings `sdk-test` into the
+release and hosted Linux gates. Windows password prompts now reject redirected
+input before entering `_getch` and treat console EOF as an error; its key-file
+regression validates the protected current-user-only DACL rather than an MSYS
+POSIX-mode projection. The C/C++ default-branch scan run `33452563116` of
+commit `7a8e5c5` completed successfully after the follow-up changed the new SDK
+regression to no-follow descriptors plus `fstat` and descriptor reads. Alerts
+#5 through #10 are fixed, and the authenticated code-scanning API reported zero
+open alerts. Final release-commit CodeQL run `33456049125` also completed
+successfully, with the API still reporting zero open alerts. These corrections
+do not change archive format v1.6,
+cryptography, the bundled codec release, or the SDK ABI.
+
+The predecessor `v5.2.7` tag is immutable and was not promoted. Exact-tag run
+`33445470664` concluded `cancelled` at `2026-08-31T23:11:19Z`, with 13
+successful jobs, a macOS raw-C1/EILSEQ fixture failure, and a cancelled Windows
+job. The hosted Windows job stalled in `make check`; a MinGW/Wine reproduction
+attributed the stall to a non-console password prompt entering `_getch`. No
+v5.2.7 evidence transfers automatically to v5.2.8.
+
+Manual pre-tag run `33452602634` then completed 14 of 15 jobs successfully at
+`7a8e5c5`, including the native macOS DMG gate and the Windows build and full
+distribution checks. Its Windows smoke test failed only when the old MSYS
+`grep` matched a literal non-BMP filename after the product had already
+compressed and verified all five files. MinGW/Wine reproduction confirmed the
+exact `F0 9F 98 80` UTF-8 bytes in ZUPT's redirected listing. The corrected
+gate creates that name from byte escapes, validates Latin-1, BMP, and non-BMP
+listing bytes with Python, and requires extraction plus a full tree diff. The
+failed run is diagnostic evidence, not release-candidate approval.
+
+The immutable `v5.2.8` candidate at commit
+`ebb9ab3aa1d42c50030ca02883f6162dc4771fe1` subsequently passed all 15 jobs in
+manually dispatched exact-tag run `33456209269`. That run includes the pinned
+local OBS source-service chain, reproducible source checks, GCC/Clang, analyzers,
+sanitizers, DEB/RPM/SRPM and portable-package gates, the native Windows ZIP
+round trip, and the mounted macOS arm64 DMG test. Corrected promotion run
+`33457868306` validated and published exactly 13 assets. The canonical source
+archive is 798296 bytes with SHA-256
+`378b9506211545b9594cf0d38ac8955d9b1cac34eb6b379ae0ec26b84edb65f7`.
 
 Version 5.2.2 restored the original ZUPT product name and the `zupt` command.
 The `.zupt` archive extension, format v1.6, magic bytes, codec identifiers, and
 SDK ABI remain unchanged. An optional `vaptvupt` command alias may be provided
 for scripts written against versions 3.0.0 through 5.2.1.
 
-## Corrective changes in 5.2.3
+## Corrective changes in 5.2.8
+
+SDK key saves use atomic descriptor/handle-backed publication and preserve the
+requested private/public modes without reopening the destination. Disk restore
+opens a POSIX target once before its type, identity, and device-capacity
+decisions, and benchmark cleanup is descriptor-relative on POSIX and
+handle/reparse-point aware on Windows. The live-workspace symlink regression,
+SDK link-target/mode regression, static path-race guards, portable raw-C1
+fixture with Bash 3.2 unsigned-byte normalization, native redirected-prompt
+and protected-DACL regressions, byte-exact BMP/non-BMP Windows list and extract
+checks, and `sdk-test` CI step cover these boundaries. All current release
+paths moved to 5.2.8 and received fresh exact-tag hosted CI, package,
+native-platform, source-only, checksum, OBS, and promotion evidence in runs
+`33456209269` and `33457868306`.
+
+## Corrective changes introduced in 5.2.7
+
+The SHA-NI regression keeps x86-only helper declarations out of unsupported
+arm64 builds, and the safe UTF-8 Windows fixture crosses the argv boundary in a
+byte-stable representation. Those test-harness changes did not alter the
+archive format, cryptography, codec, or SDK ABI. Exact-tag run `33445470664`
+subsequently exposed the separate macOS raw-C1/EILSEQ fixture failure; Windows
+was cancelled after the hosted job stalled in `make check`; MinGW/Wine then
+isolated the stall to a non-console password prompt entering `_getch`. The run recorded 13 successful jobs, one
+failure, and one cancellation; v5.2.7 remained unpromoted.
+
+## Corrective changes introduced in 5.2.6
+
+Darwin and NetBSD select the portable compiler-resistant secure-wipe fallback;
+scanner option/path arrays are guarded for Bash 3.2; and hostile Windows path
+fixtures use explicit bytes and reject dangerous raw diagnostic fragments.
+Those corrections changed release/test integration only. The resulting v5.2.6
+candidate was not promoted because its next exact-tag run exposed the distinct
+arm64 SHA-NI helper and safe UTF-8 Windows argv failures described above.
+
+## Corrective changes introduced in 5.2.5
+
+The exact-tag openSUSE gate executes its standalone service chain from the
+directory containing `_service`. A local Tumbleweed reproduction confirmed
+that `refs/tags/v5.2.4` resolves correctly and that entering the service
+directory completes `obs_scm`, `tar`, and `recompress`. The immutable v5.2.4
+candidate recorded 12 successful jobs in run `33431386002`; its openSUSE job
+failed before the correction and dependent Windows/macOS jobs were skipped.
+
+## Corrective changes introduced in 5.2.4
+
+The release gate now validates the required CRLF checkout form without treating
+it as source drift. That candidate required fresh exact-tag CI, package,
+native-platform, source-only, and checksum evidence before promotion. The
+`v5.2.3` tag remains immutable and unpromoted.
+
+## Corrective changes introduced in 5.2.3
 
 The corrective release carries the 5.2.2 security and format work forward
 without a new archive format, codec, or SDK ABI. It realigns every current
@@ -98,8 +190,12 @@ See [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md) for the release record.
 ## Canonical source
 
 - Canonical: https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt
+- Codeberg mirror: https://codeberg.org/berkeley/zupt
+- SecurityOps Brazil mirror: https://git.securityops.com.br/cristiancmoises/zupt
+- SecurityOps global mirror: https://git.securityops.co/cristiancmoises/zupt
 
-Release tags and source archives are published from this repository.
+GitHub remains canonical. The `v5.2.8` tag and its 13 release assets are also
+published byte-for-byte on the three mirrors above.
 
 ## Source-only policy
 
@@ -113,10 +209,10 @@ users. Those assets must be built from the tagged source, tested on their target
 environment, and kept outside Git and the source archive. A format that was not
 built and tested is not presented as supported.
 
-## 5.2.3 release artifacts
+## 5.2.8 release artifacts
 
-The 5.2.3 release workflow is defined to produce the following files only after
-the corresponding target gate succeeds. `SHA256SUMS` records the exact promoted
+The published 5.2.8 release contains exactly the following 13 files after
+every corresponding target gate succeeded. `SHA256SUMS` records the exact promoted
 filenames and digests. The release notes identify the tested commit and the
 manually dispatched CI run; that run's job definitions and logs are the runtime
 evidence for runner image, architecture, toolchain, results, and explicit
@@ -124,23 +220,26 @@ skips. This table is not a substitute for that evidence.
 
 | Format | Intended target and validation boundary |
 | --- | --- |
-| `zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz` | Reproducible, source-only archive; scanned twice-built input plus SHA-256. |
-| `zupt_5.2.3_amd64.deb` | Ubuntu 24.04 amd64 package; install, functional round trip, and uninstall gate. |
-| `zupt-5.2.3-*.x86_64.rpm` and `.src.rpm` | openSUSE Tumbleweed x86_64 source/binary RPM gate; package inspection, install, round trip, and uninstall. |
-| `zupt-5.2.3-linux-x86_64.tar.xz` | Linux x86_64 CLI plus the complete public license/notice payload; dependency allowlist and extracted-package functional gate. |
-| `zupt-gui_5.2.3_all.deb` | Architecture-independent Python/Qt GUI package; exact dependency/payload checks plus installed off-screen GUI/CLI integration gate. |
-| `zupt-gui-5.2.3-1.noarch.rpm` | Architecture-independent Python/Qt GUI RPM; package inspection plus installed off-screen GUI/CLI integration gate. |
-| `zupt-gui-5.2.3-1.src.rpm` | Source RPM corresponding exactly to the gated noarch GUI RPM. |
-| `zupt-gui-5.2.3-portable.zip` | Source-only GUI and launchers with licenses/provenance; source scan, exact member allowlist, and extracted off-screen GUI/CLI gate. |
-| `zupt-5.2.3-windows-x86_64.zip` | Native Windows x86_64 executable with notices; extracted-ZIP round-trip gate. |
-| `ZUPT-5.2.3-macOS-*.dmg` | Native macOS image; mounted packaged executable round-trip gate, with the actual architecture in the filename. |
+| `zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz` | Reproducible, source-only archive; scanned twice-built input plus SHA-256. |
+| `zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz.sha256` | SHA-256 sidecar for the reproducible source archive. |
+| `zupt_5.2.8_amd64.deb` | Ubuntu 24.04 amd64 package; install, functional round trip, and uninstall gate. |
+| `zupt-5.2.8-0.x86_64.rpm` | openSUSE Tumbleweed x86_64 binary RPM; package inspection, install, round trip, and uninstall gate. |
+| `zupt-5.2.8-0.src.rpm` | Source RPM corresponding exactly to the gated openSUSE binary RPM. |
+| `zupt-5.2.8-linux-x86_64.tar.xz` | Linux x86_64 CLI plus the complete public license/notice payload; dependency allowlist and extracted-package functional gate. |
+| `zupt-gui_5.2.8_all.deb` | Architecture-independent Python/Qt GUI package; exact dependency/payload checks plus installed off-screen GUI/CLI integration gate. |
+| `zupt-gui-5.2.8-1.noarch.rpm` | Architecture-independent Python/Qt GUI RPM; package inspection plus installed off-screen GUI/CLI integration gate. |
+| `zupt-gui-5.2.8-1.src.rpm` | Source RPM corresponding exactly to the gated noarch GUI RPM. |
+| `zupt-gui-5.2.8-portable.zip` | Source-only GUI and launchers with licenses/provenance; source scan, exact member allowlist, and extracted off-screen GUI/CLI gate. |
+| `zupt-5.2.8-windows-x86_64.zip` | Native Windows x86_64 executable with notices; extracted-ZIP round-trip gate. |
+| Exactly one `ZUPT-5.2.8-macOS-{x86_64\|arm64}.dmg` | Native macOS image; mounted packaged executable round-trip gate, with the actual runner architecture in the filename. |
+| `SHA256SUMS` | Deterministic manifest covering the other 12 promoted files. |
 
 An asset absent from the release was not promoted through its mandatory gate.
 Do not infer support for another distribution release, OS version, CPU
 architecture, raw UNC/SMB destination, or package manager from a similarly
 named file. Binary assets are release outputs, never source-build inputs.
 
-No AppImage is promised for 5.2.3. The inspected upstream type-2 runtime lacked
+No AppImage is promised for 5.2.8. The inspected upstream type-2 runtime lacked
 a complete notice/source-relink handoff for every statically linked component,
 so redistributing it would not meet this release's provenance gate. AppDir and
 Flatpak bundles and GUI platform installers are likewise outside the promoted
@@ -156,9 +255,10 @@ software already installed on the target. Other historical GUI packages and
 platform installers are not carried forward implicitly.
 
 The canonical source repository is
-<https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt>. Release assets referenced by the AUR,
-Homebrew, Guix, or generic RPM recipes must exist in the canonical GitHub
-release at their recorded URL before those recipes are published.
+<https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt>. The canonical release is
+<https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt/releases/tag/v5.2.8>. Assets referenced
+by the AUR, Homebrew, Guix, or generic RPM recipes must exist there at their
+recorded URL before those recipes are published.
 
 Audit the current checkout and its Git archive with:
 
@@ -170,8 +270,8 @@ bash tests/test_source_only.sh
 For a tag or an existing source archive:
 
 ~~~sh
-bash scripts/check-source-only.sh --tag v5.2.3
-bash scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz
+bash scripts/check-source-only.sh --tag v5.2.8
+bash scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz
 ~~~
 
 Unknown `.bin` files fail the scan. A necessary binary data fixture may be
@@ -275,6 +375,7 @@ The principal source-only gates are:
 ~~~sh
 make WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0 check
 make WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0 test-all
+make sdk-test
 make test-asan
 make test-asan-run
 make audit-licenses
@@ -307,14 +408,34 @@ sanitizer-detected crash. An earlier off-screen GUI smoke run remains supporting
 evidence rather than an exact-candidate package result.
 
 Those results are historical upstream self-audit evidence, not independent
-certification and not 5.2.3 results. Post-tag CI integration failures prevented
-5.2.2 promotion. The exact 5.2.3 candidate must repeat all required gates;
-native Windows and macOS, hosted GitHub CI/release promotion, authenticated OBS,
-and resolution of the openSUSE automatic `debugsource` rpmlint `no-binary`
-finding remain pending until recorded otherwise. Unexecuted gates are `SKIP`,
-never `PASS`.
+certification and not 5.2.8 results. Post-tag CI integration failures prevented
+5.2.2 promotion. The immutable 5.2.3 candidate was also not promoted because its
+source-policy test assumed LF for a `.bat` checkout that correctly used CRLF.
+The immutable v5.2.4 candidate then recorded 12 successful jobs in exact-tag CI
+run `33431386002`; the sole openSUSE service-harness job failed because the
+standalone executor did not enter its service directory, so dependent Windows
+and macOS jobs were skipped. A local Tumbleweed reproduction proved the explicit
+tag ref and corrected working-directory contract, but neither that reproduction
+nor the successful v5.2.4 jobs are v5.2.8 evidence. The immutable v5.2.5
+candidate was not promoted after exact-tag GitHub Actions run `33434986357`:
+13 jobs succeeded, but the native Windows hostile-path fixture and macOS
+build/check gate failed. Their 5.2.6 corrections were followed by exact-tag run
+`33442264243`, which also completed 13 jobs successfully but failed native
+macOS on arm64-unused SHA-NI helper declarations under `-Werror` and native
+Windows during safe UTF-8 fixture argv transcoding. The immutable v5.2.6 tag was
+not promoted. The immutable v5.2.7 tag was also not promoted: exact-tag run
+`33445470664` reached the macOS raw-C1 filename-creation failure with `EILSEQ`,
+recorded 13 successful jobs, and cancelled Windows after the hosted job stalled
+in `make check`; a MinGW/Wine reproduction isolated the stall to
+`test --password-prompt ... </dev/null` entering `_getch`. The
+exact 5.2.8 candidate then repeated all required gates: exact-tag run
+`33456209269` completed 15/15 jobs successfully, including native Windows and
+macOS, the pinned local OBS service chain, source/package gates, and the
+openSUSE RPM checks. Promotion run `33457868306` published the exact tested
+asset allowlist. Unexecuted environments remain `SKIP`, never `PASS`; these
+project-run results are not independent certification.
 
-On Windows, 5.2.3 scopes output handling to normal local Win32 paths. A MinGW
+On Windows, 5.2.8 scopes output handling to normal local Win32 paths. A MinGW
 cross-build or Wine run is not native-Windows evidence; the `windows-latest`
 package job, including its Unicode round trip, remains a mandatory publication
 gate. Win32 extended-length and device-namespace paths, raw UNC output roots
@@ -336,7 +457,7 @@ downgrading authentication of header and footer metadata.
 `disk restore`, and exists only to recover a known, trusted archive created
 before AIT was introduced. Do not use that override for an archive from
 untrusted or attacker-writable storage; verify and migrate the recovered data to
-a newly created 5.2.3 archive. Compression and disk backup never create a
+a newly created 5.2.8 archive. Compression and disk backup never create a
 no-AIT archive.
 
 `info` is deliberately different: it reports unauthenticated framing metadata,
@@ -354,10 +475,9 @@ lists, tests, extracts, and restores it byte-exact. The full local Linux gate
 passed on commit `ff99770`. This is not a claim that a 5.2.1 reader understands every new
 flag-gated 5.2.2 encoding or that every historical combination was tested.
 
-The candidate commands and outcome fields for 5.2.3 are maintained in the
-release handoff and
-[packaging/opensuse/README.md](packaging/opensuse/README.md). They must be
-updated from the final release candidate before tagging. No architecture or
+The build/audit commands and recorded 5.2.8 outcomes are maintained in the
+release evidence and
+[packaging/opensuse/README.md](packaging/opensuse/README.md). No architecture or
 distribution is claimed merely because the code has a fallback path.
 
 ## Source archive
@@ -366,9 +486,9 @@ Generate the reproducible source archive outside the repository:
 
 ~~~sh
 make dist
-sha256sum /tmp/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz
+sha256sum /tmp/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz
 bash scripts/check-source-only.sh \
-    --archive /tmp/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz
+    --archive /tmp/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz
 ~~~
 
 Archive ordering, ownership and timestamps are normalized. The default epoch is
@@ -378,13 +498,13 @@ the same SHA-256. The AUR, Homebrew and Guix recipes are `export-ignore` so
 their checksum fields do not make the archive self-referential. `make dist`
 archives the verified `HEAD` tree object rather than embedding the commit ID,
 so a commit changing only those ignored recipes leaves the fixed-epoch archive
-byte-identical. The recipes remain versioned in Git and must be filled with the
-final digest before the tag is published.
+byte-identical. The recipes remain versioned in Git and pin the final tagged
+digest `378b9506211545b9594cf0d38ac8955d9b1cac34eb6b379ae0ec26b84edb65f7`.
 
 ## openSUSE and OBS
 
-The maintained upstream recipe is in packaging/opensuse. It is prepared for an
-immutable v5.2.3 tag, disables submodules and Git LFS, builds with
+The maintained upstream recipe is in packaging/opensuse. It targets the
+immutable v5.2.8 tag, disables submodules and Git LFS, builds with
 WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0, runs real checks, and installs without the renamed-era
 `vaptvupt` alias.
 
@@ -427,7 +547,7 @@ The optional GUI is under `gui/`. It invokes the `zupt` CLI and needs Python 3
 plus PySide6 or PyQt6. GUI image assets are data files whose purpose,
 provenance and license are recorded in [gui/assets/README.md](gui/assets/README.md).
 The integrated source and lightweight consistency checks do not constitute a
-target-native audit of every historical GUI format. The 5.2.3 artifact promise
+target-native audit of every historical GUI format. The 5.2.8 artifact promise
 is limited to the gated GUI DEB, noarch/source RPM, and source-only portable ZIP
 listed above; AppImage, AppDir, Flatpak bundles, and platform GUI installers
 remain excluded.
@@ -436,13 +556,15 @@ remain excluded.
 
 Cristian Cezar Moisés is the creator and current upstream maintainer of ZUPT and
 the author of the current upstream source, build, test, documentation, and
-packaging changes, including the 5.2.2 baseline and corrective 5.2.3 work.
+packaging changes, including the 5.2.2 baseline and corrective
+5.2.3/5.2.4/5.2.5/5.2.6/5.2.7/5.2.8 work.
 
 Alessandro de Oliveira Faria (Cabelo) is credited as the openSUSE collaborator
 and downstream package maintainer. He reviews the handoff, commits it in the
 OBS project he maintains, and may make the additional openSUSE-side adjustments
 he considers necessary. That downstream role is not attribution of ZUPT source
-authorship or of the upstream 5.2.2 or 5.2.3 changes.
+authorship or of the upstream 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.2.4, 5.2.5, 5.2.6, 5.2.7, or
+5.2.8 changes.
 
 ## License
 

SECURITY.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Security Policy — ZUPT 5.2.3
+# Security Policy — ZUPT 5.2.8
 
 ## Reporting vulnerabilities
 
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ On POSIX terminals, the explicit prompt saves terminal state and installs
 signal-aware cleanup so a handled interruption restores echo and other changed
 settings before termination. This behavior is covered by a PTY regression and
 passed in the full local Linux gate for commit `ff99770`.
+On Windows, the prompt requires a real console input handle before entering
+`_getch`; redirected input and console EOF fail instead of blocking a native
+release gate.
 
 ## Native key files
 
@@ -66,7 +69,7 @@ partially accepted.
 
 ### Optional integrations
 
-The 5.2.3 default is `WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0`:
+The 5.2.8 default is `WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0`:
 
 - `WITH_SDK=1` enables libvuptsdk-backed features, including the SDK PQ mode
   and Argon2id support, using a separately installed system development package.
@@ -78,6 +81,13 @@ downloads it. A missing requested dependency is a build error. Security
 properties of these optional libraries are outside the source-only CLI audit
 unless their exact source package and version are reviewed separately.
 
+The in-repository SDK adapter saves copied keys through the core atomic output
+publisher. POSIX permissions are applied to its already-open temporary
+descriptor, and publication replaces only the requested directory entry after
+copy/close checks succeed. `make sdk-test` exercises private/public modes and
+preservation of pre-existing symlink and hardlink targets. This covers the
+adapter boundary; it does not certify the separately installed SDK library.
+
 ## Cryptographic construction
 
 Encrypted blocks use a fresh 128-bit nonce, AES-256-CTR, and HMAC-SHA256. The
@@ -133,12 +143,19 @@ can compromise archives encrypted to it.
 
 ## Constant-time and side-channel scope
 
-Portable C is the 5.2.3 default. Sensitive comparisons and selections use
+Portable C is the 5.2.8 default. Sensitive comparisons and selections use
 branchless helpers, but generated machine-code behavior remains dependent on
 the compiler and platform. This is not a formal whole-program constant-time
 claim. The C AES implementation uses table lookups and is unsuitable for a
 claim of cache-timing resistance on hostile shared hardware.
 
+Sensitive VaptVupt working buffers are cleared through a compiler-resistant
+wipe helper. Platforms with a guaranteed libc `explicit_bzero` use it; macOS
+and NetBSD use the portable volatile-write fallback because the supported
+deployment targets do not guarantee that symbol. This source-level choice
+resists ordinary dead-store elimination but is not a formal claim about every
+compiler binary.
+
 Textual assembly under `jasmin/` can be enabled explicitly with
 `WITH_JASMIN=1` on a supported x86_64 compiler target. The directory contains
 Jasmin-generated output and separately identified hand-written assembly; all of
@@ -183,21 +200,50 @@ appropriate. Extract untrusted archives as a dedicated unprivileged user into
 a new empty directory, inspect the result before moving it, and apply OS
 sandboxing where available.
 
+Benchmark workspaces are random private directories. POSIX cleanup opens each
+directory component without following links and removes entries relative to
+pinned descriptors. Windows retains no-delete-sharing handles for the resolved
+ancestors and refuses reparse-point recursion. After emptying a directory, it
+reopens that entry relative to the pinned parent, verifies the volume and file
+index against the traversal handle, and marks only the identity-checked handle
+for deletion. An injected link is removed as a link rather than traversed to
+its target.
+
 Disk restore has a separate destructive-device boundary. It measures and
 copies the compacted archive to an exclusively created, auto-deleted private
-scratch file before opening the target, then performs both validation and
-restoration from that same snapshot. `ZUPT_TMPDIR` is an explicit existing
-scratch-directory override; an invalid override fails without fallback. Raw
-block devices are opened only after their capacity has been determined and
-shown sufficient on supported Linux, macOS, or FreeBSD interfaces. Unknown
-device capacity, an undersized device, a source/destination identity match, or
-a snapshot failure stops before the first target write. These checks do not
+scratch file, then performs validation and restoration from that same snapshot.
+`ZUPT_TMPDIR` is an explicit existing scratch-directory override; an invalid
+override fails without fallback. On POSIX, the target is opened once without
+truncation or final-symlink following, classified with `fstat`, and—when it is
+a supported Linux, macOS, or FreeBSD raw block device—the same descriptor is
+retained through capacity checks and writes. Regular files continue through
+atomic publication. Unknown device capacity, an undersized device, a
+source/destination identity match, or a snapshot failure stops before the
+first target write. These checks do not
 make raw-device restore non-destructive: verify both operands and keep recovery
 media before proceeding.
 
+These changes address the three 5.2.8 CodeQL High reports: #5 at SDK key
+publication, #6 at POSIX disk-target classification/use, and #7 at benchmark
+workspace cleanup. The regressions and source review are project evidence, not
+an independent certification. Exact-tag run `33456209269` subsequently passed
+all 15 jobs at `ebb9ab3aa1d42c50030ca02883f6162dc4771fe1`.
+
+The C/C++ default-branch analysis of commit `69fc26b` closed #5, #6, and #7,
+then opened test-only High #8, #9, and #10 because the new SDK regression used
+path-level `stat`/`lstat` before later reads or cleanup. Each individual test
+check now uses a no-follow descriptor with `fstat` or descriptor reads; the
+static gate rejects reintroduction of path-level metadata checks there. The
+subsequent C/C++ default-branch scan run `33452563116` completed successfully at
+commit `7a8e5c5`; alerts #5 through #10 are fixed, and the authenticated
+code-scanning API reported zero open alerts.
+The final release-commit CodeQL run `33456049125` also completed successfully;
+the authenticated API again reported zero open alerts, with #5 through #10
+recorded as fixed rather than dismissed.
+
 The Windows handle-relative implementation is scoped to normal local Win32
 paths. Win32 extended-length and device-namespace paths, raw UNC output roots,
-and mapped/network-drive output are not supported in 5.2.3. Cross-build and
+and mapped/network-drive output are not supported in 5.2.8. Cross-build and
 Wine results are not native-Windows evidence; the `windows-latest` package gate
 must pass its Unicode round trip before Windows assets are published. Restore
 to a normal local directory first and move verified output to network storage
@@ -240,7 +286,7 @@ shared/static library, or distribution package. Audit them with:
 
 ```sh
 scripts/check-source-only.sh
-scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz
+scripts/check-source-only.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz
 ```
 
 Nested archive inspection is required to enforce bounded recursion, member
@@ -250,13 +296,13 @@ limit violations. On commit `ff99770`, the source-only scanner suite passed
 
 DEB, binary RPM, SRPM, notice-bearing Linux tar.xz, source-only portable GUI
 ZIP, Windows ZIP, and macOS DMG release assets are separate outputs. An
-AppImage is not promoted for 5.2.3. A bare Linux or Windows executable is also
+AppImage is not promoted for 5.2.8. A bare Linux or Windows executable is also
 excluded; executables are distributed only inside their notice-bearing
 archives. Trust an artifact only when its exact format has a recorded build,
 content/metadata inspection, extracted or installed smoke test, and applicable
 archive round trip. Never treat an unexecuted platform as passing.
 
-The gated 5.2.3 set is the CLI package/archive set plus the exact GUI DEB,
+The gated 5.2.8 set is the CLI package/archive set plus the exact GUI DEB,
 noarch/source RPM, and source-only portable ZIP documented in the README. The
 portable GUI ZIP contains no compiled runtime and is scanned as source before
 and after extraction. Other GUI packages, AppImage, AppDir and Flatpak bundles,
@@ -273,6 +319,7 @@ make -j"$(getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN 2>/dev/null || printf 1)" \
   WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0 V=1
 make WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0 check
 make WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0 test-all
+make sdk-test
 ```
 
 Where the compiler supports them, run the sanitizer target separately:
@@ -296,11 +343,49 @@ result.
 
 Post-tag CI integration failures prevented 5.2.2 promotion. Those upstream
 self-audit results are not independent certification and do not transfer to
-5.2.3. The exact 5.2.3 candidate must repeat the required suite. Native Windows
-and macOS, hosted GitHub CI/release promotion, authenticated OBS, and the
-openSUSE automatic `debugsource` rpmlint `no-binary` finding remain pending
-until recorded otherwise. An unavailable or unexecuted environment remains
-`SKIP`, never `PASS`.
+5.2.8. The immutable 5.2.3 candidate was not promoted because its source-policy
+test assumed LF for a Windows `.bat` file checked out as CRLF. The immutable
+v5.2.4 candidate was not promoted after exact-tag GitHub Actions run
+`33431386002`: 12 jobs succeeded, the sole openSUSE job failed in its
+standalone source-service harness because it did not enter the service
+directory, and dependent Windows and macOS jobs were skipped. A local
+Tumbleweed reproduction confirmed that `refs/tags/v5.2.4` is valid and that
+`os.chdir(service_dir)` lets `obs_scm`, `tar`, and `recompress` complete with a
+source-scanned archive. This was a release/test integration defect, not a
+product, archive, cryptographic, codec, or SDK ABI change, and its evidence does
+not transfer automatically to 5.2.8. The immutable v5.2.5 candidate was also
+not promoted: exact-tag GitHub Actions run `33434986357` recorded 13 successful
+jobs and failed native Windows/macOS jobs. Its Windows fixture-byte and macOS
+secure-wipe/Bash 3.2 defects were corrected for 5.2.6. A targeted clean-clone
+run of the corrected scanner under genuine GNU Bash 3.2.57 passed repository, standalone
+tree, standalone archive, and root-plus-tag modes; that local compatibility
+result does not transfer to any other gate. Exact-tag v5.2.6 run `33442264243`
+then completed 13 jobs successfully but failed native macOS because x86 SHA-NI
+test helpers were unused on arm64 under `-Werror`, and failed native Windows
+when argv transcoding aborted the safe UTF-8 fixture. Those are test-harness
+integration defects, not product, archive, cryptographic, codec, or SDK ABI
+changes; v5.2.6 remained unpromoted, so its results did not transfer to the
+required 5.2.8 suite. The immutable v5.2.7 candidate was likewise not
+promoted: exact-tag run `33445470664` concluded `cancelled` at
+`2026-08-31T23:11:19Z`, with 13 successful jobs, one failed macOS job after
+raw-C1 fixture creation returned `EILSEQ`, and one cancelled Windows job after
+the hosted job stalled in `make check`; a MinGW/Wine reproduction isolated the
+cause to a redirected password prompt entering `_getch`. Version 5.2.8 makes
+both test boundaries fail or skip without hanging. Manual pre-tag run
+`33452602634` subsequently passed 14 of 15 jobs, including the native macOS
+DMG and the Windows source audit, build, and full distribution checks. The
+remaining Windows smoke failure was an old MSYS `grep` non-BMP pattern boundary
+after ZUPT had compressed and verified all inputs; MinGW/Wine confirmed ZUPT's
+byte-exact UTF-8 listing. The corrected gate validates Latin-1, BMP, and
+non-BMP listing bytes without locale-sensitive matching, then requires
+extraction and a full tree diff. The failed run is not exact-candidate
+evidence. Exact-tag run `33456209269` then completed 15/15 jobs successfully,
+including native Windows/macOS, the pinned local OBS service chain, package
+installation/round trips, source-only checks, analyzers, and sanitizers.
+Promotion run `33457868306` published the exact 13-file allowlist after
+format, metadata, payload, and checksum validation. An unavailable or
+unexecuted environment remains `SKIP`, never `PASS`; successful project CI is
+still not independent security certification.
 
 Run target-native static analyzers and package checks as additional evidence.
 Do not infer x86_64, aarch64, ppc64le, s390x, riscv64, macOS, Windows, Leap, or

THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md

@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ grant attached to their unchanged Git blobs, are recorded in
 
 ## AppImage type-2 runtime
 
-No AppImage is a promised or promoted 5.2.3 release asset. The upstream
+No AppImage is a promised or promoted 5.2.8 release asset. The upstream
 type-2 runtime inspected during the 5.2.2 review statically linked musl, libfuse,
 squashfuse, zstd, zlib, and mimalloc, but its own license notice did not list
 mimalloc and the available release inputs did not provide a complete
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ no network input and requires the operator to supply both a locally verified
 runtime and `APPIMAGE_RUNTIME_COMPLIANCE_FILE`, containing the license notices,
 source correspondence or offer, and relink information applicable to those
 exact runtime bytes. An artifact produced independently with that helper is
-not covered by the 5.2.3 upstream release gates.
+not covered by the 5.2.8 upstream release gates.
 
 ## Reporting attribution issues
 

THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# ZUPT 5.2.3 threat model
+# ZUPT 5.2.8 threat model
 
 This document defines the security boundary of the ZUPT archive tool. It is
 not a certification, a guarantee against every hostile input, or a substitute
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ plausibly deniable.
 
 ## Baseline considered here
 
-The upstream baseline is built from the 5.2.3 source with:
+The upstream baseline is built from the 5.2.8 source with:
 
 ```sh
 make WITH_SDK=0 WITH_PQBOX=0
@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ duplicates but shares the underlying stream/offset and may buffer beyond the
 line, so callers should provide a descriptor dedicated to that password read.
 On POSIX, handled prompt interruptions restore the saved terminal state before
 termination; an exact-candidate PTY regression is required before release.
+On Windows, a prompt is entered only for a real console input handle;
+redirected input and console EOF fail instead of blocking in `_getch`.
 
 Native private-key generation uses no-replace creation with POSIX mode `0600`
 or a Windows current-user-only DACL. A failed write, flush/fsync, or close leaves
@@ -99,6 +101,13 @@ and public/private role validation. This prevents role confusion and
 partial/trailing-key acceptance; it does not protect a key after endpoint or
 account compromise.
 
+When the optional system SDK is enabled, the in-repository adapter copies a key
+through the core atomic publisher, applies POSIX mode through the already-open
+temporary descriptor, and publishes only after copy/close checks succeed. Its
+`sdk-test` regression preserves existing symlink/hardlink targets and verifies
+private/public modes. This narrows the adapter boundary; it does not extend the
+baseline assessment to the external SDK implementation.
+
 ### Encrypted archive integrity
 
 Current encrypted archives authenticate ciphertext, canonical block metadata,
@@ -175,22 +184,39 @@ temporary through its descriptor or handle. These controls reduce traversal,
 link, race, and partial-output risks, but do not establish that no parser or
 filesystem bug can exist.
 
-The Windows handle-relative boundary in 5.2.3 covers normal local Win32 paths.
+Benchmark scratch data lives in a random private directory. Cleanup resolves
+POSIX components without following links and deletes relative to pinned
+descriptors. On Windows it retains no-delete-sharing ancestor handles, refuses
+reparse-point recursion, then reopens each emptied directory relative to its
+pinned parent and verifies its filesystem identity before handle-based
+deletion. An attacker who inserts a link can cause cleanup failure, but the
+cleanup must not traverse to the link target.
+
+The Windows handle-relative boundary in 5.2.8 covers normal local Win32 paths.
 Win32 extended-length and device-namespace paths, raw UNC output roots, and
 mapped/network-drive output are not supported. Cross-build and Wine results are
 not a substitute for the required native `windows-latest` Unicode package
 gate. Restore locally before moving verified output to network storage.
 
 Disk restore copies the measured compacted archive into one exclusively
-created, auto-deleted scratch file before it opens a destructive destination.
-Preflight and restoration consume that same open snapshot. An explicit
-`ZUPT_TMPDIR` selects an existing scratch directory; failure there does not
-fall back to consuming the mutable source pathname. On supported Linux, macOS,
-and FreeBSD interfaces, a raw block-device target is rejected before writing if
-its capacity is unknown or smaller than the image. These controls reduce source
-exchange and immediate overrun risk but do not protect against a compromised
-kernel/device, a wrongly selected sufficiently large device, power loss, or
-hardware failure.
+created, auto-deleted scratch file. Preflight and restoration consume that same
+open snapshot. An explicit `ZUPT_TMPDIR` selects an existing scratch directory;
+failure there does not fall back to consuming the mutable source pathname. On
+POSIX, the destination is opened once without truncation or final-symlink
+following, classified with `fstat`, and the same raw-device descriptor is
+retained for supported Linux, macOS, and FreeBSD capacity checks and writes.
+Regular-file output retains atomic publication. A raw target is rejected before
+writing if its capacity is unknown or smaller than the image. These controls
+reduce source exchange, target exchange, and immediate overrun risk but do not
+protect against a compromised kernel/device, a wrongly selected sufficiently
+large device, power loss, or hardware failure.
+
+The SDK publication, POSIX disk-target, and benchmark-cleanup changes address
+CodeQL High #5, #6, and #7 respectively. Their source review and regressions
+alone are project evidence, not independent certification. Exact-tag run
+`33456209269` subsequently passed all 15 hosted jobs at
+`ebb9ab3aa1d42c50030ca02883f6162dc4771fe1`; final release-commit CodeQL run
+`33456049125` completed successfully with zero open alerts.
 
 For an untrusted archive:
 
@@ -250,9 +276,9 @@ tagged source. Each artifact extends the trust boundary to its builder,
 toolchain, runner image, and packaging scripts. Treat it as validated only when
 the exact target has a recorded build, content/package inspection, extracted or
 installed smoke test, and applicable archive round trip. An AppImage is not
-promoted for 5.2.3; bare Linux and Windows executables are also excluded.
+promoted for 5.2.8; bare Linux and Windows executables are also excluded.
 
-For 5.2.3, that gated artifact scope covers the CLI files plus the exact GUI
+For 5.2.8, that gated artifact scope covers the CLI files plus the exact GUI
 DEB, noarch/source RPM, and source-only portable ZIP named in the README. The
 portable ZIP contains no compiled runtime and crosses the release boundary only
 after source scans and an exact safe-member check. AppDir and Flatpak bundles
@@ -265,10 +291,37 @@ strict Clang, GCC `-fanalyzer`, the 9/9 tool-enabled static-analysis run,
 ASan/UBSan/LSan, and 1,000 mutation-fuzz iterations passed. Earlier off-screen
 GUI smoke evidence is retained separately. Post-tag CI integration failures
 prevented 5.2.2 promotion. This upstream self-review is not an independent
-certification and is not 5.2.3 evidence. Native Windows/macOS, hosted GitHub CI
-and release promotion, authenticated OBS, and the openSUSE automatic
-`debugsource` rpmlint `no-binary` finding remain pending until recorded
-otherwise.
+certification and is not 5.2.8 evidence. The immutable 5.2.3 candidate was not
+promoted because its source-policy test assumed LF for a Windows `.bat` checkout
+that correctly used CRLF. The immutable v5.2.4 candidate was not promoted after
+exact-tag GitHub Actions run `33431386002`: 12 jobs succeeded, the sole openSUSE
+service-harness job failed because its standalone executor did not enter the
+service directory, and dependent Windows/macOS jobs were skipped. A local
+Tumbleweed reproduction established that the explicit `refs/tags/v5.2.4`
+revision works and that `os.chdir(service_dir)` completes the source-service
+chain. This narrows the failure to release/test integration; it changes no
+product, archive, cryptographic, codec, or SDK ABI boundary and supplies no
+automatic 5.2.8 evidence. The immutable v5.2.5 candidate was not promoted after
+exact-tag GitHub Actions run `33434986357`: 13 jobs succeeded, but native
+Windows and macOS failed on fixture-byte preservation and Darwin/Bash 3.2
+portability respectively. The corresponding 5.2.6 corrections were followed by
+exact-tag run `33442264243`: 13 jobs succeeded, while native macOS failed on
+x86-only SHA-NI helper declarations unused on arm64 under `-Werror`, and native
+Windows aborted during safe UTF-8 fixture argv transcoding. The v5.2.6 tag was
+not promoted. Version 5.2.7 corrected those two boundaries, but its exact-tag
+run `33445470664` concluded `cancelled` at `2026-08-31T23:11:19Z`, with 13
+successful jobs, one failed macOS job after raw-C1 filename creation returned
+`EILSEQ`, and one cancelled Windows job after the hosted job stalled in `make
+check`; a MinGW/Wine reproduction isolated the cause to a redirected password
+prompt entering `_getch`.
+The corresponding 5.2.8 fixture and prompt corrections alone did not establish
+a result. Exact-tag run `33456209269` then passed 15/15 jobs, including
+`sdk-test`, native Windows/macOS, the pinned local OBS source-service chain,
+and the package/source gates. Promotion run `33457868306` published the exact
+13 tested assets. Official authenticated OBS/Factory acceptance, the full
+automatic debug-package result, and untested architectures remain unclaimed;
+the earlier `debugsource` rpmlint `no-binary` finding remains unresolved and
+unsuppressed.
 
 ## Historical compatibility notes
 
@@ -295,7 +348,7 @@ These are historical facts about earlier releases, retained to support recovery:
   combinations remain unclaimed.
 
 Historical test counts in the changelog describe those releases. They do not
-automatically become 5.2.3 results; current outcomes belong in the release
+automatically become 5.2.8 results; current outcomes belong in the release
 validation record, with unavailable environments marked `SKIP`. In particular,
 runs made before the final positional-AAD and mandatory-AIT changes are not
 final release gates for the resulting candidate.
@@ -306,4 +359,4 @@ Email **zupt@riseup.net** with `[security]` in the subject. Include the version,
 platform, impact, and a minimal non-sensitive reproducer. Do not disclose the
 issue publicly until a coordinated timeline has been agreed.
 
-Document version: 5.2.3, 2026-08-31.
+Document version: 5.2.8, 2026-08-31.

doc/zupt-gui.1

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 .\" SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
 .\" Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés
-.TH ZUPT-GUI 1 "2026-08-31" "ZUPT 5.2.3" "User Commands"
+.TH ZUPT-GUI 1 "2026-08-31" "ZUPT 5.2.8" "User Commands"
 .SH NAME
 zupt-gui \- Qt interface for the ZUPT backup utility
 .SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ or
 only when libvuptsdk or libpqvaptvupt is independently reported enabled.
 These two optional integrations are detected separately.
 .PP
-The gated 5.2.3 GUI release set is limited to the architecture-independent DEB,
+The gated 5.2.8 GUI release set is limited to the architecture-independent DEB,
 noarch/source RPM, and source-only portable ZIP named in the project README.
 Package gates require exact checks and installed off-screen GUI/CLI integration.
 The portable ZIP receives source scans, an exact safe-member allowlist, and an

doc/zupt.1

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 .\" SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
 .\" Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés
-.TH ZUPT 1 "2026-08-31" "ZUPT 5.2.3" "User Commands"
+.TH ZUPT 1 "2026-08-31" "ZUPT 5.2.8" "User Commands"
 .
 .SH NAME
 zupt \- source-built backup compression and authenticated-encryption utility
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Git and the upstream source tarball are source-only. Separately built CLI DEB,
 binary RPM, SRPM, notice-bearing Linux tar.xz, Windows ZIP, and macOS DMG assets
 may be published from the immutable tag only after their target-specific gates
 pass; they never enter Git or the source tarball. An AppImage is not promoted
-for 5.2.3; neither are AppDir/Flatpak bundles, GUI platform installers, or bare
+for 5.2.8; neither are AppDir/Flatpak bundles, GUI platform installers, or bare
 Linux/Windows executables. The Python/Qt frontend remains available as source;
 its gated architecture-independent DEB, noarch/source RPM, and source-only
 portable ZIP are included in the release claim. The portable ZIP contains no
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ then traverse below a pinned directory descriptor with no-follow operations.
 Windows builds use handle-relative traversal and
 no-replace publication for normal local Win32 destinations. Extended-length and
 device-namespace paths, raw UNC output roots, and mapped/network-drive output
-are not supported in 5.2.3. Cross-compilation and Wine results are not native
+are not supported in 5.2.8. Cross-compilation and Wine results are not native
 Windows evidence; the native Windows package gate, including its Unicode round
 trip, is separate and mandatory before publication.
 .
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ and the encrypted-dedup linear AAD sequence published through 5.2.1. The narrow
 compatibility fixture is an actual v5.2.1 password-encrypted
 DATA/DATA/REF/DATA disk archive stored as hexadecimal text with source and hash
 provenance. The candidate lists, tests, extracts, and restores that fixture
-byte-exact. The exact 5.2.3 candidate must repeat the gate. It does not imply
+byte-exact. The exact 5.2.8 candidate must repeat the gate. It does not imply
 that a 5.2.1 reader
 accepts every new 5.2.2 archive or that every historical encrypted mode was
 retested.

gui/README.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # ZUPT GUI
 
-The ZUPT GUI is a Python/Qt front end for the ZUPT 5.2.3 command-line
+The ZUPT GUI is a Python/Qt front end for the ZUPT 5.2.8 command-line
 program. It starts the CLI as a subprocess; compression, archive parsing, and
 cryptography remain in the C program.
 
@@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ operating systems and must be tested on the target system.
 Release pages provide only these GUI artifacts after their separate package and
 installed off-screen GUI/CLI integration gates pass:
 
-- `zupt-gui_5.2.3_all.deb`;
-- `zupt-gui-5.2.3-1.noarch.rpm`;
-- `zupt-gui-5.2.3-1.src.rpm`;
-- `zupt-gui-5.2.3-portable.zip`.
+- `zupt-gui_5.2.8_all.deb`;
+- `zupt-gui-5.2.8-1.noarch.rpm`;
+- `zupt-gui-5.2.8-1.src.rpm`;
+- `zupt-gui-5.2.8-portable.zip`.
 
 The DEB/RPM packages install the Python/Qt source and depend on the matching
 `zupt` CLI package. The portable ZIP contains source, launchers, icons, licenses,
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ An absent artifact did not pass its gate and must not be inferred from another
 format's result.
 
 GUI AppImage, AppDir and Flatpak bundles, and Windows/macOS GUI installers are
-not promoted by the upstream 5.2.3 release gates.
+not promoted by the upstream 5.2.8 release gates.
 `packaging/build-gui-appimage.sh` is a downstream-only helper and fails unless
 its operator supplies the exact verified runtime plus a complete
 license/source-relink notice through `APPIMAGE_RUNTIME_COMPLIANCE_FILE`; that
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ notices. It fails unless the directory also has non-empty
 `PYTHON-NOTICE.txt`, `PYINSTALLER-NOTICE.txt`, `QT-NOTICE.txt`, and either
 `PYSIDE6-NOTICE.txt` or `PYQT6-NOTICE.txt`. The installer includes that
 directory together with every ZUPT license and notice. This requirement does
-not make the untested GUI installer a 5.2.3 release asset. The promoted Windows
+not make the untested GUI installer a 5.2.8 release asset. The promoted Windows
 ZIP and macOS DMG are CLI-only.
 
 Packaging recipes and scripts under `gui/packaging/` and `packaging/` are build

gui/packaging/deb/control

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 Package: zupt-gui
-Version: 5.2.3
+Version: 5.2.8
 Section: utils
 Priority: optional
 Architecture: all
-Depends: python3 (>= 3.9), python3-pyqt6 | python3-pyside6.qtwidgets, zupt (= 5.2.3)
+Depends: python3 (>= 3.9), python3-pyqt6 | python3-pyside6.qtwidgets, zupt (= 5.2.8)
 Maintainer: Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>
 Homepage: https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt
 Description: Qt graphical interface for the ZUPT backup utility

gui/packaging/windows/build-windows.bat

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ rem runtime files embedded by this local build.
 setlocal EnableExtensions
 for %%I in ("%~dp0\..\..\..") do set "REPO_ROOT=%%~fI"
 set "VERSION=%~1"
-if not defined VERSION set "VERSION=5.2.3"
+if not defined VERSION set "VERSION=5.2.8"
 if not defined ZUPT_DIST_DIR set "ZUPT_DIST_DIR=%TEMP%\zupt-release"
 if not defined ZUPT_CLI_EXE set "ZUPT_CLI_EXE=%REPO_ROOT%\zupt.exe"
 set "WORK=%TEMP%\zupt-gui-build-%RANDOM%-%RANDOM%"

include/zupt.h

@@ -118,7 +118,12 @@ static inline int zupt_win_mkdir_utf8(const char *path) {
 #define ZUPT_PRODUCT_TAGLINE   "Post-quantum backup compression"
 
 /* v5.2.3 corrects release packaging and CI; archive format remains v1.6. */
-#define ZUPT_VERSION_STRING "5.2.3"
+/* v5.2.4 makes package metadata checks CRLF-safe; format remains v1.6. */
+/* v5.2.5 corrects the OBS service harness cwd; format remains v1.6. */
+/* v5.2.6 corrects native release-gate portability; format remains v1.6. */
+/* v5.2.7 corrects native test-harness portability; format remains v1.6. */
+/* v5.2.8 hardens three path-race boundaries; format remains v1.6. */
+#define ZUPT_VERSION_STRING "5.2.8"
 /* Vendored codec release (upstream tag) — single source for display strings.
  * The codec's own VV_VERSION_* is its internal API version, not the release. */
 #define ZUPT_CODEC_RELEASE "2.65.3"

install.sh

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 set -Eeuo pipefail
 umask 077
 
-VERSION=${VERSION:-5.2.3}
+VERSION=${VERSION:-5.2.8}
 PREFIX=${PREFIX:-/usr/local}
 
 echo "🔧 Installing ZUPT..."

packaging/aur/PKGBUILD

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 # Test locally with `makepkg -s` after the release archive is published.
 
 pkgname=zupt
-pkgver=5.2.3
+pkgver=5.2.8
 pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc='Pure-C11 post-quantum backup compression utility (AES-256-CTR + HMAC-SHA256 + ML-KEM-768 + X25519)'
 arch=('x86_64')
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ makedepends=('gcc' 'git' 'make')
 checkdepends=('python')
 
 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt/releases/download/v${pkgver}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz")
-# Byte-reproducible upstream v5.2.3 source archive.
-sha256sums=('062f008751a4333bd88ad8a826b98066704b4cb9bc08a016f2f5083365b449d4')
+# Byte-reproducible upstream v5.2.8 source archive.
+sha256sums=('378b9506211545b9594cf0d38ac8955d9b1cac34eb6b379ae0ec26b84edb65f7')
 
 build() {
     cd "${pkgname}-${pkgver}"

packaging/build-gui-rpm.sh

@@ -124,20 +124,49 @@ mapfile -t source_rpms < <(find "$top/SRPMS" -type f -name "zupt-gui-$version-*.
 [[ ${#main_rpms[@]} -eq 1 ]] || die "expected one GUI RPM, found ${#main_rpms[@]}"
 [[ ${#source_rpms[@]} -eq 1 ]] || die "expected one GUI source RPM, found ${#source_rpms[@]}"
 
-rpm -qpl "${main_rpms[0]}" >"$work/contents.txt"
+main_rpm=${main_rpms[0]}
+source_rpm=${source_rpms[0]}
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{NAME}' "$main_rpm") == zupt-gui ]] || \
+    die 'GUI binary RPM name metadata is not zupt-gui'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{VERSION}' "$main_rpm") == "$version" ]] || \
+    die 'GUI binary RPM version metadata does not match the release'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{RELEASE}' "$main_rpm") == 1 ]] || \
+    die 'GUI binary RPM release metadata is not 1'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCEPACKAGE}' "$main_rpm") == '(none)' ]] || \
+    die 'GUI binary RPM is marked as a source package'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCERPM}' "$main_rpm") == "$(basename -- "$source_rpm")" ]] || \
+    die 'GUI binary RPM does not reference the matching source RPM'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{NAME}' "$source_rpm") == zupt-gui ]] || \
+    die 'GUI source RPM name metadata is not zupt-gui'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{VERSION}' "$source_rpm") == "$version" ]] || \
+    die 'GUI source RPM version metadata does not match the release'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{RELEASE}' "$source_rpm") == 1 ]] || \
+    die 'GUI source RPM release metadata is not 1'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCEPACKAGE}' "$source_rpm") == 1 ]] || \
+    die 'GUI source RPM is not marked as a source package'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCERPM}' "$source_rpm") == '(none)' ]] || \
+    die 'GUI source RPM unexpectedly references another source RPM'
+mapfile -t source_members < <(rpm -qpl "$source_rpm" | sort)
+expected_source_members=("zupt-gui-${version}.tar.gz" zupt-gui.spec)
+mapfile -t expected_source_members < <(printf '%s\n' "${expected_source_members[@]}" | sort)
+[[ ${#source_members[@]} -eq 2 && \
+    ${source_members[*]} == "${expected_source_members[*]}" ]] || \
+    die 'GUI source RPM payload is not the exact Source0/spec pair'
+
+rpm -qpl "$main_rpm" >"$work/contents.txt"
 grep -q '^/usr/bin/zupt-gui$' "$work/contents.txt" || die 'GUI launcher missing from RPM'
 if grep -Eq '(^/usr/bin/vaptvupt-gui$|\.(o|obj|a|so|so\.[^/]+|dll|dylib|exe)$)' "$work/contents.txt"; then
     cat "$work/contents.txt" >&2
     die 'forbidden compatibility alias or compiled artifact in GUI RPM'
 fi
-(cd -- "$extract" && rpm2cpio "${main_rpms[0]}" | cpio -idm --quiet)
+(cd -- "$extract" && rpm2cpio "$main_rpm" | cpio -idm --quiet)
 PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 - <<PY
 from pathlib import Path
 p = Path("$extract/usr/share/zupt-gui/zupt_gui.py")
 compile(p.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), str(p), "exec")
 PY
 
-for artifact in "${main_rpms[0]}" "${source_rpms[0]}"; do
+for artifact in "$main_rpm" "$source_rpm"; do
     destination=$dist_dir/$(basename -- "$artifact")
     [[ ! -e $destination ]] || die "refusing to overwrite existing output: $destination"
     cp -- "$artifact" "$destination"

packaging/build-rpm.sh

@@ -80,6 +80,33 @@ mapfile -t source_rpms < <(find "$top/SRPMS" -type f -name "zupt-${version}-*.sr
 [[ ${#source_rpms[@]} -eq 1 ]] || die "expected one source RPM, found ${#source_rpms[@]}"
 source_rpm=${source_rpms[0]}
 
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{NAME}' "$main_rpm") == zupt ]] || \
+    die 'binary RPM name metadata is not zupt'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{VERSION}' "$main_rpm") == "$version" ]] || \
+    die 'binary RPM version metadata does not match the release'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{RELEASE}' "$main_rpm") == 0 ]] || \
+    die 'binary RPM release metadata is not 0'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCEPACKAGE}' "$main_rpm") == '(none)' ]] || \
+    die 'binary RPM is marked as a source package'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCERPM}' "$main_rpm") == "$(basename -- "$source_rpm")" ]] || \
+    die 'binary RPM does not reference the matching source RPM'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{NAME}' "$source_rpm") == zupt ]] || \
+    die 'source RPM name metadata is not zupt'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{VERSION}' "$source_rpm") == "$version" ]] || \
+    die 'source RPM version metadata does not match the release'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{RELEASE}' "$source_rpm") == 0 ]] || \
+    die 'source RPM release metadata is not 0'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCEPACKAGE}' "$source_rpm") == 1 ]] || \
+    die 'source RPM is not marked as a source package'
+[[ $(rpm -qp --qf '%{SOURCERPM}' "$source_rpm") == '(none)' ]] || \
+    die 'source RPM unexpectedly references another source RPM'
+mapfile -t source_members < <(rpm -qpl "$source_rpm" | sort)
+expected_source_members=("zupt-${version}.tar.gz" zupt.spec)
+mapfile -t expected_source_members < <(printf '%s\n' "${expected_source_members[@]}" | sort)
+[[ ${#source_members[@]} -eq 2 && \
+    ${source_members[*]} == "${expected_source_members[*]}" ]] || \
+    die 'source RPM payload is not the exact Source0/spec pair'
+
 rpm -qpi "$main_rpm" >/dev/null
 rpm -qpl "$main_rpm" > "$work/contents.txt"
 if grep -Eq '(^/usr/bin/vaptvupt$|\.(o|obj|a|so|so\.[^/]+|dll|dylib)$)' "$work/contents.txt"; then

packaging/debian/changelog

@@ -1,3 +1,54 @@
+zupt (5.2.8-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+
+  * Close CodeQL High path-race findings in SDK key publication, disk-restore
+    target handling, and benchmark workspace cleanup.
+  * Treat a filesystem refusal to create the macOS raw-C1 scanner fixture as
+    an explicit skip; reject redirected Windows prompts before _getch; and run
+    sdk-test in the release and hosted Linux gates.
+  * Preserve immutable, unpromoted v5.2.7 run 33445470664: 13 jobs succeeded,
+    macOS failed the raw-C1 fixture, and Windows was cancelled after the hosted
+    job stalled; a MinGW/Wine reproduction isolated redirected _getch entry.
+    Require fresh 5.2.8 evidence.
+
+ -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Mon, 31 Aug 2026 23:30:00 +0000
+
+zupt (5.2.7-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+
+  * Scope SHA-NI test helpers to supported x86 builds so macOS arm64 strict
+    compilation does not fail on unused declarations.
+  * Preserve safe UTF-8 fixture bytes across the Windows argv boundary.
+  * Preserve the immutable, unpromoted 5.2.6 history and require fresh 5.2.7
+    package, checksum, native-platform, OBS, and promotion gates.
+
+ -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Mon, 31 Aug 2026 23:00:00 +0000
+
+zupt (5.2.6-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+
+  * Use the compiler-resistant volatile wipe fallback on macOS and NetBSD, and
+    make the source scanner's empty-array handling compatible with Bash 3.2.
+  * Preserve hostile archive-path fixture bytes exactly on Windows.
+  * Preserve the immutable, unpromoted 5.2.5 history and require fresh 5.2.6
+    package, checksum, native-platform, OBS, and promotion gates.
+
+ -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Mon, 31 Aug 2026 21:30:00 +0000
+
+zupt (5.2.5-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+
+  * Run the standalone OBS source-service chain from its isolated working
+    directory and add a packaging-policy regression for that contract.
+  * Preserve the immutable, unpromoted 5.2.4 history and require fresh 5.2.5
+    package, checksum, native-platform, and promotion gates.
+
+ -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Mon, 31 Aug 2026 19:55:00 +0000
+
+zupt (5.2.4-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+
+  * Make the static Windows GUI package-version check robust to canonical
+    CRLF checkouts.
+  * Advance source-only package metadata and prepare final archive checksums.
+
+ -- Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>  Mon, 31 Aug 2026 18:55:00 +0000
+
 zupt (5.2.3-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
 
   * Derive package checks from the upstream version header and stabilize the

packaging/guix/zupt.scm

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
         xcb-util-renderutil xcb-util-wm xcb-util-cursor
         libinput-minimal mtdev libevdev eudev))
 
-(define %zupt-version "5.2.3")
+(define %zupt-version "5.2.8")
 
 (define %zupt-source
   (origin
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
           "/releases/download/v" %zupt-version
           "/zupt-" %zupt-version ".tar.gz"))
     (sha256
-    (base32 "1m29nijk627my8ba025wp564nw36h2wjda6qibc3ncx4a63h0bq6"))))
+     (base32 "1xv5vd7bh9pcw2d3fszb6jn1r6sxjp48mlzh9icvji8m4439b2rp"))))
 
 (define-public zupt
   (package

packaging/homebrew/zupt.rb

@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@
 class Zupt < Formula
   desc "Post-quantum backup compression utility (ML-KEM-768 + AES-256-CTR + HMAC-SHA256)"
   homepage "https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt"
-  url "https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt/releases/download/v5.2.3/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz"
-  version "5.2.3"
-  sha256 "062f008751a4333bd88ad8a826b98066704b4cb9bc08a016f2f5083365b449d4"
+  url "https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt/releases/download/v5.2.8/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz"
+  version "5.2.8"
+  sha256 "378b9506211545b9594cf0d38ac8955d9b1cac34eb6b379ae0ec26b84edb65f7"
   license all_of: ["AGPL-3.0-or-later", "GPL-3.0-or-later", "BSD-2-Clause", "BSD-3-Clause", "CC0-1.0"]
 
   depends_on "python@3.12" => :test  # only for test-suite tamper harness

packaging/nix/flake.nix

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 #   nix flake check                     # lint the flake
 #
 # To consume from another flake:
-#   inputs.zupt.url = "github:cristiancmoises/zupt/v5.2.3";
+#   inputs.zupt.url = "github:cristiancmoises/zupt/v5.2.8";
 #   ...packages.x86_64-linux.default = inputs.zupt.packages.x86_64-linux.zupt;
 #
 # `make dist` has its own reproducibility gate. This development flake has no
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 
         zupt = pkgs.stdenv.mkDerivation {
           pname = "zupt";
-          version = "5.2.3";
+          version = "5.2.8";
 
           # When publishing, replace this with `fetchurl` against the
           # release tarball. For local development the flake assumes it

packaging/opensuse/README.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# ZUPT 5.2.3 for openSUSE Build Service
+# ZUPT 5.2.8 for openSUSE Build Service
 
 This directory is the upstream, source-only OBS recipe for ZUPT. It is a
 handoff for the downstream maintainer; its presence does not mean that the
@@ -10,13 +10,14 @@ changes in this handoff. Alessandro de Oliveira Faria (Cabelo) is credited only
 as the openSUSE collaborator and downstream OBS package maintainer: he reviews
 the handoff, commits it through the portal/project he maintains, and may make
 the openSUSE-side adjustments he considers necessary. This role does not
-attribute upstream code or the 5.2.2/5.2.3 upstream changes to Cabelo.
+attribute upstream code or the
+5.2.2/5.2.3/5.2.4/5.2.5/5.2.6/5.2.7/5.2.8 upstream changes to Cabelo.
 
 ## Files and source policy
 
 | File | Purpose |
 |---|---|
-| `_service` | Fetch the immutable `v5.2.3` tag and create `Source0` at build time. |
+| `_service` | Fetch the immutable `v5.2.8` tag and create `Source0` at build time. |
 | `zupt.spec` | Build and test the CLI with optional external system integrations disabled. |
 | `zupt.changes` | openSUSE-format package history. |
 | `source-audit.sh` | Handoff wrapper for the repository scanner; run it from the complete handoff tree. |
@@ -29,11 +30,11 @@ https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt.git
 ```
 
 `obs_scm` stores an `.obscpio` plus `.obsinfo`. The `tar` and `recompress`
-services reconstruct `zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz` inside the build environment, which
+services reconstruct `zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz` inside the build environment, which
 matches `Source0` in the spec.
 
 This source policy does not prohibit separately built release-page packages.
-The upstream 5.2.3 gates may publish the CLI source tarball, DEB, binary RPM,
+The upstream 5.2.8 gates may publish the CLI source tarball, DEB, binary RPM,
 SRPM, notice-bearing Linux tar.xz, Windows ZIP, and macOS DMG, together with a
 GUI DEB, noarch RPM, GUI SRPM, and source-only portable GUI ZIP after each
 format-specific test succeeds. None of those files is an OBS `Source0` input
@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ reconstructed by the build-time services. Neither `%build` nor `%check` may
 access the network.
 
 For a source RPM check outside OBS, place the service-produced
-`zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz` next to the spec and use a disposable RPM build tree:
+`zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz` next to the spec and use a disposable RPM build tree:
 
 ```sh
 rpm_top=$(mktemp -d)
@@ -166,11 +167,93 @@ unavailable rather than passing it. Earlier off-screen GUI smoke evidence is
 supporting evidence, not an exact-commit package result.
 
 Post-tag CI integration failures prevented 5.2.2 promotion. These historical
-local results do not establish 5.2.3, native Windows or macOS success, hosted
+local results do not establish 5.2.8, native Windows or macOS success, hosted
 GitHub CI/release promotion, authenticated OBS acceptance, or resolution of the
-automatic openSUSE `debugsource` rpmlint `no-binary` finding. The exact 5.2.3
-candidate must repeat every applicable gate; those gates remain pending until
-recorded otherwise.
+automatic openSUSE `debugsource` rpmlint `no-binary` finding. The immutable
+5.2.3 candidate was not promoted because its source-policy test assumed LF for
+a Windows `.bat` file checked out as CRLF.
+
+## Prior 5.2.4 exact-tag source-service evidence
+
+The immutable v5.2.4 candidate was not promoted. Exact-tag GitHub Actions run
+`33431386002` recorded 12 successful jobs and one failed openSUSE job. That job's
+standalone `Serviceinfo` harness passed the service directory to the executor
+but did not make it the process working directory; dependent native Windows and
+macOS jobs were skipped.
+
+A disposable local openSUSE Tumbleweed reproduction independently resolved
+`refs/tags/v5.2.4` to the tagged commit. With `osc` 1.27.3,
+`obs-service-obs_scm` 0.12.4, `obs-service-tar` 0.12.4, and
+`obs-service-recompress` 0.5.2 installed, the same executor completed
+`obs_scm`, `tar`, and `recompress` after `os.chdir(service_dir)`. It produced
+exactly one `zupt-5.2.4.tar.gz`; its SHA-256 was
+`aa68a58fc2e88ee92296542de1f189e2b8a803154d832fb04d5296b25acaef8f`, and the
+source scanner reported `PASS source-only: 204 files, 1 archives`.
+
+This result establishes that the explicit tag revision works and isolates a
+release/test harness defect. It does not change the product, archive format,
+cryptography, codec, or SDK ABI; it does not make skipped native jobs pass or
+establish authenticated OBS/Factory acceptance. No v5.2.4 evidence transferred
+automatically to v5.2.8; the exact candidate later repeated every applicable
+upstream gate in run `33456209269`, as recorded below. The automatic openSUSE
+`debugsource` rpmlint `no-binary` finding remains unresolved and unsuppressed.
+
+## Prior 5.2.5 exact-tag native-gate evidence
+
+The immutable v5.2.5 candidate was not promoted. Exact-tag GitHub Actions run
+`33434986357` completed 13 jobs successfully and failed the native Windows and
+macOS jobs. Windows exposed a hostile-path fixture that did not preserve its
+requested bytes across the command-line boundary; macOS exposed the unsupported
+`explicit_bzero` assumption and Bash 3.2 empty-array handling. The 5.2.6
+corrections address those release/test integration defects without an archive,
+cryptographic, codec, or SDK ABI change.
+
+## Prior 5.2.6 exact-tag native-gate evidence
+
+The immutable v5.2.6 candidate was not promoted. Exact-tag GitHub Actions run
+`33442264243` completed 13 jobs successfully and failed two native jobs. The
+macOS arm64 SHA-NI test build treated unused x86-only helper declarations as
+errors under `-Werror`; Windows argv transcoding aborted the safe printable
+UTF-8 fixture before its intended path assertions. The 5.2.7 changes correct
+those test-harness boundaries without an archive-format, cryptographic, codec,
+or SDK ABI change. They do not establish 5.2.8 hosted, native, OBS, or promotion
+evidence.
+
+## Prior 5.2.7 exact-tag native-gate evidence
+
+The immutable v5.2.7 candidate was not promoted. Exact-tag GitHub Actions run
+`33445470664` concluded `cancelled` at `2026-08-31T23:11:19Z`, with 13
+successful jobs, one failed macOS job, and one cancelled Windows job. macOS
+rejected creation of the raw-C1 scanner fixture
+with `EILSEQ`; the hosted Windows job stalled in `make check`, and a MinGW/Wine
+reproduction isolated the cause to a redirected password prompt entering
+`_getch`. Version 5.2.8 makes those test
+boundaries fail or skip without hanging, addresses CodeQL High #5/#6/#7 in SDK
+key publication, disk restore, and benchmark cleanup, and adds `sdk-test` to
+release and hosted Linux gates. None of those changes establishes an exact
+5.2.8 OBS, native, hosted-CI, or promotion result.
+
+## 5.2.8 exact-tag upstream package evidence
+
+Manually dispatched exact-tag GitHub Actions run `33456209269` passed all 15
+jobs at `ebb9ab3aa1d42c50030ca02883f6162dc4771fe1`. Its openSUSE Tumbleweed
+x86_64 job parsed and normalized the spec, executed the pinned standalone OBS
+source-service chain, source-scanned the resulting archive, built the binary
+RPM and genuine SRPM, ran `rpmlint` without suppressions, and completed the
+install/round-trip/uninstall test. The canonical source archive is 798296 bytes
+with SHA-256
+`378b9506211545b9594cf0d38ac8955d9b1cac34eb6b379ae0ec26b84edb65f7`.
+
+Promotion run `33457868306` published the exact tested binary RPM and SRPM with
+the other gated assets. The source package is identified by
+`%{SOURCEPACKAGE}=1` and an absent `%{SOURCERPM}`; its `%{ARCH}` legitimately
+reflects the spec's build architecture and is not the SRPM discriminator.
+Repository, Git archive, and upstream source tarball scans remain binary-free.
+
+This is upstream local-service and package evidence, not a claim that the
+package was submitted to or accepted by openSUSE Factory, nor a result for the
+full set of automatically generated OBS debug packages or any untested
+architecture.
 
 ## Prior openSUSE packaging validation
 
@@ -209,11 +292,11 @@ gate.
 ## Handoff procedure for Alessandro/Cabelo
 
 1. Upstream completes every applicable pre-tag source and local audit gate,
-   then creates and verifies the annotated `v5.2.3` tag. Exact-tag hosted,
+   then creates and verifies the annotated `v5.2.8` tag. Exact-tag hosted,
    native-platform, package, and promotion gates must pass before release or
    downstream handoff; the tag itself is never moved to repair a failure.
 2. With Git, `file`, bsdtar, tar, zip, unzip and SHA-256 tools installed, run
-   `scripts/export-opensuse-package.sh v5.2.3`. Verify the reported ZIP and
+   `scripts/export-opensuse-package.sh v5.2.8`. Verify the reported ZIP and
    SHA-256 outside the Git index. The handoff includes both
    `packaging/opensuse/source-audit.sh` and its required
    `scripts/check-source-only.sh`; keep that relative layout while auditing.
@@ -225,7 +308,7 @@ gate.
    ```
 
 4. From the extracted handoff root, run
-   `packaging/opensuse/source-audit.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.3.tar.gz`.
+   `packaging/opensuse/source-audit.sh --archive /path/to/zupt-5.2.8.tar.gz`.
    Then copy `_service`, `zupt.spec`, `zupt.changes` and `README.md`
    into the flat OBS package checkout. The audit wrapper is not an OBS build
    source and must not be copied without its companion `scripts/` directory.

packaging/opensuse/_service

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
   <service name="obs_scm" mode="manual">
     <param name="url">https://github.com/cristiancmoises/zupt.git</param>
     <param name="scm">git</param>
-    <param name="revision">refs/tags/v5.2.3</param>
+    <param name="revision">refs/tags/v5.2.8</param>
     <param name="versionformat">@PARENT_TAG@</param>
     <param name="versionrewrite-pattern">^v(.*)$</param>
     <param name="versionrewrite-replacement">\1</param>

packaging/opensuse/zupt.changes

@@ -1,3 +1,56 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Aug 31 23:30:00 UTC 2026 - Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>
+
+- Update to 5.2.8:
+  * Close CodeQL High path-race findings in SDK key publication,
+    descriptor-first disk restore, and benchmark workspace cleanup.
+  * Make the raw-C1 scanner fixture explicitly skip filesystems that reject
+    the byte with EILSEQ, reject redirected Windows prompts before _getch, and
+    add sdk-test to release/hosted Linux gates.
+  * Preserve immutable, unpromoted v5.2.7 run 33445470664: 13 jobs succeeded,
+    macOS failed the raw-C1 fixture, and Windows was cancelled after the hosted
+    job stalled; a MinGW/Wine reproduction isolated redirected _getch entry.
+  * Pin the OBS source service to the immutable v5.2.8 tag and require fresh
+    exact-candidate evidence before promotion.
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Aug 31 23:00:00 UTC 2026 - Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>
+
+- Update to 5.2.7:
+  * Scope SHA-NI test helpers away from unsupported macOS arm64 builds.
+  * Preserve safe UTF-8 fixture bytes across the Windows argv boundary.
+  * Preserve immutable, unpromoted 5.2.6 history and require fresh 5.2.7 gates.
+  * Pin the OBS source service to the immutable v5.2.7 tag.
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Aug 31 21:30:00 UTC 2026 - Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>
+
+- Update to 5.2.6:
+  * Use the compiler-resistant volatile wipe fallback on macOS and NetBSD.
+  * Make source-scanner empty-array handling compatible with Bash 3.2.
+  * Preserve hostile archive-path fixture bytes exactly on Windows.
+  * Preserve immutable, unpromoted 5.2.5 history and require fresh 5.2.6 gates.
+  * Pin the OBS source service to the immutable v5.2.6 tag.
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Aug 31 19:55:00 UTC 2026 - Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>
+
+- Update to 5.2.5:
+  * Run the standalone OBS source-service chain from its isolated working
+    directory so downstream services can find .obsinfo.
+  * Add a packaging-policy regression for the executor working directory.
+  * Preserve immutable, unpromoted 5.2.4 history and require fresh 5.2.5 gates.
+  * Pin the OBS source service to the immutable v5.2.5 tag.
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Aug 31 18:55:00 UTC 2026 - Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>
+
+- Update to 5.2.4:
+  * Make the static Windows GUI package-version check robust to canonical
+    CRLF checkouts.
+  * Advance source-only package metadata and prepare final archive hashes.
+  * Pin the OBS source service to the immutable v5.2.4 tag.
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Mon Aug 31 18:15:00 UTC 2026 - Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co>
 

packaging/opensuse/zupt.spec

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #
 
 Name:           zupt
-Version:        5.2.3
+Version:        5.2.8
 Release:        0
 Summary:        Backup compression with authenticated and post-quantum encryption
 License:        AGPL-3.0-or-later AND GPL-3.0-or-later AND BSD-2-Clause AND BSD-3-Clause AND CC0-1.0

packaging/portable/README.txt

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Requirements
 ------------
   1. Python 3.9 or newer.
   2. PySide6 6.5 or newer, or a compatible PyQt6 package.
-  3. ZUPT 5.2.3, installed as `zupt` on PATH or placed beside the launcher
+  3. ZUPT 5.2.8, installed as `zupt` on PATH or placed beside the launcher
      (`zupt.exe` on Windows). A local command must have been built
      and tested independently; this bundle never downloads one.
 
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Troubleshooting
 ---------------
   * "requires PySide6 or PyQt6": install one Qt binding through your operating
     system package manager or another trusted, preconfigured Python source.
-  * "zupt not found": install ZUPT 5.2.3 or place its command beside
+  * "zupt not found": install ZUPT 5.2.8 or place its command beside
     the launcher.
   * Set ZUPT_DEBUG=1 to print command-discovery diagnostics to stderr.
 

packaging/rpm/zupt.spec

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 # installed smoke test.
 
 Name:           zupt
-Version:        5.2.3
+Version:        5.2.8
 Release:        1%{?dist}
 Summary:        Backup compression with authenticated and post-quantum encryption
 
@@ -101,6 +101,35 @@ comments. Plain archives use non-cryptographic checksums.
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Aug 31 2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co> - 5.2.8-1
+- Close CodeQL High path-race findings in SDK key save, disk restore, and
+  benchmark cleanup; add the SDK gate, portable raw-C1 fixture handling, and
+  redirected Windows password-prompt rejection.
+- Preserve immutable, unpromoted v5.2.7 run 33445470664: 13 jobs succeeded,
+  macOS failed the raw-C1 fixture, and Windows was cancelled after the hosted
+  job stalled; a MinGW/Wine reproduction isolated redirected _getch entry.
+- Require fresh 5.2.8 gates.
+
+* Mon Aug 31 2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co> - 5.2.7-1
+- Correct native test integration: scope SHA-NI helpers away from macOS arm64
+  and preserve safe UTF-8 fixture bytes across the Windows argv boundary.
+- Preserve immutable, unpromoted 5.2.6 history and require fresh 5.2.7 gates.
+
+* Mon Aug 31 2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co> - 5.2.6-1
+- Correct native release gates: use the secure volatile wipe fallback on
+  macOS and NetBSD, support Bash 3.2 empty arrays in the source scanner, and
+  preserve hostile archive-path fixture bytes exactly on Windows.
+- Preserve immutable, unpromoted 5.2.5 history and require fresh 5.2.6 gates.
+
+* Mon Aug 31 2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co> - 5.2.5-1
+- Run the standalone OBS source-service chain from its isolated working
+  directory and add a packaging-policy regression for that contract.
+- Preserve immutable, unpromoted 5.2.4 history and require fresh 5.2.5 gates.
+
+* Mon Aug 31 2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co> - 5.2.4-1
+- Make the static Windows GUI package-version check robust to canonical CRLF
+  checkouts, advance source-only package metadata, and prepare final hashes.
+
 * Mon Aug 31 2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés <sac@securityops.co> - 5.2.3-1
 - Correct the release-package CI version checks and portable GUI version
   contract, and make the openSUSE container replace busybox-gawk before

scripts/check-source-only.sh

@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ HAVE_EXTERNAL_TARGET=0
 declare -a TAGS=()
 declare -a ARCHIVES=()
 declare -a TREES=()
+TAG_COUNT=0
+ARCHIVE_COUNT=0
+TREE_COUNT=0
 
 FAILURES=0
 SCANNED=0
@@ -92,17 +95,20 @@ while (($#)); do
         --tag)
             (($# >= 2)) || { printf 'ERROR: --tag requires a revision\n' >&2; exit 2; }
             TAGS+=("$2")
+            TAG_COUNT=$((TAG_COUNT + 1))
             shift 2
             ;;
         --archive)
             (($# >= 2)) || { printf 'ERROR: --archive requires a file\n' >&2; exit 2; }
             ARCHIVES+=("$2")
+            ARCHIVE_COUNT=$((ARCHIVE_COUNT + 1))
             HAVE_EXTERNAL_TARGET=1
             shift 2
             ;;
         --tree)
             (($# >= 2)) || { printf 'ERROR: --tree requires a directory\n' >&2; exit 2; }
             TREES+=("$2")
+            TREE_COUNT=$((TREE_COUNT + 1))
             HAVE_EXTERNAL_TARGET=1
             shift 2
             ;;
@@ -127,7 +133,7 @@ while (($#)); do
     esac
 done
 
-if ((HAVE_EXTERNAL_TARGET)) && ((ROOT_REQUESTED == 0)) && ((${#TAGS[@]} == 0)); then
+if ((HAVE_EXTERNAL_TARGET)) && ((ROOT_REQUESTED == 0)) && ((TAG_COUNT == 0)); then
     REPOSITORY_AUDIT=0
 fi
 
@@ -159,6 +165,10 @@ safe_path_for_output() {
     for ((index = 0; index < length; index++)); do
         character=${path:index:1}
         printf -v byte '%d' "'$character"
+        # Bash 3.2 can sign-extend bytes >= 0x80 when converting a character
+        # with %d. Normalize to an unsigned octet before UTF-8 validation and
+        # diagnostic escaping.
+        byte=$((byte & 0xff))
 
         if ((byte < 0x20 || byte == 0x7f)); then
             printf -v escaped '\\x%02x' "$byte"
@@ -179,6 +189,7 @@ safe_path_for_output() {
         if ((byte >= 0xc2 && byte <= 0xdf && index + 1 < length)); then
             character=${path:index+1:1}
             printf -v byte2 '%d' "'$character"
+            byte2=$((byte2 & 0xff))
             if ((byte2 >= 0x80 && byte2 <= 0xbf)); then
                 codepoint=$(((byte & 0x1f) << 6 | (byte2 & 0x3f)))
                 sequence=${path:index:2}
@@ -186,8 +197,10 @@ safe_path_for_output() {
         elif ((byte >= 0xe0 && byte <= 0xef && index + 2 < length)); then
             character=${path:index+1:1}
             printf -v byte2 '%d' "'$character"
+            byte2=$((byte2 & 0xff))
             character=${path:index+2:1}
             printf -v byte3 '%d' "'$character"
+            byte3=$((byte3 & 0xff))
             if ((byte3 >= 0x80 && byte3 <= 0xbf &&
                 ((byte == 0xe0 && byte2 >= 0xa0 && byte2 <= 0xbf) ||
                  (byte >= 0xe1 && byte <= 0xec && byte2 >= 0x80 && byte2 <= 0xbf) ||
@@ -200,10 +213,13 @@ safe_path_for_output() {
         elif ((byte >= 0xf0 && byte <= 0xf4 && index + 3 < length)); then
             character=${path:index+1:1}
             printf -v byte2 '%d' "'$character"
+            byte2=$((byte2 & 0xff))
             character=${path:index+2:1}
             printf -v byte3 '%d' "'$character"
+            byte3=$((byte3 & 0xff))
             character=${path:index+3:1}
             printf -v byte4 '%d' "'$character"
+            byte4=$((byte4 & 0xff))
             if ((byte3 >= 0x80 && byte3 <= 0xbf &&
                 byte4 >= 0x80 && byte4 <= 0xbf &&
                 ((byte == 0xf0 && byte2 >= 0x90 && byte2 <= 0xbf) ||
@@ -268,7 +284,9 @@ path_stays_below_root() {
     [[ $candidate != /* && $candidate != //* ]] || return 1
     [[ ! $candidate =~ ^[[:alpha:]]: ]] || return 1
     read -r -a components <<< "$candidate"
-    for component in "${components[@]}"; do
+    # Bash 3.2 treats an empty array expansion as unset under `set -u`.
+    # The + guard expands to no words for an empty path component list.
+    for component in ${components[@]+"${components[@]}"}; do
         case $component in
             ''|.) ;;
             ..)
@@ -821,38 +839,44 @@ if ((REPOSITORY_AUDIT)); then
     else
         fail_path git-archive-HEAD HEAD 'repository has no commit'
     fi
-    for target in "${TAGS[@]}"; do
-        if git -C "$ROOT" rev-parse --verify -q "$target^{commit}" >/dev/null; then
-            scan_git_archive "$ROOT" "$target" "git-archive-$target"
+    if ((TAG_COUNT)); then
+        for target in "${TAGS[@]}"; do
+            if git -C "$ROOT" rev-parse --verify -q "$target^{commit}" >/dev/null; then
+                scan_git_archive "$ROOT" "$target" "git-archive-$target"
+            else
+                fail_path git-tag "$target" 'revision does not resolve to a commit'
+            fi
+        done
+    fi
+fi
+
+if ((TREE_COUNT)); then
+    for target in "${TREES[@]}"; do
+        if [[ -d $target ]]; then
+            target=$(canonicalize_allow_missing "$target") || {
+                fail_path standalone-tree "$target" 'cannot canonicalize tree'
+                continue
+            }
+            scan_tree "$target" standalone-tree 0
         else
-            fail_path git-tag "$target" 'revision does not resolve to a commit'
+            fail_path standalone-tree "$target" 'tree does not exist'
         fi
     done
 fi
 
-for target in "${TREES[@]}"; do
-    if [[ -d $target ]]; then
-        target=$(canonicalize_allow_missing "$target") || {
-            fail_path standalone-tree "$target" 'cannot canonicalize tree'
-            continue
-        }
-        scan_tree "$target" standalone-tree 0
-    else
-        fail_path standalone-tree "$target" 'tree does not exist'
-    fi
-done
-
-for target in "${ARCHIVES[@]}"; do
-    if [[ -f $target ]]; then
-        target=$(canonicalize_allow_missing "$target") || {
-            fail_path standalone-archive "$target" 'cannot canonicalize archive'
-            continue
-        }
-        scan_archive "$target" "${target##*/}" standalone-archive 0
-    else
-        fail_path standalone-archive "$target" 'archive does not exist'
-    fi
-done
+if ((ARCHIVE_COUNT)); then
+    for target in "${ARCHIVES[@]}"; do
+        if [[ -f $target ]]; then
+            target=$(canonicalize_allow_missing "$target") || {
+                fail_path standalone-archive "$target" 'cannot canonicalize archive'
+                continue
+            }
+            scan_archive "$target" "${target##*/}" standalone-archive 0
+        else
+            fail_path standalone-archive "$target" 'archive does not exist'
+        fi
+    done
+fi
 
 if ((FAILURES == 0)); then
     printf 'PASS source-only: %d files, %d archives\n' "$SCANNED" "$ARCHIVES_SCANNED"

sdk/src/zuptsdk.c

@@ -556,20 +556,46 @@ void zuptsdk_keypair_destroy(zuptsdk_keypair_t *kp) {
 static int zsdk_copy_file(const char *src, const char *dst, mode_t mode) {
     FILE *fi = fopen(src, "rb");
     if (!fi) return ZSDK_FAIL(ZUPTSDK_ERR_IO, "open %s", src);
-    FILE *fo = fopen(dst, "wb");
-    if (!fo) { fclose(fi); return ZSDK_FAIL(ZUPTSDK_ERR_IO, "create %s", dst); }
-    uint8_t buf[4096];
-    size_t n;
-    int rc = ZUPTSDK_OK;
-    while ((n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), fi)) > 0)
-        if (fwrite(buf, 1, n, fo) != n) { rc = ZSDK_FAIL(ZUPTSDK_ERR_IO, "write %s", dst); break; }
-    zuptsdk_secure_zero(buf, sizeof(buf));
-    fclose(fi); fclose(fo);
+    FILE *fo = NULL;
+    zupt_atomic_output_t *output = zupt_atomic_output_open(dst, &fo);
+    if (!output) {
+        int saved_errno = errno;
+        fclose(fi);
+        errno = saved_errno;
+        return ZSDK_FAIL(ZUPTSDK_ERR_IO, "create %s", dst);
+    }
+
 #ifndef _WIN32
-    if (rc == ZUPTSDK_OK) chmod(dst, mode);
+    /* Apply permissions to the private temporary object, never to a
+     * re-resolved destination path. */
+    if (fchmod(fileno(fo), mode) != 0) {
+        int saved_errno = errno;
+        fclose(fi);
+        (void)zupt_atomic_output_finish(output, 0);
+        errno = saved_errno;
+        return ZSDK_FAIL(ZUPTSDK_ERR_IO, "set permissions on %s", dst);
+    }
 #else
     (void)mode;
 #endif
+
+    uint8_t buf[4096];
+    size_t n;
+    int rc = ZUPTSDK_OK;
+    while ((n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), fi)) > 0) {
+        if (fwrite(buf, 1, n, fo) != n) {
+            rc = ZSDK_FAIL(ZUPTSDK_ERR_IO, "write %s", dst);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (rc == ZUPTSDK_OK && ferror(fi))
+        rc = ZSDK_FAIL(ZUPTSDK_ERR_IO, "read %s", src);
+    zuptsdk_secure_zero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+    if (fclose(fi) != 0 && rc == ZUPTSDK_OK)
+        rc = ZSDK_FAIL(ZUPTSDK_ERR_IO, "close %s", src);
+    if (zupt_atomic_output_finish(output, rc == ZUPTSDK_OK) != 0 &&
+        rc == ZUPTSDK_OK)
+        rc = ZSDK_FAIL(ZUPTSDK_ERR_IO, "publish %s", dst);
     return rc;
 }
 

sdk/tests/test_sdk_roundtrip.c

@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#ifndef _WIN32
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
 #include <unistd.h>
 
 static int g_pass = 0, g_fail = 0;
@@ -47,6 +51,98 @@ static const uint8_t TEST_DATA[] =
     "Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet consectetur adipiscing elit sed do eiusmod. "
     "End of test data.\n";
 
+#ifndef _WIN32
+static int file_matches(const char *path, const void *expected,
+                        size_t expected_size) {
+    struct stat info;
+    char observed[128];
+    if (expected_size > sizeof(observed))
+        return 0;
+    int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK);
+    if (fd < 0) return 0;
+    int ok = fstat(fd, &info) == 0 && S_ISREG(info.st_mode) &&
+             info.st_size >= 0 &&
+             (uint64_t)info.st_size == (uint64_t)expected_size;
+    size_t got = 0;
+    while (ok && got < expected_size) {
+        ssize_t count = read(fd, observed + got, expected_size - got);
+        if (count <= 0) {
+            ok = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        got += (size_t)count;
+    }
+    if (close(fd) != 0) ok = 0;
+    return ok && got == expected_size &&
+           memcmp(observed, expected, expected_size) == 0;
+}
+
+static int regular_file_info(const char *path, struct stat *info) {
+    int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK);
+    if (fd < 0) return 0;
+    int ok = fstat(fd, info) == 0 && S_ISREG(info->st_mode);
+    if (close(fd) != 0) ok = 0;
+    return ok;
+}
+
+static int private_key_save_avoids_link_targets(const zuptsdk_keypair_t *kp) {
+    static const char sentinel[] = "do not replace through a symlink\n";
+    char workspace[] = "/tmp/zupt-sdk-link-save.XXXXXX";
+    char target[192];
+    char symlink_path[192];
+    char hardlink_path[192];
+    FILE *stream;
+    struct stat target_st;
+    struct stat output_st;
+    int ok = 0;
+
+    if (!mkdtemp(workspace)) return 0;
+    snprintf(target, sizeof(target), "%s/target", workspace);
+    snprintf(symlink_path, sizeof(symlink_path), "%s/symlink-output",
+             workspace);
+    snprintf(hardlink_path, sizeof(hardlink_path), "%s/hardlink-output",
+             workspace);
+
+    stream = fopen(target, "wb");
+    if (!stream) goto cleanup;
+    size_t written = fwrite(sentinel, 1, sizeof(sentinel) - 1, stream);
+    int close_rc = fclose(stream);
+    if (written != sizeof(sentinel) - 1 || close_rc != 0)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if (symlink(target, symlink_path) != 0 ||
+        zuptsdk_keypair_save_private(kp, symlink_path) != ZUPTSDK_OK ||
+        !file_matches(target, sentinel, sizeof(sentinel) - 1) ||
+        !regular_file_info(target, &target_st) ||
+        !regular_file_info(symlink_path, &output_st) ||
+        (target_st.st_dev == output_st.st_dev &&
+         target_st.st_ino == output_st.st_ino) ||
+        output_st.st_size <= 0 ||
+        (output_st.st_mode & 0777) != 0600)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if (link(target, hardlink_path) != 0 ||
+        zuptsdk_keypair_save_private(kp, hardlink_path) != ZUPTSDK_OK ||
+        !file_matches(target, sentinel, sizeof(sentinel) - 1) ||
+        !regular_file_info(target, &target_st) ||
+        !regular_file_info(hardlink_path, &output_st) ||
+        (target_st.st_dev == output_st.st_dev &&
+         target_st.st_ino == output_st.st_ino) ||
+        output_st.st_size <= 0 ||
+        (output_st.st_mode & 0777) != 0600)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+cleanup:
+    unlink(symlink_path);
+    unlink(hardlink_path);
+    unlink(target);
+    rmdir(workspace);
+    return ok;
+}
+#endif
+
 static void test_version(void) {
     TEST("version_string returns non-NULL");
     const char *v = zuptsdk_version_string();
@@ -250,6 +346,19 @@ cleanup:
 
 static void test_keypair_pq(void) {
     TEST("keypair_generate + compress_pq + extract_pq");
+    char saved_priv[160];
+    char saved_pub[160];
+#ifdef _WIN32
+    snprintf(saved_priv, sizeof(saved_priv), "/tmp/_zsdk_priv_%ld.key",
+             (long)getpid());
+    snprintf(saved_pub, sizeof(saved_pub), "/tmp/_zsdk_pub_%ld.key",
+             (long)getpid());
+    unlink(saved_priv);
+    unlink(saved_pub);
+#else
+    char saved_workspace[] = "/tmp/zupt-sdk-roundtrip.XXXXXX";
+#endif
+
     zuptsdk_ctx_t *ctx = NULL;
     CHECK(zuptsdk_ctx_create(&ctx), "ctx");
 
@@ -257,17 +366,45 @@ static void test_keypair_pq(void) {
     int rc = zuptsdk_keypair_generate(ctx, &kp);
     if (rc != ZUPTSDK_OK) { FAIL("keygen"); zuptsdk_ctx_destroy(ctx); return; }
 
+#ifndef _WIN32
+    if (!mkdtemp(saved_workspace)) {
+        FAIL("private temporary workspace");
+        zuptsdk_keypair_destroy(kp);
+        zuptsdk_ctx_destroy(ctx);
+        return;
+    }
+    snprintf(saved_priv, sizeof(saved_priv), "%s/private.key",
+             saved_workspace);
+    snprintf(saved_pub, sizeof(saved_pub), "%s/public.key",
+             saved_workspace);
+    if (!private_key_save_avoids_link_targets(kp)) {
+        FAIL("private key save followed a symlink or hardlink target");
+        goto err;
+    }
+#endif
+
     /* Save and load to exercise that path too */
-    rc = zuptsdk_keypair_save_private(kp, "/tmp/_zsdk_priv.key");
+    rc = zuptsdk_keypair_save_private(kp, saved_priv);
     if (rc != ZUPTSDK_OK) { FAIL("save priv"); goto err; }
-    rc = zuptsdk_keypair_save_public(kp, "/tmp/_zsdk_pub.key");
+    rc = zuptsdk_keypair_save_public(kp, saved_pub);
     if (rc != ZUPTSDK_OK) { FAIL("save pub"); goto err; }
+#ifndef _WIN32
+    struct stat private_st;
+    struct stat public_st;
+    if (!regular_file_info(saved_priv, &private_st) ||
+        !regular_file_info(saved_pub, &public_st) ||
+        (private_st.st_mode & 0777) != 0600 ||
+        (public_st.st_mode & 0777) != 0644) {
+        FAIL("saved key permissions do not match the requested modes");
+        goto err;
+    }
+#endif
 
     zuptsdk_pubkey_t *pub = NULL;
     zuptsdk_privkey_t *priv = NULL;
-    rc = zuptsdk_pubkey_load("/tmp/_zsdk_pub.key", &pub);
+    rc = zuptsdk_pubkey_load(saved_pub, &pub);
     if (rc != ZUPTSDK_OK) { FAIL("load pub"); goto err; }
-    rc = zuptsdk_privkey_load("/tmp/_zsdk_priv.key", &priv);
+    rc = zuptsdk_privkey_load(saved_priv, &priv);
     if (rc != ZUPTSDK_OK) { FAIL("load priv"); zuptsdk_pubkey_destroy(pub); goto err; }
 
     zuptsdk_options_t *opts = NULL;
@@ -295,8 +432,10 @@ static void test_keypair_pq(void) {
     zuptsdk_privkey_destroy(priv);
     zuptsdk_options_destroy(opts);
 
-    unlink("/tmp/_zsdk_priv.key");
-    unlink("/tmp/_zsdk_pub.key");
+    if (unlink(saved_priv) != 0 || unlink(saved_pub) != 0) ok = 0;
+#ifndef _WIN32
+    if (rmdir(saved_workspace) != 0) ok = 0;
+#endif
 
     if (!ok) { FAIL("byte mismatch or rc != OK"); zuptsdk_keypair_destroy(kp); zuptsdk_ctx_destroy(ctx); return; }
     zuptsdk_keypair_destroy(kp);
@@ -305,6 +444,11 @@ static void test_keypair_pq(void) {
     return;
 
 err:
+    unlink(saved_priv);
+    unlink(saved_pub);
+#ifndef _WIN32
+    rmdir(saved_workspace);
+#endif
     zuptsdk_keypair_destroy(kp);
     zuptsdk_ctx_destroy(ctx);
 }

src/vv_encoder.c

@@ -41,14 +41,15 @@
  *
  * Implementation strategy:
  *   - Prefer `explicit_bzero` (BSD/glibc 2.25+, guaranteed-secure)
- *   - Fall back to `memset_explicit` (C23)
- *   - Last resort: volatile-pointer memset (compiler cannot
+ *   - Otherwise use a volatile-pointer loop (compiler cannot
  *     prove the writes are dead)
  * ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ */
 
 #if defined(__GLIBC__) && (__GLIBC__ > 2 || (__GLIBC__ == 2 && __GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25))
 #  define VV_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1
-#elif defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)
+/* Darwin intentionally uses the volatile fallback: current deployment targets
+ * do not guarantee an explicit_bzero symbol in libSystem. */
+#elif defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__)
 #  define VV_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1
 #else
 #  define VV_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO 0

src/zupt_disk.c

@@ -1220,23 +1220,35 @@ zupt_error_t zupt_disk_restore(const char *archive_path, const char *target_path
 #else
     int tgt_fd = -1;
     int is_block_dev = 0;
-    struct stat target_st;
-
-    if (lstat(target_path, &target_st) == 0) {
-        if (S_ISLNK(target_st.st_mode)) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "Error: refusing a symbolic-link restore target.\n");
-            fclose(f);
-            return ZUPT_ERR_INVALID;
-        }
-        if (S_ISREG(target_st.st_mode)) {
-            if (target_st.st_dev == archive_identity.device &&
-                target_st.st_ino == archive_identity.inode) {
+    /* Resolve the target exactly once before making any type or identity
+     * decision.  The open is non-truncating, O_NOFOLLOW rejects a final
+     * symlink, and fstat classifies the kernel object that was actually
+     * opened.  Device restores retain this same descriptor through the final
+     * write, so a concurrent pathname exchange cannot redirect the restore. */
+    tgt_fd = open(target_path, O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC |
+                               O_NONBLOCK | O_SYNC);
+    if (tgt_fd >= 0) {
+        struct stat opened_st;
+        if (fstat(tgt_fd, &opened_st) != 0) {
+            int saved_errno = errno;
+            close(tgt_fd);
+            tgt_fd = -1;
+            errno = saved_errno;
+        } else if (S_ISREG(opened_st.st_mode)) {
+            int close_result = close(tgt_fd);
+            tgt_fd = -1;
+            if (close_result != 0) {
+                fclose(f);
+                return ZUPT_ERR_IO;
+            }
+            if (opened_st.st_dev == archive_identity.device &&
+                opened_st.st_ino == archive_identity.inode) {
                 fprintf(stderr,
                         "Error: archive and restore target are the same file.\n");
                 fclose(f);
                 return ZUPT_ERR_INVALID;
             }
-            if (target_st.st_nlink != 1) {
+            if (opened_st.st_nlink != 1) {
                 fprintf(stderr,
                         "Error: refusing a multiply-linked restore target.\n");
                 fclose(f);
@@ -1244,59 +1256,46 @@ zupt_error_t zupt_disk_restore(const char *archive_path, const char *target_path
             }
             target_atomic =
                 zupt_atomic_output_open(target_path, &target_stream);
-        } else if (S_ISBLK(target_st.st_mode) ||
-                   S_ISCHR(target_st.st_mode)) {
-            tgt_fd = open(target_path, O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC |
-                                       O_NONBLOCK | O_SYNC);
-            if (tgt_fd >= 0) {
-                struct stat opened_st;
-                if (fstat(tgt_fd, &opened_st) != 0 ||
-                    opened_st.st_dev != target_st.st_dev ||
-                    opened_st.st_ino != target_st.st_ino ||
-                    !(S_ISBLK(opened_st.st_mode) ||
-                      S_ISCHR(opened_st.st_mode))) {
+        } else if (S_ISBLK(opened_st.st_mode) ||
+                   S_ISCHR(opened_st.st_mode)) {
+            int flags = fcntl(tgt_fd, F_GETFL);
+            if (flags < 0 ||
+                fcntl(tgt_fd, F_SETFL, flags & ~O_NONBLOCK) != 0) {
+                close(tgt_fd);
+                tgt_fd = -1;
+            } else {
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__FreeBSD__)
+                uint64_t target_capacity = 0;
+                if (!disk_restore_target_capacity(
+                        tgt_fd, &opened_st, &target_capacity)) {
+                    fprintf(stderr,
+                            "Error: cannot determine restore device "
+                            "capacity safely.\n");
                     close(tgt_fd);
                     tgt_fd = -1;
-                    errno = EAGAIN;
+                } else if (expected_size > target_capacity) {
+                    fprintf(stderr,
+                            "Error: disk image (%llu bytes) exceeds "
+                            "restore device capacity (%llu bytes).\n",
+                            (unsigned long long)expected_size,
+                            (unsigned long long)target_capacity);
+                    close(tgt_fd);
+                    tgt_fd = -1;
+                    errno = EFBIG;
                 } else {
-                    int flags = fcntl(tgt_fd, F_GETFL);
-                    if (flags < 0 ||
-                        fcntl(tgt_fd, F_SETFL, flags & ~O_NONBLOCK) != 0) {
-                        close(tgt_fd);
-                        tgt_fd = -1;
-                    } else {
-#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__FreeBSD__)
-                        uint64_t target_capacity = 0;
-                        if (!disk_restore_target_capacity(
-                                tgt_fd, &opened_st, &target_capacity)) {
-                            fprintf(stderr,
-                                    "Error: cannot determine restore device "
-                                    "capacity safely.\n");
-                            close(tgt_fd);
-                            tgt_fd = -1;
-                        } else if (expected_size > target_capacity) {
-                            fprintf(stderr,
-                                    "Error: disk image (%llu bytes) exceeds "
-                                    "restore device capacity (%llu bytes).\n",
-                                    (unsigned long long)expected_size,
-                                    (unsigned long long)target_capacity);
-                            close(tgt_fd);
-                            tgt_fd = -1;
-                            errno = EFBIG;
-                        } else {
-                            is_block_dev = 1;
-                        }
-#else
-                        fprintf(stderr,
-                                "Error: restore-device capacity queries are "
-                                "not supported on this platform.\n");
-                        close(tgt_fd);
-                        tgt_fd = -1;
-#endif
-                    }
+                    is_block_dev = 1;
                 }
+#else
+                fprintf(stderr,
+                        "Error: restore-device capacity queries are "
+                        "not supported on this platform.\n");
+                close(tgt_fd);
+                tgt_fd = -1;
+#endif
             }
         } else {
+            close(tgt_fd);
+            tgt_fd = -1;
             fprintf(stderr,
                     "Error: restore target is not a regular file or device.\n");
             fclose(f);
@@ -1304,8 +1303,12 @@ zupt_error_t zupt_disk_restore(const char *archive_path, const char *target_path
         }
     } else if (errno == ENOENT) {
         target_atomic = zupt_atomic_output_open(target_path, &target_stream);
+    } else if (errno == ELOOP) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error: refusing a symbolic-link restore target.\n");
+        fclose(f);
+        return ZUPT_ERR_INVALID;
     } else {
-        fprintf(stderr, "Error: Cannot inspect target '%s': %s\n",
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error: Cannot open target '%s': %s\n",
                 target_path, strerror(errno));
         fclose(f);
         return ZUPT_ERR_IO;

src/zupt_format.c

@@ -4221,7 +4221,7 @@ static zupt_error_t open_archive(FILE *f, zupt_options_t *opts,
      * parser ignored block_type at this position and decoded whatever it
      * found — making the byte truly unauthenticated. Now it is structurally
      * validated (rejected at parse time on mismatch), which is the
-     * OPAQUE-class coverage promised by PROMPT.md §5. */
+     * OPAQUE-class structural coverage recorded in the audit history. */
     if (ib.block_type != ZUPT_BLOCK_INDEX) {
         free(ib.payload);
         return ZUPT_ERR_CORRUPT;

src/zupt_main.c

@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@
 #ifdef _WIN32
   #include <conio.h>
   #include <windows.h>
+  #include <winternl.h>
 #else
+  #include <fcntl.h>
   #include <signal.h>
   #include <termios.h>
 #endif
@@ -100,9 +102,11 @@ static int zupt_create_private_temp_directory(char *output, size_t capacity) {
     }
     return 0;
 #else
-    static const char pattern[] = "/tmp/zupt-bench-XXXXXX";
-    if (sizeof(pattern) > capacity) return 0;
-    memcpy(output, pattern, sizeof(pattern));
+    char temp_root[ZUPT_MAX_PATH];
+    if (!realpath("/tmp", temp_root)) return 0;
+    int written = snprintf(output, capacity, "%s/zupt-bench-XXXXXX",
+                           temp_root);
+    if (written < 0 || (size_t)written >= capacity) return 0;
     if (!mkdtemp(output)) return 0;
     if (chmod(output, 0700) != 0) {
         rmdir(output);
@@ -114,7 +118,97 @@ static int zupt_create_private_temp_directory(char *output, size_t capacity) {
 }
 
 #ifdef _WIN32
-static int zupt_remove_tree_wide(const wchar_t *directory) {
+static void zupt_win_set_cleanup_errno(NTSTATUS status) {
+    if (status == (NTSTATUS)0xC0000034L || /* STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND */
+        status == (NTSTATUS)0xC000003AL) { /* STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND */
+        errno = ENOENT;
+    } else {
+        errno = EACCES;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Open one entry relative to a pinned parent.  Omitting FILE_SHARE_DELETE
+ * keeps the name bound to this handle until cleanup finishes; opening the
+ * reparse point itself prevents a junction or symlink from redirecting the
+ * recursive walk. */
+static HANDLE zupt_win_open_cleanup_entry(HANDLE parent,
+                                           const wchar_t *name,
+                                           int directory_only,
+                                           int delete_access) {
+    size_t name_length = wcslen(name);
+    if (name_length == 0 ||
+        name_length > (size_t)USHRT_MAX / sizeof(wchar_t)) {
+        errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+        return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+    }
+    UNICODE_STRING object_name;
+    object_name.Buffer = (PWSTR)name;
+    object_name.Length = (USHORT)(name_length * sizeof(wchar_t));
+    object_name.MaximumLength = object_name.Length + sizeof(wchar_t);
+    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES attributes;
+    InitializeObjectAttributes(&attributes, &object_name,
+                               OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, parent, NULL);
+    IO_STATUS_BLOCK status_block;
+    HANDLE handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+    ACCESS_MASK access = FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY | FILE_TRAVERSE |
+                         FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | SYNCHRONIZE;
+    if (delete_access) access |= DELETE;
+    ULONG share = FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE;
+    if (delete_access) share |= FILE_SHARE_DELETE;
+    ULONG options = FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT;
+    if (directory_only) options |= FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE;
+    NTSTATUS status = NtCreateFile(
+        &handle, access, &attributes, &status_block, NULL,
+        FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, share, FILE_OPEN,
+        options, NULL, 0);
+    if (status < 0 || handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+        zupt_win_set_cleanup_errno(status);
+        return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+    }
+    return handle;
+}
+
+/* Mark the exact object held by an identity-checked deletion handle. */
+static int zupt_win_delete_cleanup_handle(HANDLE handle) {
+    FILE_DISPOSITION_INFO disposition;
+    disposition.DeleteFile = TRUE;
+    if (SetFileInformationByHandle(handle, FileDispositionInfo,
+                                   &disposition, sizeof(disposition)))
+        return 1;
+    errno = EACCES;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Reopen an emptied child only after closing its no-delete-sharing traversal
+ * handle.  Comparing the filesystem identity before marking the new handle
+ * for deletion makes a close/reopen name exchange fail safely. */
+static int zupt_win_delete_cleanup_entry(
+    HANDLE parent, const wchar_t *name,
+    const BY_HANDLE_FILE_INFORMATION *expected) {
+    HANDLE handle = zupt_win_open_cleanup_entry(parent, name, 1, 1);
+    if (handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return 0;
+    BY_HANDLE_FILE_INFORMATION current;
+    int same = GetFileInformationByHandle(handle, &current) &&
+               (current.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0 &&
+               (current.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) == 0 &&
+               current.dwVolumeSerialNumber == expected->dwVolumeSerialNumber &&
+               current.nFileIndexHigh == expected->nFileIndexHigh &&
+               current.nFileIndexLow == expected->nFileIndexLow;
+    int deleted = same && zupt_win_delete_cleanup_handle(handle);
+    int closed = CloseHandle(handle) != 0;
+    if (!same) errno = EBUSY;
+    return deleted && closed;
+}
+
+static int zupt_win_plain_directory(HANDLE handle) {
+    BY_HANDLE_FILE_INFORMATION info;
+    return GetFileInformationByHandle(handle, &info) &&
+           (info.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0 &&
+           (info.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) == 0;
+}
+
+static int zupt_remove_tree_wide(HANDLE directory_handle,
+                                 const wchar_t *directory) {
     size_t directory_length = wcslen(directory);
     wchar_t *pattern = (wchar_t *)calloc(directory_length + 3u,
                                          sizeof(*pattern));
@@ -125,6 +219,8 @@ static int zupt_remove_tree_wide(const wchar_t *directory) {
 
     WIN32_FIND_DATAW data;
     HANDLE search = FindFirstFileW(pattern, &data);
+    DWORD search_error = search == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE
+                             ? GetLastError() : ERROR_SUCCESS;
     free(pattern);
     int failed = 0;
     if (search != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
@@ -143,23 +239,217 @@ static int zupt_remove_tree_wide(const wchar_t *directory) {
             child[directory_length] = L'\\';
             memcpy(child + directory_length + 1u, data.cFileName,
                    (name_length + 1u) * sizeof(*child));
-            if ((data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0) {
-                if ((data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) != 0) {
-                    if (!RemoveDirectoryW(child)) failed = 1;
-                } else if (zupt_remove_tree_wide(child) != 0) {
-                    failed = 1;
-                }
-            } else {
-                SetFileAttributesW(child, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL);
-                if (!DeleteFileW(child)) failed = 1;
+            if (DeleteFileW(child) || RemoveDirectoryW(child)) {
+                free(child);
+                continue;
             }
+            DWORD delete_error = GetLastError();
+            if (delete_error == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND ||
+                delete_error == ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND) {
+                free(child);
+                continue;
+            }
+            HANDLE child_handle = zupt_win_open_cleanup_entry(
+                directory_handle, data.cFileName, 1, 0);
+            if (child_handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+                if (errno != ENOENT) failed = 1;
+                free(child);
+                continue;
+            }
+            int child_failed = 0;
+            BY_HANDLE_FILE_INFORMATION child_identity;
+            if (!GetFileInformationByHandle(child_handle, &child_identity) ||
+                (child_identity.dwFileAttributes &
+                 FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) == 0 ||
+                (child_identity.dwFileAttributes &
+                 FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) != 0 ||
+                zupt_remove_tree_wide(child_handle, child) != 0)
+                child_failed = 1;
+            if (!CloseHandle(child_handle)) child_failed = 1;
+            if (!child_failed && !zupt_win_delete_cleanup_entry(
+                    directory_handle, data.cFileName, &child_identity))
+                child_failed = 1;
+            if (child_failed) failed = 1;
             free(child);
         } while (FindNextFileW(search, &data));
+        if (GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES) failed = 1;
         if (!FindClose(search)) failed = 1;
-    } else if (GetLastError() != ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) {
+    } else if (search_error != ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) {
         failed = 1;
     }
-    if (!RemoveDirectoryW(directory)) failed = 1;
+    return failed ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Resolve the absolute temporary path one component at a time and retain
+ * every ancestor handle.  This makes the pathname used for enumeration
+ * stable even if another process tries to exchange an ancestor directory. */
+static int zupt_win_open_cleanup_path(
+    const wchar_t *directory, wchar_t full[ZUPT_MAX_PATH + 256],
+    HANDLE **handles_out, size_t *handle_count_out) {
+    if (!_wfullpath(full, directory, ZUPT_MAX_PATH + 256)) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (wchar_t *p = full; *p; p++) if (*p == L'/') *p = L'\\';
+    if ((full[0] == L'\\' && full[1] == L'\\') ||
+        !(full[0] && full[1] == L':' && full[2] == L'\\')) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    size_t capacity = wcslen(full) + 1u;
+    HANDLE *handles = (HANDLE *)calloc(capacity, sizeof(*handles));
+    if (!handles) return 0;
+    wchar_t drive_root[4] = {full[0], L':', L'\\', L'\0'};
+    HANDLE current = CreateFileW(
+        drive_root,
+        FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY | FILE_TRAVERSE | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES |
+            SYNCHRONIZE,
+        FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,
+        FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS | FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL);
+    if (current == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ||
+        !zupt_win_plain_directory(current)) {
+        DWORD open_error = current == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE
+                               ? GetLastError() : ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
+        if (current != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) CloseHandle(current);
+        free(handles);
+        errno = open_error == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND ||
+                        open_error == ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND
+                    ? ENOENT : EACCES;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    size_t count = 0;
+    handles[count++] = current;
+
+    wchar_t *scan = full + 3;
+    while (*scan) {
+        wchar_t *separator = wcschr(scan, L'\\');
+        if (separator) *separator = L'\0';
+        HANDLE next = zupt_win_open_cleanup_entry(
+            current, scan, 1, 0);
+        if (separator) *separator = L'\\';
+        if (next == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ||
+            !zupt_win_plain_directory(next)) {
+            if (next != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) CloseHandle(next);
+            while (count > 0) CloseHandle(handles[--count]);
+            free(handles);
+            if (next != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) errno = EACCES;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        handles[count++] = next;
+        current = next;
+        if (!separator) break;
+        scan = separator + 1;
+    }
+    *handles_out = handles;
+    *handle_count_out = count;
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _WIN32
+/* Resolve every component without following symlinks and return both the
+ * pinned target and its pinned parent.  The caller can therefore remove the
+ * final directory with unlinkat() instead of resolving its pathname again. */
+static int zupt_open_temp_tree(const char *path, int *parent_out,
+                               int *directory_out, char *leaf,
+                               size_t leaf_capacity) {
+    if (!path || !*path || !parent_out || !directory_out || !leaf ||
+        leaf_capacity == 0) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    int current = open(path[0] == '/' ? "/" : ".",
+                       O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
+    if (current < 0) return 0;
+
+    const char *cursor = path;
+    while (*cursor == '/') cursor++;
+    while (*cursor) {
+        const char *start = cursor;
+        while (*cursor && *cursor != '/') cursor++;
+        size_t component_length = (size_t)(cursor - start);
+        while (*cursor == '/') cursor++;
+        int final_component = *cursor == '\0';
+        if ((component_length == 1u && start[0] == '.') ||
+            component_length == 0u) {
+            if (final_component) {
+                close(current);
+                errno = EINVAL;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (component_length == 2u && start[0] == '.' && start[1] == '.') {
+            close(current);
+            errno = EINVAL;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (component_length >= leaf_capacity) {
+            close(current);
+            errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        memcpy(leaf, start, component_length);
+        leaf[component_length] = '\0';
+        int next = openat(current, leaf,
+                          O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
+        if (next < 0) {
+            int saved_errno = errno;
+            close(current);
+            errno = saved_errno;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (final_component) {
+            *parent_out = current;
+            *directory_out = next;
+            return 1;
+        }
+        close(current);
+        current = next;
+    }
+    close(current);
+    errno = EINVAL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Delete leaves before attempting to open them as directories.  unlinkat()
+ * never follows a symlink; a directory is recursively visited only through
+ * an O_NOFOLLOW descriptor returned by openat(). */
+static int zupt_remove_temp_tree_fd(int directory_fd) {
+    DIR *stream = fdopendir(directory_fd);
+    if (!stream) {
+        close(directory_fd);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    int failed = 0;
+    int parent_fd = dirfd(stream);
+    for (;;) {
+        errno = 0;
+        struct dirent *entry = readdir(stream);
+        if (!entry) {
+            if (errno != 0) failed = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+        if (strcmp(entry->d_name, ".") == 0 ||
+            strcmp(entry->d_name, "..") == 0)
+            continue;
+        if (unlinkat(parent_fd, entry->d_name, 0) == 0 || errno == ENOENT)
+            continue;
+
+        int child_fd = openat(parent_fd, entry->d_name,
+                              O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW |
+                                  O_CLOEXEC);
+        if (child_fd < 0) {
+            if (errno != ENOENT) failed = 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (zupt_remove_temp_tree_fd(child_fd) != 0) failed = 1;
+        if (unlinkat(parent_fd, entry->d_name, AT_REMOVEDIR) != 0 &&
+            errno != ENOENT)
+            failed = 1;
+    }
+    if (closedir(stream) != 0) failed = 1;
     return failed ? -1 : 0;
 }
 #endif
@@ -169,41 +459,43 @@ static int zupt_remove_temp_tree(const char *directory) {
 #ifdef _WIN32
     wchar_t *wide = zupt_win_utf8_to_wide_alloc(directory);
     if (!wide) return -1;
-    int result = zupt_remove_tree_wide(wide);
+    wchar_t full[ZUPT_MAX_PATH + 256];
+    HANDLE *handles = NULL;
+    size_t handle_count = 0;
+    if (!zupt_win_open_cleanup_path(wide, full, &handles, &handle_count)) {
+        int result = errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -1;
+        free(wide);
+        return result;
+    }
+    HANDLE root_handle = handles[handle_count - 1u];
+    int result = zupt_remove_tree_wide(root_handle, full);
+    BY_HANDLE_FILE_INFORMATION root_identity;
+    if (result == 0 && !GetFileInformationByHandle(root_handle,
+                                                    &root_identity))
+        result = -1;
+    const wchar_t *root_name = wcsrchr(full, L'\\');
+    if (!root_name || root_name[1] == L'\0') result = -1;
+    else root_name++;
+    if (!CloseHandle(handles[--handle_count])) result = -1;
+    if (result == 0 && !zupt_win_delete_cleanup_entry(
+            handles[handle_count - 1u], root_name, &root_identity))
+        result = -1;
+    while (handle_count > 0)
+        if (!CloseHandle(handles[--handle_count])) result = -1;
+    free(handles);
     free(wide);
     return result;
 #else
-    DIR *stream = opendir(directory);
-    if (!stream) return errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -1;
-    int failed = 0;
-    struct dirent *entry;
-    while ((entry = readdir(stream)) != NULL) {
-        if (strcmp(entry->d_name, ".") == 0 ||
-            strcmp(entry->d_name, "..") == 0)
-            continue;
-        size_t needed = strlen(directory) + strlen(entry->d_name) + 2u;
-        char *child = (char *)malloc(needed);
-        if (!child) {
-            failed = 1;
-            continue;
-        }
-        if (!zupt_join_temp_path(child, needed, directory, entry->d_name)) {
-            free(child);
-            failed = 1;
-            continue;
-        }
-        struct stat info;
-        if (lstat(child, &info) != 0) {
-            failed = 1;
-        } else if (S_ISDIR(info.st_mode)) {
-            if (zupt_remove_temp_tree(child) != 0) failed = 1;
-        } else if (unlink(child) != 0) {
-            failed = 1;
-        }
-        free(child);
-    }
-    if (closedir(stream) != 0) failed = 1;
-    if (rmdir(directory) != 0) failed = 1;
+    int parent_fd = -1;
+    int directory_fd = -1;
+    char leaf[ZUPT_MAX_PATH];
+    if (!zupt_open_temp_tree(directory, &parent_fd, &directory_fd,
+                             leaf, sizeof(leaf)))
+        return errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -1;
+    int failed = zupt_remove_temp_tree_fd(directory_fd) != 0;
+    if (unlinkat(parent_fd, leaf, AT_REMOVEDIR) != 0 && errno != ENOENT)
+        failed = 1;
+    if (close(parent_fd) != 0) failed = 1;
     return failed ? -1 : 0;
 #endif
 }
@@ -429,7 +721,11 @@ static int prompt_password(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t cap) {
     if (!buf || cap < 2) return 0;
     buf[0] = '\0';
 #ifdef _WIN32
-    if (!_isatty(_fileno(stdin))) {
+    HANDLE input_handle = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
+    DWORD input_mode = 0;
+    if (input_handle == NULL || input_handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ||
+        GetFileType(input_handle) != FILE_TYPE_CHAR ||
+        !GetConsoleMode(input_handle, &input_mode)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "Error: password prompt requires a terminal.\n");
         return 0;
     }
@@ -445,6 +741,11 @@ static int prompt_password(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t cap) {
     int too_long = 0;
     for (;;) {
         int c = _getch();
+        if (c == EOF) {
+            zupt_secure_wipe(buf, cap);
+            fprintf(stderr, "\nError: cannot read password prompt.\n");
+            return 0;
+        }
         if (c == '\r' || c == '\n') break;
         if (c == 0 || c == 0xe0) {
             (void)_getch();

tests/archive_path_fixture.c

@@ -42,6 +42,31 @@ static size_t put_varint(uint8_t *out, uint64_t value) {
     return count;
 }
 
+static int hex_nibble(unsigned char value) {
+    if (value >= '0' && value <= '9') return (int)(value - '0');
+    if (value >= 'a' && value <= 'f') return (int)(value - 'a') + 10;
+    if (value >= 'A' && value <= 'F') return (int)(value - 'A') + 10;
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int decode_hex_entry(const char *hex, uint8_t *out, size_t capacity,
+                            size_t *out_size) {
+    size_t hex_size = strlen(hex);
+    if (hex_size == 0 || (hex_size & 1u) != 0 ||
+        hex_size / 2u >= capacity)
+        return -1;
+
+    size_t decoded_size = hex_size / 2u;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < decoded_size; i++) {
+        int high = hex_nibble((unsigned char)hex[i * 2u]);
+        int low = hex_nibble((unsigned char)hex[i * 2u + 1u]);
+        if (high < 0 || low < 0) return -1;
+        out[i] = (uint8_t)((high << 4) | low);
+    }
+    *out_size = decoded_size;
+    return 0;
+}
+
 static int write_block(FILE *stream, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *payload,
                        size_t payload_size, uint64_t unpacked_size,
                        uint64_t checksum) {
@@ -66,11 +91,24 @@ static int write_block(FILE *stream, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *payload,
 
 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
     static const uint8_t content[] = "fixture content\n";
-    const char *entry = argc == 3 && strncmp(argv[2], "--entry=", 8) == 0
-        ? argv[2] + 8 : NULL;
-    if (!entry || argv[1][0] == '\0' || entry[0] == '\0' ||
-        strlen(entry) >= ZUPT_MAX_PATH) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s ARCHIVE --entry=ENTRY_PATH\n", argv[0]);
+    uint8_t decoded_entry[ZUPT_MAX_PATH];
+    const uint8_t *entry = NULL;
+    size_t path_size = 0;
+
+    if (argc == 3 && strncmp(argv[2], "--entry=", 8) == 0) {
+        entry = (const uint8_t *)argv[2] + 8;
+        path_size = strlen(argv[2] + 8);
+    } else if (argc == 3 &&
+               strncmp(argv[2], "--entry-hex=", 12) == 0 &&
+               decode_hex_entry(argv[2] + 12, decoded_entry,
+                                sizeof(decoded_entry), &path_size) == 0) {
+        entry = decoded_entry;
+    }
+    if (!entry || argv[1][0] == '\0' || path_size == 0 ||
+        path_size >= ZUPT_MAX_PATH) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "usage: %s ARCHIVE --entry=ENTRY_PATH|--entry-hex=HEX_BYTES\n",
+                argv[0]);
         return 2;
     }
 
@@ -106,7 +144,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
 
     uint8_t index[ZUPT_MAX_PATH + 128];
     size_t index_size = 0;
-    size_t path_size = strlen(entry);
     index_size += put_varint(index + index_size, 1);
     index_size += put_varint(index + index_size, path_size);
     memcpy(index + index_size, entry, path_size);

tests/test_audit_flake.sh

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
 # Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés
 #
-# Flake-stress harness — §3 of PROMPT.md.
+# Repeated-suite flake-stress harness.
 #
 # Runs every short test suite N times (default 50) and aborts on the
 # first non-deterministic outcome. Specifically targeted at the audit
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ set -u
 # F-02's repro needed 50 runs to be statistically convincing (~10%
 # baseline flake rate), but at 20 runs we still have ~88% chance of
 # catching a 10%-flake — fine for routine CI. For a hardened audit
-# pass, invoke with 50 or 100 (see PROMPT.md §3).
+# pass, invoke with 50 or 100 for a deeper audit run.
 N="${1:-20}"
 ZUPT_BIN="${ZUPT_BIN:-./zupt}"
 

tests/test_benchmark_temp_safety.sh

@@ -3,6 +3,11 @@
 set -Eeuo pipefail
 
 bin=${1:-./zupt}
+repo_root=$(CDPATH='' cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd -P)
+case $bin in
+    /*) ;;
+    *) bin="$(pwd -P)/${bin#./}" ;;
+esac
 tmp=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/zupt-bench-safety.XXXXXXXX")
 trap 'rm -rf -- "$tmp"' EXIT HUP INT TERM
 
@@ -11,9 +16,36 @@ fail() {
     exit 1
 }
 
+# CodeQL #7 reported the old lstat(child) -> recursive pathname operation as
+# cpp/toctou-race-condition. Keep the platform-specific cleanup primitives in
+# the source gate as well as exercising the runtime symlink boundary below.
+cleanup_source=$repo_root/src/zupt_main.c
+grep -Fq 'static int zupt_remove_temp_tree_fd(int directory_fd)' \
+    "$cleanup_source" || fail 'POSIX descriptor-relative cleanup is missing'
+grep -Fq 'unlinkat(parent_fd, entry->d_name, 0)' "$cleanup_source" ||
+    fail 'POSIX leaf cleanup is not unlinkat-relative'
+grep -Fq 'directory_handle, data.cFileName, 1, 0)' "$cleanup_source" ||
+    fail 'Windows recursive cleanup is not handle-relative'
+grep -Fq 'FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT' "$cleanup_source" ||
+    fail 'Windows cleanup no longer opens reparse points without following'
+grep -Fq 'zupt_win_delete_cleanup_entry(' "$cleanup_source" ||
+    fail 'Windows cleanup lacks identity-checked handle deletion'
+grep -Fq 'current.nFileIndexLow == expected->nFileIndexLow' "$cleanup_source" ||
+    fail 'Windows cleanup no longer rejects a close/reopen name exchange'
+if grep -Fq 'RemoveDirectoryW(full)' "$cleanup_source"; then
+    fail 'Windows root cleanup restored post-handle pathname deletion'
+fi
+if grep -Fq 'lstat(child' "$cleanup_source" ||
+   grep -Fq 'zupt_remove_temp_tree(child' "$cleanup_source"; then
+    fail 'temporary cleanup restored a check-then-use pathname traversal'
+fi
+
 case $(uname -s 2>/dev/null || printf unknown) in
     MINGW*|MSYS*|CYGWIN*)
-        printf 'SKIP: historical POSIX /tmp symlink benchmark test is not native on Windows\n'
+        "$bin" bench --compare >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+            fail 'native Windows handle-relative benchmark cleanup failed'
+        printf 'SKIP: adversarial POSIX symlink injection is not native on Windows\n'
+        printf 'private Windows handle-relative benchmark workspace: PASS\n'
         exit 0
         ;;
 esac
@@ -46,4 +78,50 @@ if [[ -d $old_directory ]]; then
     mv "$old_directory" "$tmp/historical-remnant"
 fi
 
-printf 'private benchmark workspace: PASS\n'
+# Inject a directory symlink into the private workspace while a real benchmark
+# is active. Cleanup must remove the link itself and never visit its target.
+mkdir "$tmp/symlink-target"
+printf 'cleanup sentinel must survive\n' > "$tmp/symlink-target/sentinel"
+cp "$tmp/symlink-target/sentinel" "$tmp/symlink-target.expected"
+dd if=/dev/urandom of="$tmp/injection-input" bs=65536 count=128 2>/dev/null
+
+physical_tmp=$(CDPATH='' cd -P -- /tmp && pwd -P)
+: > "$tmp/preexisting-workspaces"
+for candidate in "$physical_tmp"/zupt-bench-*; do
+    if [[ -d $candidate && ! -L $candidate ]]; then
+        printf '%s\n' "$candidate" >> "$tmp/preexisting-workspaces"
+    fi
+done
+
+(cd "$tmp" && "$bin" bench injection-input >/dev/null 2>&1) &
+bench_pid=$!
+injected=0
+injected_workspace=
+attempt=0
+while (( attempt < 1000 )); do
+    for candidate in "$physical_tmp"/zupt-bench-*; do
+        [[ -d $candidate && ! -L $candidate ]] || continue
+        if grep -Fqx -- "$candidate" "$tmp/preexisting-workspaces"; then
+            continue
+        fi
+        if ln -s "$tmp/symlink-target" "$candidate/attacker-link" \
+                2>/dev/null; then
+            injected=1
+            injected_workspace=$candidate
+            break
+        fi
+    done
+    (( injected == 1 )) && break
+    kill -0 "$bench_pid" 2>/dev/null || break
+    sleep 0.01
+    attempt=$((attempt + 1))
+done
+wait "$bench_pid" || fail 'benchmark with injected symlink failed'
+(( injected == 1 )) || fail 'could not observe the private benchmark workspace'
+if [[ -e $injected_workspace || -L $injected_workspace ]]; then
+    fail 'injected workspace was not the benchmark tree that was removed'
+fi
+cmp "$tmp/symlink-target.expected" "$tmp/symlink-target/sentinel" ||
+    fail 'temporary cleanup followed an injected directory symlink'
+
+printf 'private descriptor/handle-relative benchmark workspace: PASS\n'

tests/test_f08_topmac.sh

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
 # Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés
 #
-# F-08 regression test (VaptVupt 2.3.0).
+# F-08 regression test (ZUPT 2.3.0).
 #
 # A v1.5+ archive is tampered at each previously-cosmetic header/footer byte;
 # every mutation MUST be detected (top-MAC verifies header+footer[0..23]).

tests/test_f09_preface.sh

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
 # Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés
 #
-# F-09 regression test (VaptVupt 2.3.1).
+# F-09 regression test (ZUPT 2.3.1).
 #
 # F-09 closed the per-block frame preface tamper window by:
 #   1. Binding the canonical preface (block_type, codec_id, block_flags,

tests/test_f11_authfail_message.sh

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
 # Copyright (c) 2025-2026 Cristian Cezar Moisés
 #
-# F-11 regression test (VaptVupt 2.4.2).
+# F-11 regression test (ZUPT 2.4.2).
 #
 # F-11: pre-2.4.2 the AIT-fail message said "archive header or footer has
 # been tampered with" in both the actual-tamper case AND the wrong-password

tests/test_key_files.sh

@@ -41,17 +41,76 @@ file_mode() {
     fi
 }
 
+windows_private_acl() {
+    local output=$1 windows_path
+    command -v cygpath >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
+    command -v powershell.exe >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
+    windows_path=$(cygpath -aw -- "$output") || return 1
+    # PowerShell variables must remain literal until powershell.exe evaluates
+    # this single-quoted Bash argument.
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2016
+    ZUPT_KEY_ACL_PATH=$windows_path powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile \
+        -NonInteractive -Command '
+            $ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
+            $acl = Get-Acl -LiteralPath $env:ZUPT_KEY_ACL_PATH
+            $sidType = [System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]
+            $rules = @($acl.GetAccessRules($true, $true, $sidType))
+            $currentSid =
+                [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User.Value
+            if (-not $acl.AreAccessRulesProtected) {
+                throw "private-key DACL permits inheritance"
+            }
+            if ($rules.Count -ne 1) {
+                throw "private-key DACL does not contain exactly one ACE"
+            }
+            $rule = $rules[0]
+            if ($rule.IsInherited) {
+                throw "private-key ACE is inherited"
+            }
+            if ($rule.AccessControlType -ne
+                    [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow) {
+                throw "private-key ACE is not an allow rule"
+            }
+            if ($rule.IdentityReference.Value -ne $currentSid) {
+                throw "private-key ACE is not restricted to the current user"
+            }
+            if ($rule.InheritanceFlags -ne
+                    [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]::None -or
+                $rule.PropagationFlags -ne
+                    [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::None) {
+                throw "private-key ACE unexpectedly propagates"
+            }
+            $fullControl = [int64](
+                [System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemRights]::FullControl)
+            $actualRights = [int64]($rule.FileSystemRights)
+            if (($actualRights -band $fullControl) -ne $fullControl) {
+                throw "private-key ACE does not grant current-user full control"
+            }
+        ' </dev/null >/dev/null
+}
+
 generate_with_mode() {
     local label=$1 mask=$2 output=$3
     shift 3
     if (umask "$mask"; "$zupt_bin" keygen "$@" -o "$output" >/dev/null 2>&1); then
-        local mode
-        mode=$(file_mode "$output")
-        if [[ $mode == 600 ]]; then
-            pass "$label is mode 0600 under umask $mask"
-        else
-            fail "$label mode under umask $mask is $mode, expected 600"
-        fi
+        case $(uname -s 2>/dev/null || printf unknown) in
+            MINGW*|MSYS*|CYGWIN*)
+                if windows_private_acl "$output"; then
+                    pass "$label has a protected current-user-only DACL under umask $mask"
+                else
+                    fail "$label lacks a protected current-user-only DACL under umask $mask"
+                fi
+                ;;
+            *)
+                local mode
+                mode=$(file_mode "$output")
+                if [[ $mode == 600 ]]; then
+                    pass "$label is mode 0600 under umask $mask"
+                else
+                    fail "$label mode under umask $mask is $mode, expected 600"
+                fi
+                ;;
+        esac
     else
         fail "$label generation failed under umask $mask"
     fi

tests/test_packaging_syntax.sh

@@ -15,6 +15,17 @@ pass() { pass_count=$((pass_count + 1)); printf 'PASS: %s\n' "$*"; }
 fail() { fail_count=$((fail_count + 1)); printf 'FAIL: %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
 skip() { skip_count=$((skip_count + 1)); printf 'SKIP: %s\n' "$*"; }
 
+has_exact_line_crlf_safe() {
+    local expected=$1 path=$2 line
+    while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n $line ]]; do
+        line=${line%$'\r'}
+        if [[ $line == "$expected" ]]; then
+            return 0
+        fi
+    done < "$path"
+    return 1
+}
+
 version=$(sed -n 's/^#define ZUPT_VERSION_STRING "\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' include/zupt.h)
 [[ -n $version ]] || { printf 'FAIL: cannot determine upstream version\n' >&2; exit 1; }
 
@@ -62,7 +73,8 @@ check_recipe_version GUI-Deb-Control \
     "$(awk '/^Version:/{print $2; exit}' gui/packaging/deb/control)"
 
 if grep -Fqx "VERSION=\${VERSION:-$version}" install.sh && \
-   grep -Fqx "if not defined VERSION set \"VERSION=$version\"" \
+   has_exact_line_crlf_safe \
+       "if not defined VERSION set \"VERSION=$version\"" \
        gui/packaging/windows/build-windows.bat && \
    grep -Fqx "Depends: python3 (>= 3.9), python3-pyqt6 | python3-pyside6.qtwidgets, zupt (= $version)" \
        gui/packaging/deb/control; then
@@ -183,6 +195,12 @@ tumbleweed_job=$(sed -n '/^  tumbleweed-rpm:/,/^  gui-rpm-package:/p' \
     .github/workflows/ci.yml)
 fedora_gui_job=$(sed -n '/^  gui-rpm-package:/,/^  linux-portable:/p' \
     .github/workflows/ci.yml)
+if grep -Fq 'os.chdir(service_dir)' <<<"$tumbleweed_job"; then
+    pass 'OBS service executor enters its isolated working directory'
+else
+    fail 'OBS service executor does not enter its isolated working directory'
+fi
+
 # These matches intentionally assert the literal Actions variable in YAML.
 # shellcheck disable=SC2016
 if grep -Fq 'git config --global --add safe.directory "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"' \

tests/test_password_sources.sh

@@ -56,9 +56,30 @@ if "$binary" test --pass-fd not-a-number archive.zupt >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     exit 1
 fi
 
-if "$binary" test --password-prompt archive.zupt </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+prompt_log=$test_root/non-interactive-prompt.log
+if command -v timeout >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    set +e
+    timeout 10 "$binary" test --password-prompt archive.zupt \
+        </dev/null >"$prompt_log" 2>&1
+    prompt_status=$?
+    set -e
+else
+    set +e
+    "$binary" test --password-prompt archive.zupt \
+        </dev/null >"$prompt_log" 2>&1
+    prompt_status=$?
+    set -e
+fi
+if ((prompt_status == 124)); then
+    printf '%s\n' 'FAIL: non-interactive password prompt timed out' >&2
+    exit 1
+elif ((prompt_status == 0)); then
     printf '%s\n' 'FAIL: non-interactive password prompt unexpectedly succeeded' >&2
     exit 1
+elif ! grep -Fq 'password prompt requires a terminal.' "$prompt_log"; then
+    printf 'FAIL: non-interactive password prompt returned status %d without a terminal rejection\n' \
+        "$prompt_status" >&2
+    exit 1
 fi
 
 case $(uname -s) in

tests/test_path_traversal.sh

@@ -104,33 +104,62 @@ else
     fail 'control-byte archive path is rejected without terminal injection'
 fi
 
-expect_display_unsafe_path_rejected() {
-    local label=$1 name=$2 entry=$3
+file_contains_hex_bytes() {
+    python3 - "$1" "$2" <<'PY'
+import pathlib
+import sys
+
+data = pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).read_bytes()
+needle = bytes.fromhex(sys.argv[2])
+raise SystemExit(0 if needle in data else 1)
+PY
+}
+
+expect_display_unsafe_hex_path_rejected() {
+    local label=$1 name=$2 entry_hex=$3 forbidden_hex=$4
     local archive=$TEST_ROOT/$name.zupt log=$TEST_ROOT/$name.log status
-    MSYS2_ARG_CONV_EXCL='--entry=' "$FIXTURE" "$archive" "--entry=$entry"
+    MSYS2_ARG_CONV_EXCL='--entry-hex=' \
+        "$FIXTURE" "$archive" "--entry-hex=$entry_hex"
+    if ! file_contains_hex_bytes "$archive" "$entry_hex"; then
+        printf '  fixture did not preserve the requested path bytes: %s\n' \
+            "$entry_hex" >&2
+        fail "$label"
+        return
+    fi
     set +e
     "$ZUPT_BIN" list "$archive" > "$log" 2>&1
     status=$?
     set -e
-    if ((status != 0)) && ! LC_ALL=C grep -Fq -- "$entry" "$log"; then
+    if ((status != 0)) && ! file_contains_hex_bytes "$log" "$forbidden_hex"; then
         pass "$label"
     else
         fail "$label"
     fi
 }
 
-expect_display_unsafe_path_rejected \
+if MSYS2_ARG_CONV_EXCL='--entry-hex=' \
+       "$FIXTURE" "$TEST_ROOT/invalid-hex.zupt" '--entry-hex=0' \
+       >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+   MSYS2_ARG_CONV_EXCL='--entry-hex=' \
+       "$FIXTURE" "$TEST_ROOT/invalid-hex.zupt" '--entry-hex=GG' \
+       >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    fail 'archive path fixture rejects malformed hex input'
+else
+    pass 'archive path fixture rejects malformed hex input'
+fi
+
+expect_display_unsafe_hex_path_rejected \
     'raw C1 archive path is rejected without terminal injection' \
-    raw-c1 $'safe\23331m.txt'
-expect_display_unsafe_path_rejected \
+    raw-c1 736166659b33316d2e747874 9b
+expect_display_unsafe_hex_path_rejected \
     'UTF-8 C1 archive path is rejected without terminal injection' \
-    utf8-c1 $'safe\302\23331m.txt'
-expect_display_unsafe_path_rejected \
+    utf8-c1 73616665c29b33316d2e747874 c29b
+expect_display_unsafe_hex_path_rejected \
     'Unicode bidi-control archive path is rejected without display spoofing' \
-    bidi $'safe\342\200\256exe.txt'
-expect_display_unsafe_path_rejected \
+    bidi 73616665e280ae6578652e747874 e280ae
+expect_display_unsafe_hex_path_rejected \
     'invalid UTF-8 archive path is rejected without raw display' \
-    invalid-utf8 $'safe\300\257.txt'
+    invalid-utf8 73616665c0af2e747874 c0af
 
 make_fixture "$TEST_ROOT/leaf.zupt" 'innocent.txt'
 printf '%s\n' DO_NOT_OVERWRITE > "$TEST_ROOT/sentinel"
@@ -219,14 +248,33 @@ else
     fail 'backslash separators are normalized within the extraction root'
 fi
 
-make_fixture "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate.zupt" 'safe dir/ação.txt'
+legitimate_entry_hex=73616665206469722f61c3a7c3a36f2df09f98802e747874
+MSYS2_ARG_CONV_EXCL='--entry-hex=' \
+    "$FIXTURE" "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate.zupt" \
+    "--entry-hex=$legitimate_entry_hex"
 mkdir "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate-out"
-if "$ZUPT_BIN" extract -o "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate-out" \
+if file_contains_hex_bytes "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate.zupt" \
+        "$legitimate_entry_hex" &&
+   "$ZUPT_BIN" list "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate.zupt" \
+        > "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate-list.log" 2>&1 &&
+   file_contains_hex_bytes "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate-list.log" \
+        "$legitimate_entry_hex" &&
+   "$ZUPT_BIN" extract -o "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate-out" \
         "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate.zupt" > "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate.log" 2>&1 &&
-   [[ $(<"$TEST_ROOT/legitimate-out/safe dir/ação.txt") == 'fixture content' ]]; then
-    pass 'safe nested UTF-8 path extracts normally'
+   python3 - "$TEST_ROOT/legitimate-out" "$legitimate_entry_hex" <<'PY'
+import pathlib
+import sys
+
+# All process arguments are ASCII.  Decode the exact UTF-8 archive bytes here
+# so the native MinGW fixture's narrow-argv transcoding cannot affect the test.
+relative_path = bytes.fromhex(sys.argv[2]).decode("utf-8")
+extracted = pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).joinpath(*relative_path.split("/"))
+raise SystemExit(0 if extracted.read_bytes() == b"fixture content\n" else 1)
+PY
+then
+    pass 'safe nested BMP and non-BMP UTF-8 path lists and extracts normally'
 else
-    fail 'safe nested UTF-8 path extracts normally'
+    fail 'safe nested BMP and non-BMP UTF-8 path lists and extracts normally'
 fi
 
 mkdir -p "$TEST_ROOT/relative-root/work"

tests/test_sha256_shani.c

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #define HAVE_SHANI_BUILD 1
 #endif
 
+#ifdef HAVE_SHANI_BUILD
 static const uint32_t IV[8] = {
     0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a,
     0x510e527f, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ static void bad(const char *m) { printf("  \xE2\x9C\x97 %s\n", m); fail++; }
 static void hex(const uint8_t *b, int n, char *out) {
     for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) sprintf(out + i*2, "%02x", b[i]);
 }
+#endif
 
 int main(void) {
     zupt_detect_cpu(&zupt_cpu);

tests/test_source_only.sh

@@ -154,16 +154,19 @@ case "$(uname -s)" in
 
         tree=$(fresh_tree raw-c1-path)
         control_name=$'raw-\200.txt'
-        printf '\177ELF\002\001\001\000compiled' >"$tree/$control_name"
-        if "$SCANNER" --tree "$tree" >"$TEST_TMP/output" 2>&1; then
-            printf 'not ok - raw C1 path was not rejected\n'
-            exit 1
-        elif ! grep -Fq 'raw-\x80.txt' "$TEST_TMP/output" ||
-             LC_ALL=C grep -q $'\200' "$TEST_TMP/output"; then
-            printf 'not ok - raw C1 path was not rendered safely\n'
-            exit 1
+        if { printf '\177ELF\002\001\001\000compiled' >"$tree/$control_name"; } 2>/dev/null; then
+            if "$SCANNER" --tree "$tree" >"$TEST_TMP/output" 2>&1; then
+                printf 'not ok - raw C1 path was not rejected\n'
+                exit 1
+            elif ! grep -Fq 'raw-\x80.txt' "$TEST_TMP/output" ||
+                 LC_ALL=C grep -q $'\200' "$TEST_TMP/output"; then
+                printf 'not ok - raw C1 path was not rendered safely\n'
+                exit 1
+            else
+                pass 'scanner escapes invalid raw C1 bytes in reported paths'
+            fi
         else
-            pass 'scanner escapes invalid raw C1 bytes in reported paths'
+            skip 'raw C1 filenames are forbidden by this filesystem'
         fi
 
         tree=$(fresh_tree utf8-c1-path)

tests/test_static_analysis.sh

@@ -187,6 +187,44 @@ else
     F "ECHO bit-clear missing the explicit (tcflag_t) cast"
 fi
 
+# A restore to a device is irreversible.  Classify the already-open descriptor
+# rather than checking target_path and resolving that mutable name again.
+if grep -Fq 'lstat(target_path' src/zupt_disk.c; then
+    F "disk restore has a path-check/open TOCTOU pattern"
+elif grep -Fq 'tgt_fd = open(target_path' src/zupt_disk.c &&
+     grep -Fq 'fstat(tgt_fd, &opened_st)' src/zupt_disk.c; then
+    P "disk restore classifies the opened target descriptor"
+else
+    F "disk restore descriptor-first target guard is missing"
+fi
+
+# CodeQL #5 reported chmod(dst, mode) after reopening/resolving the SDK save
+# path.  Key copies must use the core's handle/descriptor-relative atomic
+# publisher and apply POSIX permissions to its already-open temporary stream.
+if grep -Fq 'chmod(dst, mode)' sdk/src/zuptsdk.c; then
+    F "SDK key save has a path-based chmod TOCTOU pattern"
+elif grep -Fq 'zupt_atomic_output_open(dst, &fo)' sdk/src/zuptsdk.c &&
+     grep -Fq 'fchmod(fileno(fo), mode)' sdk/src/zuptsdk.c &&
+     grep -Fq 'zupt_atomic_output_finish(output, rc == ZUPTSDK_OK)' \
+         sdk/src/zuptsdk.c; then
+    P "SDK key save uses descriptor-relative atomic publication"
+else
+    F "SDK key save atomic publication guard is missing"
+fi
+
+# The SDK regression must not recreate the same check/use pattern while
+# inspecting its sentinels and key modes. Open once, then classify/read via
+# that descriptor; this also keeps CodeQL evidence free of test-only races.
+if grep -Eq '(^|[^[:alnum:]_])(stat|lstat)[[:space:]]*\(' \
+        sdk/tests/test_sdk_roundtrip.c; then
+    F "SDK regression uses path-level stat/lstat before later path operations"
+elif grep -Fq 'fstat(fd, &info)' sdk/tests/test_sdk_roundtrip.c &&
+     grep -Fq 'fstat(fd, info)' sdk/tests/test_sdk_roundtrip.c; then
+    P "SDK regression inspects already-open file descriptors"
+else
+    F "SDK regression descriptor-based inspection guard is missing"
+fi
+
 echo ""
 echo "  ───────────────────────────────────────"
 echo "  Static analysis: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed"